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35Tl'I CoNGREss, } HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. { Ex. Doc.

2d Session.

No. 1 L4.

TOPOGRAPHICAL MEMOIR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
PACIFIC.

FROM

THE SECRETARY OF WAR,
TRANSM11TING

The topographical memoir and report qf Captain T. J. Gram, relative to
the Territories qf Oregon and Washington, in the military department
of the Pacific.

MARCH

3, 1859 .-Lo.id on the table, and ordered to be printed.

WAR DEPARTMENT, March 3, 1859.
SIR: I transmit herewith the report of Captain T. J. Cram, Topographical Engineers, on the military department of the Pacific, called
for by a resolution of the House of Representatives.
The topographical information contained in this report is, to a great
extent, published in the reports and maps of the War Department, or
is in course of preparation.
A large portion of the report is devoted to subjects irrelevant tu its
objects, as indicated by the title and the duties of Captain Cram, and
contains animadversions upon public functionaries, which are out of
place in a topographical communication, and which are, in no )sense,
sanctioned or endorsed by this department.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN B. FLOYD;
Secretary~

Hon. JAMES L. ORR,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

of

War ..

~
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WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF ExPLORATIONs AND SuRVEYS,

Washington, February 24, 1859.
SIR: I transmit herewith the military topographical memoir and re-

port, with maps: on the military department of the Pacific, by Captain
T. J. Cram, Topographical Engineers, called for by a resolution of the
House of Representatives of January 8.
This is the report to which I called the special attention of the War
Department in a report dated March 1, 1858.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. A. HUMPHREYS,
Captain of Topographical Engineers, in cha1·ge .

.lJ.frilitary topographical memoir and 1·eport, with maps, -r.- on the United
States military department if the Pacific, by Thomas Jefferson Cram,
captain Corps if Topograph·ical EngineeTs, chiif topographical engineer,
·department if the Pacific, 1855, '56, '57.
PREFACE.

This memoir has been drawn up by virtue of orders receiYed by
me ·while serving in the department of the Pacific, under the command
,of Major General J. E. Wool, United States army, of which the fol1lowing is a copy:
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,

Benicia, California, J1me 20, 1855.
'SIR: The commanding general directs that you prepare a topo~graphical memoir, or view of the department of the Pacific, and that, .
·for this purpose, you consult such papers as may be on file at these
'headquarters. You will also call upon any officers serving within
the department for such information as they may be able to give you
iin the execution of these instructions.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. D. TOWNSEND,

Assistant AdJutant General.
(Captain T. J. CRAM,
Topographical Enginee?·s, Benicia, California.
Accordingly, the information herein embodied has been derived1. From reports, sketches, journals of marches by officers of the
1ine, containing much that is valuable, and from reports of recon1naiseances and maps by topographical engineer officers, as I found
them at headquarters, without, however, having been, as it seemed
c The maps, not having been. ordered by the Committee on Engraving, have not been
;printed.
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to me., previously digested, arranged, and embodied in a useful shape
for pr::~ctical military purposes, before being forwarded to the War
Department.
2. From conversations during personal interviews with many officers
of the line and of the staff (too many to be here enumerated) who had
been serving in various districts of the department, and who seemed
to me to have intelligently calculated the resources of the country and
various points of the different branches of the military service.
3. From my own personal observations upon the country, and upon
the practical operations of the several branches of the service, · during
a tour of duty (of from two to three years) in various directions and
at various places, and in various surveys and reconnaissances in the
department in the years 1855, '56, '57, while in the performance of
duties as senior topographical engineer officer, attached to the general
staff of the commanding general of the department of the Pacific.
In drawing up the memoir and report I have not confined myself
simply to the task of reporting topographical information, but have
shaped aU in a manner, while rendering much of that kind of information in the text and maps, so as also to meet the requisition contained
in paragraph 481, Army Regulations; hence the double title of "Memoir and Report,'' seen on title page.
Therefore: it will be observed that this will contain what may be
regar~ed as a report of the military and other operations connected
with, or having relation to, the military service, as they came under
my own observation; and it will likewise embrace my own views, as
well as the views of other officers when relevant, in regard to various
points, upon which it will be seen by those having the patience to
follow me that I have freely, but I trust respectfully, commented in
the ensuing chapters.
Not only shall I deem it within the scope of my province to report
what I regard as existing evils in the working of the military operations of the regular army, and of the self-constituted volunteer armies
that have been in the field in the department, and of the Indian service in its relations with the army, but I shall feel at perfect liberty
to report suggestions which, from a source however destitute of pretension~ might, if carried into effect~ remove those evils, to the great
benefit of the army service in the department of the Pacific.

I.- General description

if

the military department

of

the Pacific.

This department ineludes within its limits the State of California,
the Territories of Oregon, Washington, and Utah, containing 718,361
square miles in surface; to use the language of one of its distinguished
commanders~ ':altogether, in size, an empire of itself."
Map No. 1 represents its general features, as far as necessary for
general description. The military posts, as now located, are named
in red letters, and are 21 in number, viz: nine in Califor.ni~, .fo.ur in
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Oregon, eight in Washington, and none in Utah; others may have to
be established to meet exigencies. The physical features of this great
area, while eminently favorable to secure the Indians and the depre·
dating whites .from pursuit, are, in themselves, formidable obstacles
to the transit of troops, with the necessary supplies for anything like
an extended march into the interior of the country.
These physical obstacles consist in numerous ranges of lofty mount·
ains, of great extent, with which the whole department is checkered;
a comparative deficiency in the number and extent of navigable rivers;
the want of sui table natural roads, and the extreme difficulty of making
roads, owing to the formidable obstacles presented by the mountains
all over the department, and, besides, the denseness of the forests in
Oregon and Washington. The only physical feature at all favorable
to military movements is the great extent of seacoast navigation, from
the post of San Diego to that at Bellingham Bay, an extent of about
1,400 miles, which may be regarded as the sea front of the depart·
ment.
Fortunately, this extensive front is furnished by nature with good
harbors, viz: the Bay of San Diego at the south and the waters of
Washington at the north; also one of the best in the world, at an in·
termediate point, in the Bay of San Francisco.-(See maps Nos. 7, 16,
2.) This bay, and the other smaller tide-water bays with which it is con·
nected by navigable straits and channels, are surrounded by a shore
extent of 200 miles; and they are navigable by sail and steam vessels
in any direction, and their waters communicate with the ocean by a
deep navigable strait, the '' Golden Gate,'' inside of which stands
the city of San Francisco.-(See map No. 2.)
With these beautiful bays two navigable rivers (the Sacramento
and San Joaquin) communicate: the former, from the north, affording
steamboat navigation at all stages to Sacramento, 129 miles above San
Francisco, and at high stages 150 miles further up; the latter river,
coming from the southeast, affording similar navigation to Stockton,
115 miles above San Francisco.
The Columbia is the only other river navigable for any extent
piercing the ocean front of the department of the Pacific.-(See map
16.) But the circumstances of the bar at its mouth (see map No. 3)
will forever preclude it from being a harbor. Nevertheless, this river,
navigable, without interruption: up to the Cascades, 183 miles above
its mouth, and in several reaches above that, and its tributary, the
Willamette, (see map No. 14,) which al~o has navigable reaches sepa·
rated by falls, are both important in reference to military lines of
communication with the interior of the department.
The Straits of Fuca, and Washington waters generally, (see map
No. 16,) forming an extent of navigation, by sail or steam, for some
hundreds of miles, having connexion with the ocean front of the
department, and having several excellent harbors, also possess highly
important advantages for military movements interior to this front.
Again: the Colorado river of California, though not piercing this
ocean front within our own possessions in the department, is nevertheless of military importance, (see map No. 7,) and it is used by us
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for military purposes, as far as it is known to be navigable by steamers,
up to Fort Yuma, 125 miles above its mouth; and should the explorations now in progress prove it navigable higher up, it ·will become of
still greater military importance to the department of the Pacific.
The foregoing named natural channels of interior communication
are of too much importance to be overlooked by any officer connected
with the military service in the department, and they should be carefully studied at theW ar Department, in every bureau, in reference to
their adaptation and · connexion with the seacoast front for military
purposes, more especially as all other physical features of the whole
interior, generally, are so adverse that these natural channels must
forever exercise a controlling influence in almost all important operations to be carried on, whether in establishing posts, furnishing them
with troops and supplies, or executing movements from the posts into
the Indian countries. For this study, and for sufficiently minute detail
in reference to these watercourses, maps and topography will be given
in this memoir, all in their proper places, so as to cover the whole
department.
From the general topography now given, and a study of map No. 1
alone, it seems to me it cannot fail to be perceived that, for the
general military business of the department, whether in ordinary or
extraordinary circumstances, the city of San Francisco necessarily
becomes the principal and permanent centre of that business. Hence
the great importance to the War Department of retaining the military
reserve called Presidio, near that city, and of there erecting suitable
buildings for a depot of troopt5 and supplies, and constructing a public
dock; hence the propriety of establishing, and the advantage of
retaining, the headquarters of the department at San Francisco or
the Presidio-an advantage too clearly to be seen from the general
. topography of the department, and the pre-eminent commercial character of the city, to need evidences of minor or collateral circumstances, -of which, however, many could be adduced to sustain it.
The operations of an army must, and the centre of those operations
like·wise ever be subject, in a great measure, to the physical features
of the country in which the forces are operating.
The business of carrying on military operations in a department
requires labor, materials, and supplies, other than what can be furnished by the soldier or the officer. In the department of the Pacific
labor will always be high, and materials likewise; these, in addition
to the generally adverse physical features of the country, will necessarily cause all military operations to be very expensive-in a ratio
of from 2~ or 3 to 1 to what they would be under the same commander and the same set of staff officers in the department of the
west; and it is well for the War Department, Congress, and the people, to be apprised of the reasons why it will be so.
Circumstances are so adverse to transit and locomotion generally
in this department that the duties of all, whether of the line or staff,
·when called into the field or to move from one part of the country to
another, become exceedingly difficult and often onerous; and none
more so, for example~ than those devolving on the pay officers, whose
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duties are not only arduous, but involve great pecuniary responsibility.
The posts are remote, and the means of transportation uncertain. The
routes to be tr~velled are, in some parts of the country, impassable
during the winter or rainy season, the mountain passes entirely
obstructed by snow, and the rivers unfordable. During the summer
months the heat on the plains or deserts to be crossed in several of
the routes is almost insupportable, and ·w ater extremely scarce.
The distance to be travelled by the paymaster stationed at headquarters, in paying the district under his charge, is 1, 896 miles, a
large portion of which being through a country infested by robbers
and Indians. The southern pay district includes the posts at San
Diego, Fort Tejon, and Fort Yuma, and the paymaster travels 900
miles, twice crossing a desert of 90 miles in making his periodical
round. In Oregon and Washington the labor of the pay officer, with
all the risks of a new and unsettled country, is by no means to be
coveted. The posts within this district are widely scattered, the
means of travelling even more precarious, and the seasons less favorable than in California. With all these impediments to this branch of
the military service, it ought to be a subject of congratulation that
thus far the treasury has sustained no loss, and the troops have been
paid with much regularity in this department.
The same adverse circumstances operate forcibly to prevent the
officers of the quartermaster's department from conducting their
part of the military service so as to elicit from one unacquainted
with these obstacles anything but encomium in respect to economy,
while to one cognizant of the physical features of the country it
would seem a matter of surprise how this class of officers generally
manage, under such difficulties, with as much economy as they do.
To supply the troops with the necessary subsistence at the proper
time in the various seasons, and of the proper quality, it must be confessed, requires no ordinary capacity in the chief of the commissariat in the department of the Pacific, especially when one considers
the difficulties of communication, the vici~situdes of climate, and the
comparatively few districts in which supplies are produced.
In the following chapters much will be found of practical utility
for the foregoing classes of officers, in so far as the exercise of their
official duties may be dependent on or influenced by the topographical
feature3 of the department.

!I.-Military considerations in r~ference to the oceanfront
ment of the Pacific.
·

of the depart-

This front, extending, as already stated, 1, 400 miles, from San
Diego to Belli~gha~ Bay, ha~ ~ow established on it the following
named fo~ts: San Dieg?, PresidiO, Humboldt, Umpqua, Port Townsend, Steilacoom, Belhngham Bay, all of which are occupied by
troops.
These posts are generally accessible in all seasons from San Fran. cisco by sail and steam vessels. At each, excepting Humboldt and
Umpqua, a steamer is seldom prevented by stress of weather from
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entering port; fogs sometimes cause delay. With the exceptions
mentioned, all may be said to possess good harbors; that of Humboldt
requires lighterage, except for vessels of small draught, and that of
Umpqua is difficult to enter except under the most favorable circumstances.
There are two other points on the sea front to which, although not
military posts, some military importance attaches under the circumstances existing in the department--San Pedro, to the south, and
Crescent City, to the north of San Francisco-as ports at which
troops and supplies are landed for interior posts.
The United States mail steamers run semi-monthly from San Francisco to or by all the points above named excepting Port Townsend,
Steilacoom, and Bellingham Bay, regulating their times of departure
and return by those of the United States mail steamers from San
Francisco for New York. In regard to the posts at Port Townsend,
Steilacoom, and Bellingham Bay, a mail steamer communicates from
one to the other monthly, the central point of departure of which is
at Olympia, the capital of Washington Territory. With this town
there is mail communication semi-monthly, (from San Francisco,) via
the Columbia river, to Rainier; thence, via Cowlitz river and overland, to the said centre of departure.
At all times movements of troops and of supplies by sea in the department are attended with great expense, and at any other time than
that corresponding to the starting of the mail steamers with still
greater expense, as a steam vessel has to be expressly chartered.
Still it is only by such a vessel that a given point can be reached in
a specified time to meet exigencies; and, as a general rule, experience has shown in the past three years that trusting to sail vessels
for this branch of th~ military business has been attended ·with more
expense, including damages by long voyage, than by employing
steamers whenever occasion has required a movement of troops and
the transportation of a huge quantity of stores from San Francisco
to any of the points named.
When the time of delivery is unimportant, and the quantity of supplies and number of troops quite small, then a sail vessel may possibly
be used with some sa.ving; but in no other case should any but a steam
vessel be used if true economy be sought.
Distances and times by sea steamers.
From--

To--

San Francisco •• _. __ • _•• __ •• Post San Diego •••• _•• _••• _•
San Pedro _________________
Fort Humboldt-----------City ______________
Crescent
Fort Umpqua ______________
Mouth of Columbia.-------Ca. pe Flattery. _•••• _______ .
Fort Port Townsend. ____ ••.
Fort Steilacoom._ .• __ ._ •••.
Fort Bellingham Bay ___ • ___

St. miles.

Days.

450
320
258
320

2. 1

464

2.1
3.6
3.7
4.2
4.7

783
793
900
1,008
923

1.5
1.2
1.5

4.3
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In the foregoing table the times of steaming from San Francisco to
the several points are computed at a sea-steamer speed of 9 statute
or 7. 87 nautical miles per hour: and the table gives a fair average of
the times observed in the trips of the transport steamers now engaged
in that coast navigation.
From San Francisco, via Los Angeles, it is 434 miles to San Pedro,
and 537 to San Diego, following the road, which is excellent all the
way, and over which a large body of troops, with its wagon train,
could make good marching time. On this part of tho coast, which is
south of San Francisco, there are several points at which from an
enemy's fleet the landing of an invading foe, if undisputed, could be
readily effected; but should it attempt a march upon San Francisco
there would be found many points on the road where the topography
teaches us that a resolute body of well-disciplined defenders, of comparatively small numbers, well doing their duty, as was the case at
Buena Vista, could annihilate an advancing column, or effectually
check the demonstration of a much larger force, and compel it to
seek its safety in retreat to its ships, or to make a detour into the
valleys of the Sierra Madre, the Coast range, (see map No. 4 ;) and
here, if one or two passes be properly defended, an invasion could
never be effectual upon San Francisco, nor could it r each into the
heart of the State of California. A description of these passes will
be given in another chapter. To carry San Francisco, the enemy
would thus be compelled to attack it with its fleet.
The time is very remote, if it should ever come, when the southern
part of the State of California will be in a condition to invite an
enemy to attempt to hold possession of that part of it; but if he
should gain a temporary position there he would be dislodged by a
field force; accordingly, there is no reason why our government should
ever expend a dollar in erecting seacoast fortifications between San
Francisco and San Diego. Should this last point, however, become
a commercial place, or the terminus of a railroad to the Pacific, a
permanent fort here might be requisite. But the time for this must
be placed in the remote distance of events to come.
With regard to the coast of the department north of San Francisco,
there is no roue at all running along it upon which troops could operate except in small bodies, and then transportation must be made by
pack-trains. This condition holds all the way to the Columbia river,
thence to Cape Flattery, a] so between the posts in Washington Territory; nor will there ever be, in our day, a continuous coast road
upon which a command could march, with a suitable wagon train, for
the whole or even a tenth part of the distance. Passable military
roads, however, may be opened from a few points on this part of the
coast to extend back into the interior. No march of a body of troops
landed from an enemy's fleet would ever be attempted in a direction
parallel to this coast, nor will there ever be anything in the interior
of this most forbidding stretch of country to induce the movement of
such a force into the interior should a reasonable show of defence be
exhibited by a field force. And it may be affirmed, with good reason,
that there is no point on the coast of the department north of San

DEP.A.RTMENT OF THE PACU"'IC.

9

Francisco, or even on the banks of the waters of Washington Territory, where the construction of permanent forts, for at least three
generations to come, would be anything but an extravagant waste
of the public treasure.
In making this declaration I am well aware of encountering an opposite opinion of an ex-Secretary of War, who has reported to Congress,
through the President, that ''the physical geography of the vast region drained by the Columbia river indicates that at some day a great
city must arise at the point which shall become its commercial entrepot. Attention haf3 been heretofore called to the necessity of fortifying
the entrance of the Columbia river, and I would again commend it to
atten tiou and favorable consideration:"
It is not on account of the future greatness here predicted for the
''vast regions drained by the Columbia" that I have quoted this somewhat extraordinary paragraph, but it is in reference to the military
point therein contained that I have called it up for notice. If its
author had studied the chart by the United States Coast Survey, (see
map No. 3,) which was published before the recommendation was
made, I doubt if he would ever have come to any such opinion as that
of a ''necessity," or even of there being a possibility of defending
the mouth of the Columbia with any known practical system of fixed
batteries. Nature has already fortified this entrance in a manner to
preclude the necessity of man's adding to the defence, except by floating batteries.
.
The minimum breadth of the mouth of the Columbia is 6~ miles,
from Point Adams to Cape Hancock. Within this the channels vary in
position, in depth, and in crookedness. The mouth is always blocked
by a mass of oscillating sand, called the ''Bar.'' In the channels, at
high tide, a vessel drawing 18 feet can seldom pass the bar. These
channels are tortuous, and from ten to fifteen miles in length, and no
vessel attempts to enter or emerge in stormy or rough weather; they
are emphatically fair weather channels only, and Yery dangerous at
that. Owing to the oscillations of the sand eastward and westward,
northward and southward, the channels are continually shifting their
positions, shapes, and depths, necessitating the constant presence of
a corps of pilots to observe them.
The vertical depth of the blockading sand is over 420 feet before
any bottom could be met upon which to build a fortification, and at
that depth even we are not certain of finding a stratum fit for foundations. It is true there is a middle ground, ''Sand island,'' but this,
as its name imports, is but a sand deposit, liable to wash away at any
freshet; and I think it would be impossible to render it permanent.
From this sand bank to Point Adams it is 2!, and 3~ miles to Cape
Hancock. No works could be built on the sand shoals in the river to
stand one season, and the channels are beyond the range of guns on
the shores, if we except, perhaps, the north one, in its present position; but of what use would a fort be on that shore when there are
two other ship channels each far beyond the reach of any battery on
shore?
To one who has seen the Straits of Mackinaw and studied the ques-
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tion of fortifying them, and not seen the mouth of the Columbia, I
would observe that the idea of fortifying the latter is more utopian
than that of permanent fortifications at the former.
It must be by your fleet being outside of the bar in the open sea
to give the enemy battle, or else in the river, some three to ten miles
up fcom the bar, there to wait, allowing the enemy's ships· to enter
and then giving battle, that the command of the Columbia is to be
retained; and this last method could be ventured upon with a small
defending fleet by being in positions to attack the enemy's ships in
detail, as they would never be able to enter either channel with more
than one smail vessel at a time.
It must also be by means of naval defence that the command of the
waters in Washington Territory is to be retained, and not by any theoretical system of permanent works of fortification. Steam floating
batteries are the weapons for these waters.
With regard to the military and commercial centre (see map No. 2)
of the coast of the department of the Pacific it is different. Here the
''Golden Gate'' is eminently susceptible of defence by permanent
forts; and whatever difference of opinion may exist in reference to
the expediency of fortifying other points, none can exist in reference
to the wisdom of fortifying 'vi th land batteries the entrance through
the '' Golden Gate'' to San Francisco, to the fullest extent of perperfection, as speedily as the condition of time requisite for the
solidification of the masonry will permit, notwithstanding the enormous cost to the treasury.
The Golden Gate well fortified, with a full armament faithfully
served, also a few passes in the Coast range well defended by field
forces, no invading force could seize upon the commercial centre of
that coast, or successfully penetrate the heart of the department of
the Pacific.

III.-Mib:tary considerations in r~ference to the valleys qf the Sacramento
and San Joaquin rivers.
In the chapter immediately preceding, the seacoast, and certain
views in reference to its defence against a foreign enemy, have been
presented, without special consideration of the districts interior to the
ocean front. In this chapter (III) I present an interior view of so
much as relates to the above named valleys, in so far as the topography
of their features is necessary to enable the War Department, its bureaus, and the officer serving in the department of the Pacific, to
realize the physical character of the country, so far as that character
will exert more or less influence upon the military operations that may
be carried on in it. This chapter will also contain, in connexion with
the description of the valleys, some views in reference to a certain
line of policy that has obtained, and the practical effect it has
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had upon the military service in the department for the past three
years.
The lower portion of the valley of the Sacramento may be regarded
as being occupied by a succession of beautiful bays, which are represented on map No. 2. Beginning with the uppermost, we have the
Suisun bay, fifteen miles long by seven wide; this is connected by the
Oarquinez strait, of four miles in length, with San Pablo bay, fifteen
miles long by eight wide; then comes a short channel connecting the
last named bay with San Francisco bay, which is forty miles in length
by eight miles in average width.
These bays are bordered by magnificent slopes of most excellent
soil, and their shores have a multitude of excellent landings for the
steam and sail vessels navigating ther;;e watm~s. Into and fi·om these
waters ships of large class enter and depart through the Golden Gate.
To the importance of San Francisco in a military aspect I have
already alluded; its importance as the emporium of the east shore of
the north Pacific is too well known to need comment. Its pre-eminent advantages as a military and commercial point are well attested
in the facts that our government is fortifying the gate with works to
defend it under any circumstances; that it has commenced a navy
yard on Mark island, (see map No. 2,) in contemplation to be completed on a formidable scale, already furnished with ample floating
dry docks which are of very great use to the naval and commercial
marine in the Pacific; and that it has also established on the Oarqui.
nez strait, (see map No. 2,) just above Benicia, an arsenal, magazines,
and a depot for army supplies.
In reference to the defensible works in contemplation to be completed for the gate I have spoken in chapter II.
I1l. regard to the navy yard, there are certain cogent reasons that
may be urged against its being allowed to grow into an establishment
possessing the capacity for anything more than the conveniences
requisite for repairing all kinds of war and merchant vessels. To
bring it to this condition an appropriation of money would be true
economy, but to foster its growth to a capacity for ship building upon
a large scale would be wasting the public treasure. The forests that
are accessible in the department do not afford timber or lumber of
quality requisite for the construction of ships, excepting some of an
indifferent quality for spars and yards procurable in Washingt:on
'rerritory. The absence of other raw and manufactured materials
necessary for ships, and the high price of labor, and last, though not
least, the want of an export trade, must, for a long time to come,
operate to prevent ship building to any extent on our Pacific coast.
The question was entertained, if not originated, by the late Secretary of War, (and possibly the idea may yet be entertained in the
ordnance department,) of enlarging the present arsenal near Benecia
into an ''arsenal of construction of the largest class.'' Progress has
been so far made in the project as the ordering of a board of officers
to report upon a suitable site, to be on the present reserve, and their
report has been rendered for the enlargement contemplated.
But the wisdom of appropriating money for executing this design
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may reasonably be doubted, for the total destitution of that coast of
all the chief materials essential for ordnance purposes would necessitate their transportation around the Horn; this, together with the high
price of mechanics' labor, at once shows that it will be easier, cheaper,
and better, to construct all munitions of war to be used on the Pacific
coast in eastern arsenals, and transport them ready made, than first
to transport the raw materials of so gross a nature and afterwards
fabricate them at an ''arsenal of construction in the department of
the Pacific;" besides, the project would Le attended with a dead loss
of dollars in the excess of original outlay for the necessary buildings,
tools, and machinery, over the cost of a similar establishment at any
favorable location east of the Mississippi.
But of the policy of erecting on the present ordnance site (which
is on the reserve) ample magazines for; ammunition, storehouses for an
abundance of ordnance and small arms, a convenient laboratory and
shops for repairs, and a suitable dock, and a road from it to the buildings, there can be no doubt.
The works should partake of the character of an ordnance depot
and an arsenal for repairs, rather than of an ''arsenal of construction
of the largest class.'' This last is but the name which would afford
the excuse for annually demanding heavy appropriations under which
would grow up a national armory or national foundry in a portion of
our country in which there is a remarkable destitution of all the
essential elements entering into the things required to Le made in
such an establishment. Suitable wood, iron, and coal for such purposes are as yet undiscovered in the department of the Pacific.
The public reserve near Benicia is well adapted for such an establishment as herein recommended for ordnance purposes and magazines
for ammunition.
But in reference to the adaptation of this reserve for a depot of
commissary and quartermaster's supplies and stores, it is exceedingly
inappropriate.
All such supplies as are purchased, under army regulations, in San
Francisco, have to be shipped from this place to Benicia, a distance
of 30 miles, unloaded upon a dock, carted up a steep hill, unloaded
into the storehouses, inspected, and then, what is not rejected, has to
be carted back to the dock, reshipped upon another vessel, retransport.ed to San Francisco, where it was when purchased, and there
again transhipped for its distribution to the various posts. Now, as
might be expected, such complexity enhances the cost of the supplies
by at least from 5 to 10 per cent. more than if inspected where they
are purchased, and shipped, as they are wanted, directly to the various
posts; and when it is observed that 18 out of the whole number of 21
posts participating in purchases at San Francisco have been supplied
in that complicated manner, it will be an easy problem for the commissary department to compute the annual amount thus unnecessarily
burdened upon the army appropriation by a pertinacious perseverance
in a system that, for the past two to three years to my knowledge,
has been the subject of severe comment and condemnation in the
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mouths of hundreds of highly respectable business men In that
department.
Witness the facts shown in evidence before a court-martial for the
trial of an officer of the commissariat, that during a period of some
months, in which the troops were engaged in suppressing Indian
troubles, the extra cost to the treasury v;ras many thousand dollars,
consequent upon the location ofthe commissary depot; and provision
merchants of the highest standing testified in evidence before the
court that their bids for supplies ranged from 5 to 10 per centum
above what they would have been could the inspection have been
made in San Francisco in lieu of Benicia.
Pending the investigation of the forenamed board upon the arsenal
site, it was carefully estimated by one of the members that all the
buildings on the reserve, used as storehouses and for other purposes
by the quartermaster's and commissary's departments, could be rebuilt out of new materials for less than $20, 000; I am satisfied this is
a liberal estimate of the whole value, at the present time, of all the
depot buildings there. The argument, therefore, that because these
shells of buildings cost the government so much as they did to erect
them they should be retained as a depot falls to the ground; better
that they should burn than to entail such an annual tax, as their
present use necessitates, upon the army appropriations.
True economy, in this respect, would be to utterly ab r,lish what is
now maintained at such great cost on the reserve under the title of
'' quartermatlter' s and commissary's depot,'' and the appendages of
mule teams, vessels, horses, mechanics, and other employes would be
dispensed with. The excuse of necessity can no longer be reasonably
pleaded for keeping up this cumbersome establishment, which has
come to be viewed by business men as anything but an economical
appendQ.ge to the military service in the department.
The best economy for the present vwuld be to hire, in San Francisco, the requisite storeroom, for which there are. convenient to docks,
scores of most excellent buildings now vacant, and, as it were, begging
for tenants; but in due time to erect all such buildings at the Presidio
as may be needed for this important branch of the service in the
department.
Having considered the bays of the valley of the Sacramento in
reference to their adaptation for military and naval purposes for all
future time, I pass to the consideration of the greater part of the
valley to the north of Suisun bay, (see map No 1.) The Sacramento
river is wholly within the department of the Pacific, and it has been
thoroughly explored; its general course is so~th,_ an~ it ~ebouches
into Suisun bay, (see map No ~-) Although this nver IS nmther very
laro-e nor very long, it is of great importance, and in most respects
holds the first rank among the few navigable streams on the east
border of the north Pacific. It is at all times successfully navigated
by steam to the city of Sacramento, _75 n:iles above its mouth, an_d
150 miles further up (to Red Bluffs) In h1gh stages of water. This
beautiful river is to California 'ivhat the Hudson is to New York.
Tributary to it is the Feather rivert which enters the Sacramento
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24 miles above Sacramento city, and is navigable 20 miles up to
:Marysville, a town of importance near the mouth of the Yuba, which
is a tributary to Feather river.
1,he sources of the Sacramento and headwaters of its tributaries
from the east and north are high up in the ·west slope of the Sierra
Nevada mountain range; and here it is for a great extent along the
foot of this slope, in thousands of places. Gold abounds to an extent
which has astonished and delighted the whole civilized world for the
past ten years. This, however, is not the only region in the department of the Pacific where it exists. It may be truthfully said it
abounds in many places all over the department. On the Sierra slope
the digging and washing of so much dirt to obtain it may affect the
Sacramento, by the vast quantities of earth washed from multitudes of
diggings into it, so as in time to seriously impair, if not to destroy,
its navigation. The present indications are, that this earthy matter
is being deposited in the bays.
The extensive valley of the Sacramento, and the lesser valleys of
its tributaries, afford many fertile regions of soil of excellent quality
for all agricultural purposeR; this and the gold deposits are causing
thriving towns, villages, and even cities to arise as if by magic. The
climate has various phases as we go further from the coast into the
interior, and as we ascend to different elevations on the mountain's
side; and although fever and chills are known on the streams, it is
generally pronounced a good climate.
1,he San Joaquin river, likewise, debouches into Suisun bay near
where the Sacramento enters, and drains an extensive tract called
Tulare valley, in which there is a vast deal of most excellent soil,
though there is much of a low and mashy nature. The general course
of the stream is northwestward, coming from the southeastern extremity of the Sierra Nevada. The river is navigable for steamers
up to Stockton, 78, 62, or 4t; miles (according to which channel is
taken) above its mouth; up to Stockton, in seasons of high and medium
water, there are three rivers, as it were, each of which is navigable
by steam.
Fort Miller (map No. 1) is located on the unnavigable part of the
river, 125 miles above Stockton. Tulare lake is regarded as the head
of the river, though many small streams come dmvn from the Sierra
Nevada slope and join themselves as tributaries to it.
Of all the valleys of the Sierra Nevada slope, probably the Tulare
valley is best adapted to the culture of the grape, and for this purpose not excelled by any known grape-grqwing region in the world.
At a considerable distance southeast of Tulare lake stands Fort
Tejon, (map No. 1.) This fort commands the head of this valley,
where there is an extensive Indian reservation. It occupies one of
those important passes (spoken of in chapter II,) which, if well defended, would prevent the ingress of an invading force, landed on
the southern coast of the department, into the heart of the State of
California. It is in this respect that Fort Tejon, although now important in reference to Indians, may be of greater importance in
future, and accordingly it should be kept up as a permanent post.
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It will be seen that the Tulare and the Sacramento valleys, united,
form a very extensive tract of country stretching far along the west
slope of the SierraN evada range; constituting by its extent, its fertility, its settlements, the commerce on its rivers, its climate, its rich
a?d inexhaustible gold mines, the great heart of our Pacific possesSIOns.

The passes through the mountains at the southeastern extremity of
this tract become the strategical points, which, with the Golden Gate,
if well guarded, will insure permanent possession of this most valuable tract against any invading army that could be landed on our
Pacific front.
Forts Miller and Reading derive their only importance from being
in convenient positions, as temporary posts in the district, to keep
order among the Indians and whites; and for a similar purpose a new
dragoon post may be necessary in the Pit River valley, seen on map
No. 1 coming down from the northeast of Fort Reading.
Between Fort Tejon and Fort ~filler it is a good country for dragoons to operate in. It is a march of nine days for one company
with its wagon train, and the distance is about 200 miles from fort to
fort. From Fort Miller to Benicia barracks it is 187' miles, and a
march of ten days for such a command. There is no difficulty from
heaviness of roads on account of rains, between the middle of May
and the first of December, for a body of dragoons to march from Fort
Miller or Fort Reading to the new post recommended to be established in Pit River valley, keeping ·well in towards the foot hills of
the Sierra Nevada. It is in this district of the department, after
having the new post established, that the dragoons could be profitably
employed by occasionally showing themselves to the Indians in that
quarter.

IV.-Military considerations in nference to the southeast part of the
department of the Pacific.
This chapter will contain the military topography of the department,
east of the head of the Tulare valley and the Sierra Nevada range,
to the Colorado river, and from the seacoast as far north as to include
the sink of the Mohave river and the southern rim of the Great Basin.
Map No. 4 gives the country to the north, northeast, and northwest of the port of San P.edro, including the strategical pass as through
the coast range of mountains, called the Sierra Madre, in the southern
portion of the State of California.
Tejon is the name borne by the south part or extremity of the
Tulare valley, referred to in the preceding chapter, and lies immediately
at the base of the mountains where the Sierra Nevada and Sierra
Madre come together. The Tejon is an excellent area of soil including
the United States military reserve, selected for an Indian reservation
in 1853. The place marked Depot Camp is a beautiful grove
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of oaks near a creek, and surrounded by an abundance of grass. It
is in latitude 35° 2' 4 7" north, and longitude 118° 43' 31" west of
Greenwich, and elevated 1, 500 feet above the sea.
Passes in the Sierra Nevada.-1. Canada de las Uvas, (valley if the
grape. )-From the southern corner of the Tejon there is a gap in the
mountains, running southeasterly, that is named Canada de las U vas
Pass, through which there is a tolerable wagon road (for a mountain
gorge) that may be taken in going to Los Angeles. This pass is said
by Lieutenant Williamson, Corps Topographical Engineers, who surveyed it, :'to run around the south end of the SierraN evada," and he
treats it as dividing the Coast range, in the southern part of the State
of California, from the Sierra Nevada range.
From its northern entrance we ascend a brook running into the
Tejon and fed by springs situated about halfway up to the summit
of the pass. In the vicinity of these springs is Fort Tejon. This
post was established, by order of Major General Wool, commanding
the department, in 1854, after approving the selection for the Indian
reservation, whose shape and position are more clearly exhibited on
map No. 6. The fort is some·w hat to the south of the reserve, though
within convenient distance of it, and it is undoubtedly the best position
that could have been selected for the purposes intended by it. From
the importance of this pass, in a military point of view, in regard to
the Indians in the surrounding country, it is reasonable to infer that
Fort Tejon will be kept up, notwithstanding the effects of an earthquake severely felt there last January, so severe as to injure the
public buildings, and to drive the troops into the field for more safety
than they could realize within doors. The shocks continued more or
less violent for two to three days.
There is a wagon road from Fort Tejon to Fort Miller, the length
of which is about 200 miles. From Fort Tejon, by the wagon road
through the pass, via Lake Elizabeth, San Francisquito (Turner's)
Pass, and San Fernando Misson, to Los Angeles, it is not far from 100
miles. A command of troops with its ·wagon train performed this
march in 4 to 5 days in the summer of 1855.
2. Tejon Pass.-This runs from the northeastern angle of the said
reserve through the Sierra Nevada; and there is a bad wagon road
through it leading to the plain on the east side of the mountain range.
From the reserve to the plain it is 18 miles; thence to Lake Elizabeth
it is 24 miles, making the distance b8tween the reserve and the lake
42 miles by this route.
3. Ta-hic-ha-pa Pass is about 6 miles north of the Tejon Pass, (see
map No. 5,) and also leads through the Sierra Nevada range into the
said plain; there is a wagon road through it; its summit is 4,020 feet
above the sea, and lower than the summit of the Tejon Pass by 1, 265
feet. The creek seen on the map bearing the same name, but sometimes called Walker's creek, is a tributary to Kern river.
At the head of the creek there is a beautiful prairie, 10 miles long
by 4 wide, surrounded by high mountains. The waters from the east
end of the prairie run into the Great Basin, so that the prairie is here
the water shed of the Sierra Nevada. 'rhere were Indian rancherias
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in the prairie in 1853, when Lieutenant Williamson surveyed this pass,
which he regards the least difficult of any in the Sierra Nevada
through which to construct a railroad.
There certainly can be no very serious difficulty in constructing a
good wagon road through it. In descending· from the prairie, following
the creek, (called Pass creek by Fremont,) the fall for 15! miles
averages 157 feet per mile; the steepest grade is for 1! mile, at the
rate of 192 feet per mile. Timber is abundant along the valley of
this stream. On the east of the summit prairie, as we descend into
the basin, for the first 6 miles the fall is less than 80 feet per mile,
and further down the slope is more gradual. By passing from the
prairie more directly by a southeasterly direction into the basin (ae
did Fremont) it is possible we might have a better route for a wagon
road from the prairie towards the Mohave river.
4. Walker's Pass is, according to Lieutenant Williamson's recon·
naissance, 43 miles in a direction N. 30° E. from the prairie headwaters of the Ta-hic-ha-pa. This places it 6 miles south of the 6th
standard parallel south of Mt. Diablo, (map No. 5).
From Kern river, ascending the Chay-o-poo-ya-pah, it is 17 miles
to the western extremity of the pass; thence to the summit it is 8
miles, where we are at an elevation of 5, 300 feet above the sea; from
the summit to the eastern e~tremity of the pass it is 8! miles.
Kern river is a bold, rapid stream, with steep banks and a narrow
valley; it canons 50 miles above Kern Lake. This lake is the head
proper of the Tulare valley waters, and is only 400 feet above the
level of the sea, and lower by 1, 600 feet than the western extremity
of Walker's Pass.
Gold mining on Kern river is successfully prosecuted; the quartz,
in which it is found there, is of a friable nature, rendering it easy of
pulverization; it contains some silver, which diminishes. the value per '
ounce, but the ease with which the quartz is reduced to powder
probably compensates for the presence of the less valuable metal.
The route via Kern river, the Chay-o-poo-ya-pah creek, and Walker's
PasE-~ is a good one for connecting the r.rulare valley by a wagon road
with the Great Basin east of the Sierra Nevada range. The Kern
river part would be expensive, mving to the canon and the nearness
of the spurs to the stream on either side in several places, but the
grade on this part would not exceed 30 feet average per mile for 55
miles; in some places of this, however, the grade would exceed this
averag.e very considerably. On the Chay-o-poo-ya-pah they would
not exceed 29 feet per mile anywhere. In the pass there would be
only 1! mile where it would exceed 1 foot rise to one rod horizontal,
in the steepest of which reach it is 1! foot rise to one rod horizontal,
in the other parts of the pass it would not exceed 10 inches to the rod.
The leng~ of the route between Kern Lake and the east end of the
pass is about 80 miles.
The valley of the Chay-o-poo-ya-pah is an Indian resort for gathering a sort of cane, upon the leaves of which is a kind of sugar,
obtained by sun-drying and threshing the leaf. Good camping places
for a company of dragoons are plenty in this valley.
H. Ex. Doc. 114--2
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PASSES IN THE SIERRA MADRE.
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1. San Frrancisquito Pass is now called Turner's Pass. Through
it the roads from Canada las Uvas, Tejon, and Ta-hic·ha·pa Passes
all run to the Santa Clara valley, (map No. 4,) on the south side of the
Sierra Madre (or Coast) range. In this (Turner's) pass "the road
for many places is in the bed of a mountain fltream through rocky
canons, and in several places at grades of 320 to 475 feet per mile.''
2. Soledad Pass.-This was named by Lieut. Williamson, whose
party surveyed it, "New Pass," and in his opinion it pof:'sesseR less
di::mdvantages than any other for running a railroad across this part
of the Coast range. In ascending the pass from the rim of the Great
Basin the steepest part is only one mile in extent, and the rate of
ascent 218 to 240 feet per mile. The summit is 3,164 feet above the
mean sea level. Descending towards the Pacific, in a reach of 5~
miles, the grades do not exceed, in any place, 105 feet per mile.
''There is no obstruction for a wagon except fallen trees. This pass
leads into the Santa Clara valley near where the wagon road through
the San Francisquito (Turner's) enters the same valley, from which
point there is no obstruction to the ocean."
From these facts it would seem that for.military purposes, requiring
·heavy wagon trains, New Pass would be better to improve for a mili·
tary road from San Pedro to Fort Tejon than Turner's Pass, especially
·as ·the summit of the former is 272 feet lower than that of the latter .
.3. San Fernando Pass.-On the south side of Santa Clara valLey is
a -~pur of the Coast range, called ''Susannah,'' which is crossed
through this pass in travelling between the valley and Los Angeles.
The :pa£s is 9 miles long, and its crest is 1, 940 feet above the sea level.
The roafl is difficult, though practicable for wagons through the pass.
From San Fernando Mission the country may be traversed easily in
.almost -any direction toward the coast and to San Bernardino.
As 'long as the military post, Fort Tejon, is kept up, the road from
San Pedro via Los Angeles, through the ''San Fernando Pass,''
thence across the Santa Clara, and up either the San Francisquito
(".rurner' s) or up the Soledad (New) Pass, will have to be more or less
used for military purposes; and there ought to be a liberal appropriation made out of the public treasury for improving all of these passes.
The sum of $30,000 would be sufficient for the purpose. It is
through this route that supplies reach Fort Tejon.
4. CaJon Pass, (map No. 4. )-In coming from "Depot Camp" on
the Mohave, by the old Spanish trail, which is a good wagon road, the
distance is 19 miles to the summit of this pass. · The ascent from the
north is easy. From the northern extremity of the pass to its sum·
mit it is 2! miles; thence descending southeasterly, following the
Cajon creek, it is steep for I! mile; thence for 6! miles it is eaf!ier,
the grade being 200 feet per mile; thence for the next 6~ miles 100
feet per mile. The whole distance from the summit to the southern
extremity of the pass is 14 miles, and from this extremity to San Bernardino it is 14 miles-making the distance between the Mohave
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and this town, 4 7 miles, which, for a mountain pass, having its summit
4, 676 feet above the level of the sea, is a tolerable wagon road.
Sycamore Grove is on this route, near the mouth of Cajon Creek.
It is here that General P. Smith, United States army, thought of
establishing a · post, when in command of this department. Lieut.
Mowry's detachment, after marching from Salt Lake valley, encamped
here for one week. I doubt not it would be found well suited for a
post, should one be needed in this district. It would be supplied
through the port of San Pedro with all such necessary articles as are
not produced in that region.
5. San Gorgonia Pass, (see maps 4 and 6.)-Mount San Bernardino is
said to be the highest peak in the range, and 9, 000 feet above the
sea. Southwest, at a distance of 30 miles, is the peak San Jacinto,
nearly as high. Between their bases lies the Gorgonia Pass-one of
the lowest in the coast range-being at its summit 2, 800 feet above
the sea. The grades in this are easy, and there is no great difficulty
in passing a wagon train through it. From San Bernardino to the
summit of the pass it is 27 miles; thence to its eastern extremity
18! miles; thence to Fort Yuma on the Colorado, in a straight line
across the desert bearing N. 85° E., the distance is 130 miles.
NORTH OF THE COAST RANGE.

Mohave 1·iver, (map No. 4.)-I shall here give results of the
exploration of this water-course, by Lieuts. Wil~iamson and Parke,
Corps Topographical Engineers, in October and November, 1853, and
other results corroborative, which I have obtained from notes of the
land surveyors kindly furnished me at the United States surveyor
general's office in San Francisco. It is from these notes that I have
constructed maps 5 and 6, and filled them with all the topography
obtained up to the beginning of the surveying season of 1857. lt
will be seen that I have given the whole of the Mohave and its sink,
also a definite position of a part of the hitherto unexplored Colorado
above Fort Yuma.
The Mohave takes its rise in the northern slopes of the San Bernardino mountains. The country near its source is so rugged as to
render travelling there upon mule back very difficult, and often
impossible. It is impossible to cross the mountains here with wagons.
At "Depot Camp," marked on the map, the river is broad and shallow in autumn. Its banks here are well wooded, and its bottom is
confined between terraces on either side, from one to three miles
apart; as we descend from here the water, however, soon sinks in
the sandy bed, reappearing generally at a point of rocks, or where
a ~ontraction occurs. Timber exists in places along the direction of
the river, but generally disappears with the water. About 30 miles
below Depot Camp it appears at a point of rocks and flows freely,
but only for a short distance. From here, following a broad river bed
for 35 miles, ''we come to a canon about 7 miles long, having running.
water through its whole extent. In this canon the bed of the river
is from 100 to 150 feet wide, and on either side the clay bluffs rise
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over 100 feet in height vertically. These banks present the appear#
ance of gothic pillars, and the day of which they are composed is of
every variety of. tint-purple, pink, blue, yellow, &c. In the canon
cane was growing, anrl large quantities had been cut by the Indians.''
'·On emerging· from the canon a sandy plain is met, and all signs of
the river bed are lost. It is 13 miles across this plain; upon it there
is an abundant growth of mezquite trees, and some old abandoned
Indian huts. To the north of this plain there is a salt lake bed, on
the edge of which~ at the base of the hills, there are several fine
springs, slightly prackish, but not unpalatable; around there was
good grass in November. Further to the north there is another salt
lake bed of hard clay bottom. The two are from 3 to 4 miles apart,
connected by a ditch 20 feet wide and 2 feet deep."
Lieut. Williamson concludes the first of these lake beds to be the
true sink of the Mohave river, and his reasons for the opinion are
founded upon his own observations.
From the Depot Camp, I find by the plots of the land surveys, the
distance is 90 miles to the border of the lake bed that is regarded as
the sink. 'rhe bearing of the sink from the camp is N. 63° E., and
the shortest distance from the sink to the Colorado, into which it was
formerly supposed the Mohave ran, is about 66 miles.
From Depot Camp to the Mohave Indian settlement on the left
bank of the Colorado, 6 miles above the entrance of Williams' branch,
it is about 156 miles, and the direction is N. 83° E. Following this
direction we should come to the south base of Providence mountains,
where there are several springs, at a distance from the camp on the
Mohave of about 80 miles.
This same direction would leave a volcano to the north, situated
about 15 miles from Depot Camp in a direct line to the sink. And it
would pass over rough mountains and between two old craters, which
are about 54 miles from said camp.
I have been somewhat particular in describing these landmarks, so
that in case of a necessity of troops being ordered into this district
between the Mohave and Colorado, they may easily find their way
over this desolate region.
Of the Great Basin, maps 4, 5, 6, show the rim, as it were, of that
portion immediately north of the Coast range, and east of the southern
extremity of the Sierra Nevada, as far as the Colorado. From the
base of the Coast range northward there is a belt of undulating land,
15 to 20 miles in width, and unbroken by peaks. This belt stretches,
as seen on map 4, for nearly 100 miles to the headwaters of the
Mohave. From the eastern extremity of Tejon Pass, in a direction
following the bases of Lost Hills, for 30 miles there are several springs
to be met, from 'vhich issue little streams, sinking, however, in the
dry soil after running a few yards. In coming westward from the
:Mohave: on the route seen dotted on map 4, Lieut. Williamson found
no water. ''Independent of the Lost Hills, the country is a system
of inclined planes, in which the grades often approach 100 fe,t3t per
mile. There is no timber; the surface is generally bare, or covered
with sage bushes, grease wood, yuca trees,'' &c.
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In proceeding from Lake Elizabeth with a wagon train along the
north base of the Coast range, by keeping close in by the foot hills
water and grass may be had at convenient distances, for camping a
marching command of one company of dragoons, and perhaps two.
There are several springs on the route, and a bold stream (Johnson's
river) emerges from the hills, but immediately sinks on reaching the rim
of the basin. From this river to the Spanish trail the country is filled
with yuca trees and bushes. In ·October, 1853, Lieut. Stoneman conducted the wagon train of Lieut. Williamson's party over this route
from the Tejon, through the Canada de las U vas Pass, without much
difficulty, to the Mohave river
In the part of the basin immediately north of the belt aforesaid
''is a system of isolated peaks and short ridges, known as Lost mountains, and which, as they extend north and increase- in height, become
'vorthy of the name of mountain ranges. These often enclose extensive areas which are destitute of peaks, and in the lowest part,
where water accumulates after heavy rains, is a lake bed without
water in a dry season.''
Therefore, were an expedition undertaken, with an object requiring
a march into or leading through this extensive region, at the time of
a dry season, difficulties of no small magnitude, in respect to obtaining a sufficiency of water and grass, might be encountered by the
command.
SOUTH OF THE COAST RANGE.

From map 4 it might possibly be inferred that the southern slope of
the Coast range in this district is beautifully and abundantly watered at
all seasons throughout the whole country; nothing would be more erroneous than such an idea. The numerous dark lines shown on the
map as so many head branches of the Santa Clara, the San Gabriel,
the Los Angeles, and the Santa Anna, only indicate the natural drains
from the mountain gorges and ravines in times of an abundance of
rain. In the dry seasons very many of these have not a drop of water
in them. Nevertheless, this district is a fertile country, abounding
in grapes and other fruit, good pasturage and grain. The towns and
villages are small. There are, however, a goodly number of settlements scattered over the country; it has several old missions, also
several large valuable ranches. San Bernardino is settled principal1y
by Mormons.
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Summit New Pass------------····East fork Santa Clara river_ •••• _. __ _
~:ntrance San Fernando Pass _______ _
Summit of Pass . _••••••••••••••• __
Mission of San Fernando _________ ·__ _
Cahuang Ranch •••••••••••••••••••
Los Ange ~es __ ••• ______ ••• __ ••• _. _.
Mi~sion San GabrieL ••• -·---·-----San Gabriel, (creek crossing) _____ • _.
Qui Qual Mango Ranch ____________ _
Sycamore Grove. _______ • _________ _
San Bernardino • ____________ • ____ _
San Pedro via Los Angeles---------San Francisco, by sea _____________ _
San Francisco, by land_ •• __ •• ____ ._
San Diego, by land ___________ • ___ _
San Diego ••••• _••••• ______ • _• ___ _

Miles.

155
179
121
107
47

65
156
90
43
130
56
25
55
3

22
4
4
6

11

10
9

7
26
14
3

125
320
434
97
103

EAST OF SAN DIEGO TO FORT YUMA.

This portion, which is the southernmost port of the military department of the Pacific, is, as much as we :have occasion for, seen on
map 7.)
I have already spoken, in chapter II, of San Diego being in possession of a good natural harbor for commercial and, by consequence,
for military purposes, in their relations with the southern part of the
department.
There is no navigation in the San Diego river; all that the government expended here for the improvement of the mouth of the
river seems to have been little better than thrown away, from not
following up the first appropriation with another sufficient to bring
the work to a condition of security against the next year's freshet.
This is the port at which troops from San Francisco, or other ports
north, are landed, to march thence either to Fort Yuma or to other
points, as needed in the extreme southern portion of the department.
We now have troops of the 1st dragoons and the headquarters of
the regiment at the Mission of San Diego. It has been (until quite
recently) a one company artillery post for ten years past.
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The field of the battle of San Pasqua!, of the 6th and 7th of December, 1846, is marked on the map. It was here that our troops, under
Colonel Kearney, and the Californians, under General Pico, had their
obstinate contest for two days before the latter were forced to quit
the field.
From San Diego there is a tolerably good road running directly
down into Lower California of Mexico; also from here there is a
passable road for wagons via San Pas qual, San Felipe, &c., to Fort
Yuma; also a pack trail leading more directly over the mountains.
It is the wagon route to Fort Yuma that will be more fully described,
as it is the route the troops are obliged to follow.
From San Diego to San Pasqua}, 39 miles, and thence 12 miles to
Santa Marie. the road is good for wagon trains, and the grazing and
water on this reach of 51 miles are good the year round. At Santa
:Marie the pack trail from San Diego comes in, shortening the distance
14 miles. From San Pasqua! valley the road crosses a spur, which
it is impossible to avoid, so steep for four miles that a team can only
haul half the load with which it started from San Diego.
From Santa Marie to San Felipe ranch it is 43 miles. On this reach
grass and water are plenty, and grass for 8 miles further. At Santa
Isabel, 15 miles from Santa Marie, the pack trail leaves the wagon
road and passes to the right; from 8 miles beyond San Felipe to the
J ornada. there is little, if any, grazing, and no water. Immediately
on leaving the Indian hut at San Felipe vve are on the desert. Forage
must be taken for the animals in crossing this desert.
From San Felipe to Vallecito it is 18 miles, and water is found 13
miles from San Felipe, or 5 miles before coming to Vallecito; thence
to Coresito (cane) creek 18 miles. The road is very heavy, it being
sandy. The water of Cane creek sometimes poisons animals. From
Cane creek to Sackett's Wells it is 21 miles; thence to Big Laguna,
on or near New river, 10 miles; thence down the bed of this river
for 10 miles to "Camp Salvation." It was here that the immigrants
of 1849 met the river coming up; this was a flow caused by the freshet
of the Colorado for the first time in ten years; a most fortunate circumstance for those people, who had been 50 hours from any water.
We thus make the reach from San Felipe to Camp Salvation, on New
river, 77 miles by the road.
On leaving New river the next point of importance to be reached
by the traveller is Alamo Muchos, 12 miles. Here there are wells
affording water to man and beast. From the Alamo Wells to Indian
or Cook's Wells it is 30 miles. The road is level and of heavy sand
on this reach of 42 miles. From Cook's Wells to the Colorado it is
16 miles, and the road is good, coming out on the river at Algodones,
15 miles below the junction of the Gila and Colorado. Fort Yuma
is at this junction, on the right bank of the Colorado. We thus make
the road 244 miles long between San Diego and Fort Yuma. A portion of the road, as seen on the map, is within Mexican territory.
It takes 7 days to make the journey by a wagon conveyance, and 5
days on horseback by the pack trail. The desert is sometimes covered with water from rain. The soil is so compact as to hold water
for some time.
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The march between San Diego and Fort Yuma is exceedingly
laborious and difficult for troops to perform, still it has been successfully accomplished several times. Brevet l\fajor Reynolds, of the 3d
artillery, marched his company across, most successfully, in the
month of August, 1855, without the loss of a man or animal, in 10
days.
Colorado river, emptying into the Gulf of California, divides the
Mexican from the United States possessions up to a point 50 to 60
miles north of its mouth, above that it is wholly within the United
States territory. It is successfully navigated by steamers of very
light draught up to Fort Yuma, by the river windings, 125 mile"
above its mouth. The Gila is said by some to be navigable in high
stages for some distance, but little or no dependence can be placed
on its navigability at any time. In relation to the Colorado below
Fort Yuma, I quote from the report of Lieutenant Derby, Corps Topographical Engineers, who says: "It has a strong current, and the
·channel is somewhat obstructed with snags, and is narrow, and the
frequent shifting of the sandy bed makes the navigation quite intricate.
The action of the tide ceases at about 40 miles above its month. It is
impossible to sail up the river above that point. At its mouth there
is a depth of two fathoms of water.''
There are now no towns or settlements of any importance on the
lower Colorado, and the valley is forbidding in the extreme.
The whole course of the river from Fort Yuma to the Gulf may be
said to be through an exceedingly uninteresting desert. The climate
of the valley is well calculated to enervate human energy. The extremes of temperature are such as to show the maximum to be 116
degrees F., and the minimum 36 degrees, at Fort Yuma during the
year; and the annual fall of rain amounts to only 1£- inches. The
heat of the summer is such as to preclude bodily exertion in tl1e open
air, nevertheless the troops are generally very healthy, and the post
is undoubtedly in the very best position that could have been found,
and its importance is being more and more appreciated every day.
The new mail route between San Antonio, Texas, and San Diegor
California, passes by Fort Yuma. The first mail was recently carried
through in 34 days from San Antonio to San Diego.
Fort Yuma is supplied from Benicia depot by means of a government sail vessel, as far as to the head of the Gulf of California, thence
by steamboats, of which there are two plying on the lower Colorado,
and owned by individuals. 'rhese boats do all the transportation on
the river.
The trip of the sail vessel from Benicia, out and back, generally
commmes three to four montLs. The voyage is necessarily long.
The shortest steamer run from Benicia to the mouth of the Colorado
is 2. 110 miles; this furnishes some idea of the distance a sail vessel
would run to perform the trip. From our military postr San Diegor
to Fort Yuma, the steamer run by sea is 1, 625 miles to the month of
the Colorado; thence by river 125 miles-in all, 1, 750 mile-s. The
overland wagon road distance between the bame posts, as before said,
is 244 miles.
In a late report from an officer of high rank and commanding posi-
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tion, in referring to the desert and the difficulties in the way of supplying Fort Yuma, he forcibly and truly remarks: "The route to
Fort Yuma is by land in part, and by water entirPly, within the territory of Mexico.'' He propounds the question: ''Would it not be
sound policy to submerge the desert from the Colorado and convert
thus a barren waste into a navigable lake?''
Did this question not emanate from one high in position, and, by
consequence, one whose opinion might be supposed to carry weight
even to conviction, I would not notice it here, by affirming that such
a project is practically impossible to execute, even admitting the data
to be true upon which he bases the idea of converting the desert into
a smiling lake of navigable water.
Th6 Colorado above Fort Yuma is very imperfectly known, except
the small portion shown on my map, No. 6 It has never been explored with a view to develop its capacity for navigation or adaptation for the abode of civilization. Should it prove susceptible of
steam navigation, even though it be no better than the lower part of
the river, it will become highly advantageous for carrying on military
operations in the department of the Pacific, in so far as they may
have relation to U tab.
The stories of some old trappers and Indians, who presume to be
familiar with the upper Colorado, would almost make us believe that
its banks in certain places are gilt with gold, and at others paved
with copper, iron, and even silver and precious stones. The exploration lately ordered by the Hon. Secretary of War, it is to be hoped,
will solve the several interesting problems connected with this river.

V.-Military considerations in riference to the Utah portion of the department of the P acijic.
Map No. 8 represents as much of the Territory of Utah as is necessary to be referred to in order fully to comprehend its military connexion with the other portions of this department.
There are three prominent routes, marked in red on the map, connecting Utah with the other parts of the department, viz: with the
southern part of the State of California, the middle part of that State,
and the Territory of Oregon.
Southern route.-This may be regarded as starting from the port of
San Pedro, (see map No. 4,) and passing through Los Angeles, the
Cajon Pass, in the Coast range, to the Mohave river. This reach of
110 miles, from San Pedro to the river, has been sufficiently described in chapter IV. Again, from Fort Tejon, a command could
start and pass through the Canada de las U vas, as also mentioned in
that chapter, and follow along by the foot-hills of the north slope of
the coast range, and intersect the road from San Pedro at the Mohave. This route from Fort Tejon is indicated on maps Nos. 4 and
5, and the length of the route is 107 miles.
From this intersection, which may be regarded as at Depot Camp,
on the Mohave, the road follows generally the right bank of the river
for a distance of 48 miles, where it crosses to the left bank, and up

26

TOPOGRAPHICAL MEMOIR OF THE

to this point on the route no difficulty opposes itself to the movement
of any command with its wagon train, however large. Grass and
water are good and abundant in the valley of the Mohave, and there
is wood on its banks at most of the places where the river remains
above ground.
On leaving the Mohave the country becomes almost a desert. From
this river to Bitter Spring, 44 miles; thence, by way of Resting Spring,
91 miles, to Las Vegas, (the plains,) the road is difficult, water not
good, grass poor, and it would be a serious undertaking to march a
large command over it, though by great care it could be successfully
accomplished.
From Bitter Spring all the way to Pure Water Spring, on the
.A.magosia, there is little or no grass or water. The Amagosia is a
putrid stream, running through a deep canon, along whose sides it is
difficult to pass. It was within about 14 miles of Pure Water Spring
that Mr. Soublettes party obtained gold with success in 1850, 1851,
and 1852, packing the water for washing it from that spring, until
driven off after several ,~~,rere killed by Indians. In descending to the
Vegas the road passes through a canon, affording excellent cover for
an attacking party of Indians.
The Vegas is a small stream of good water, but it sinks; it heads in
a spring that boils with such force that a person cannot sink in it.
Along the course of the stream grass is good and abundant, and it
affords the only really good camping place after leaving the Mohave.
It is understood that there is a settlement of Mormons at Las Vegas.
It is supposed the Colorado river comes within 25 miles of this settlement. Should it prove navigable for light draught steamers up to the
entrance of Virgin river, this point becomes important in reference
to a new communication from southern California into Utah, via the
Colorado river.
From the Vegas to Muddy river, 43 miles, the road is good, but
there is little or no \Vater. Lieut. Mowry's detachment made this
march in 18 hours, using the night, halting to refresh the animals on
an intervening patch of grass.
From Muddy river the road is descending for 20 miles, when it
comes to Virgin river; from here it ascends the valley of the latter
for about 23 miles, thence about 19 miles to the Santa Clara river;
from this it follows up the valley of this stream for about 27 miles,
and then we soon come to Mountain Meadows. On this reach of 89
miles, between the Muddy and the Meadows, there is no serious difficulty in the way of a wagon train. The road along the Virgin crosse~
the stream often, and is trying to the animals; in some places the
bottom is of shifting sand. The crossings of the Santa Clara are frequent, but they are narrow and easy to be made. ''The canon
through which it flows is susceptible of a strong defence by a small
body, which, if properly posted, could stop or annoy a much larger
force."
Mountain Meadows-425 miles from San Pedro, 315 miles from
where the road leaves the Mohave, ·318 miles from Fort Tejon-is a
beautiful plateau, seven to eight thousand feet above the level of the
ocean; it is shut in by the mountains, grows luxurious grass of an
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excellent quality for grazing, and is intersected by a never-failing
stream of pure cold water. Lieut. Mowry says ''it is one of the few
places on the route the traveller remembers with pleasure.'' He regards the mountains here as the southern rim of the Salt Lake Basin.
It is apparent to me that these meadows would afford a good military
position for commanding the whole route hence to Salt Lake City.
From Mountain Meadows to Cedar City it is about 35 miles, and
probably it is about the same distance to Harmony, and the road is
descending. "These two towns are inhabited by miners and ironworkers, and several large furnaces are in active operation, affording
employment for several thousand men. The ore is of the richest
quality and the supply inexhaustible. Highly ornamented castings
are produced, and the manufacture of cannon is said to be in successful operation.''
The respective distances from Cedar City to Parowan City; thence
to Fillmore, the capital of Utah; thence to Salt Lake City, as recorded
in Lieut. }.fowry' s report, are different from those given on the map.
He gives them 20, 90, 150 miles; whereas the map gives them 39,
55, 128 miles; here are great discrepancies. On the whole extent,
however, between Cedar City and Salt Lake City, the road is excellent, and water occurs all the way at convenient distances; but fuel is
scarce, though attainable at some inconvenience. The country is
well settled by Mormons, and villages and small towns occur frequently, outwardly evincing thrift and quietude.
It will be seen that I make the approximate total distance, esti ·
mating by the map, from San Pedro to Great Salt Lake City 682 miles.
It would be a march of about 40 marching days. From San Pedro to
Mountain Meadows, where the command would be placed beyond all
difficultiE's, it would be a march of 22 to 25 days.
The detachment under Lieut. Mowry made the march from United
States Camp, in Rush valley, 45 miles southwest of Salt Lake City, to
Fort Tejon, in the summer of 1855, at the rate of 26 miles per day,
according to his estimate of the total distance; and he says ''several
marches of 30 miles and more per day were without water and temperature at 120 F."
He reports, that "with care in husbanding the strength of the
animals before reaching the desert, and attention to them while crossing it, the march could be made without material loss. Two artesian
wells on the desert, that is, between the Mohave and Las Vegas, and
one between the Vegas and Muddy rivers, would make the route easy
for travel at all seasons. The proper time for starting would be from
1st to 15th April, or 1st September. In the autumn the deserts are
covered with water from rains and there is a second crop of grass.
The route is healthy at all seasons.''
INDIANS.

On the Vegas, the Virgin, the Muddy, and the Santa C.lara, there
are hundreds of Indian warriors, who Lieut. Mowry reports "have
been taught to believe the Mormon people to be altogether superior
to the Americans-morally, mentally, and physically. In each tribe
two or more Mormon missionaries were found, whose object was to
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impress upon the Indians the belief in the inferiority and hostility of
the Americans, and the superiority and friendship of the Mormons.
And Brigham Young counsels his people to intermarry with the
Indians.''
''There are many places well known to the Indians on this route
easily defensible against a large force.''
A company of dra.goons might leave Fort Tejon or San Pedro, make
an easy march through these tribes, and return in three months; the
beneficial effect of which cannot be doubted. If from Fort Tejon, the
march should l1e direct to the Mohave, following the foot-hills of the
north slope of the Coast range.
Ascending the Colorado to Utah.- We have seen how difficult the
land march is from the Mohave to Las Vegas, a distance of 135 miles,
across a portion that may be regarded almost a desert. If the Colorado, as is supposed it does, comes to within 25 miles of Las Vegas,
and prove navigable for small steamers up to the junction of the
Virgin, it wilJ be fortunate, for it will be seen, should all this be true,
we should have land carriage of only about 40 to 50 miles up the
valley of the Virgin to the point where the present road strikes this
stream; and from the junction to Mountain Meadows it would be only
109 miles.
If, while the troops are in Utah! a military reconnaissance could be
made from Cedar City, via Mountain Meadows, down the Virgin
river to the Colorado, to test the practicability of opening a road. the
results would be valuable to the "\V ar Department. I doubt if there
would be more than 50 miles in extent of country to examine, and it
would all be within 144 miles of Cedar City. While at the junction
the character of the Colorado for some f2w miles above and below
should be ascertained in reference to its capacity for ·navigation.
Middle route, or route from the valley if the Sacramento to Utah.Should it become necessary to march a command from this valley into
Utah it \Vould be beflt to organize it to start its land march from the
city of Sacramento.
From Sacramento to Placerville it is 25 miles; thence to the west
foot of the pass in the Sierra Nevada, seen on the map to the south
of Lake Bigler, it is about 30 miles; thence fairly through the pass
to its eastern extremity, about 10 miles. This pass is by way of one
of the head branches of the American river. In this reach of 80
miles the only temporary difficulty to be encountered, starting as
early as the middle of May, would probably be snow in the pass.
The condition of the snow, however, could always be learned beforehand at Placerville, and the time of commencing the march regulated
accordingly. In this pass there are more permanent difficulties than
snow-steepness of grades and rocky places; but, notwithstanding
these, wagon trains pass through it without serious detention.
From the east extremity of the pass to Reese, where the road
comes to near Carson river: it is about 25 miles. Carson valley is a
noted district on this route, affording good soil, water, and grass in
abundance, and it will afford a good position in Utah for a military
post when needed; and it would be well for the War Department to
make a reservation, the sooner the better, for the purpose. Carson
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river is said to sink, or to be lost in the earth, in its course runmng
eastward.
From Carson river to Ragtown it i8 about 25 miles; thence to the
southeast point of Lake Humboldt it is 35 miles; and in this latter
portion there is a desert to cross, where, however, no serious difficulty would be encountered.
From the said point of the lake to Lawson's Meadows it is about
45 miles.
I thus make the total distance between the city of Sacramento and
Lawson's Meadows 210 miles. Two companies of Brevet Lieutenant
Colonel Steptoe's command, with their wagon train complete, marched
by this route, though in an opposite direction, from the Meadows to
the city, between the 14th June and 9th July, 1855--:_26 days. Of
course the greatest obstacles to the movement of the train were met
in the crossing of the Nevada ridge.
Lawson's Meadows are near where the Humboldt river, after pursuing a course bearing a little south of west for about 3! degrees in
longitude, suddenly turns to the south, and then, after showing itself
for an extent of about one-half a degree in latitude, is lost in its sink,
which is Lake Humboldt. These meadows undoubtedly present an
important position for military purposes. It is here that a concentration of troops could be effected, one body starting from Fort Lane
Oregon, the other from Sacramento, or indeed from any point in the
valley of the Sacramento river. It is a position pretty well east of the
Sierra Nevada rauge and well into Utah. It is believed it possesses
all the requirements for a military reservation. It is somewhere not
far south of here that the United States wagon road, appropriated so
liberally for by Congress last year, will run across Utah to Honey
Lake, California; and it is somewhere near these meadows that
another wagon road may be expected to diverge to reach the Willamette river valley in Oregon.
From Lawson's Meadows, proceeding further into Utah, the route
is. up the narrow valley of the Humboldt river for an extent of about
175 miles. This valley may be safely marched through any time in
the summer after the lOth of June, when the grass will be abundant,
the road and the water good. But before that time the river is alkaline and the grass covered with water; the valley being narrow the
track will be over abrupt knolls, difficult for the passage of a train.
It is a march of 13 days between Lawson's Meadows and the ~st
crossing seen on the map in ascending the Humboldt.
From that crossing by the north and east of Great Salt Lake to
the City of Salt Lake-the largest Mormon town-the distance is estimated at 210 miles. The roads on this part of the route are good by
the 1st of May and afterwards, and grass plenty except in Goose Creek
mountains. The march from the meadows to this town would occupy
the command about 30 days.
I make the total length from Sacramento City to Salt Lake City
595 miles. vVhatever may be the error :fn the distance here given,
Steptoe's command -made the march in an opposite direction between
April 28 and July 9, 1855.
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It is quite probable the route we are considering is the best, under
all circumstances affecting the case, for a wagon road from Sacramento
City to intersect the one before mentioned .across Utah to Honey
Lake valley. Here we perceive another fact of importance connected
with Lawson's Meadows-as it must be s0mewhere in their vicinity
that a road will diverge from the United States trunk road across
Utah in a southwest direction, to reach the permanent head of navigation on the Sacramento river.
ROUTE

FROM OREGON TO UTAH.

Should the object be to march a command, drawn from the troops
located in Oregon, into Utah it would be best to assemble them at
Fort Lane, Oregon Territory, which is on Rogue river, (see map No. 9,)
as through the Willamette valley, they could be assembled from the
Columbia river posts, and from the Puget Sound district-and all
concentrated at Fort Lane in time to commence the march by June
10. This arrangement would enable the quartermaster's department
to take advantage of the favora.ble stage of water for transportation
up the Willamette river to the head of its navigation, and of the
favorable condition of the roads thence to Fort Lane.
From Fort Lane to the west foot of Applegate Pass, of the Cascade
range, 27 miles, there is little or no difficulty in the way of a wagon train.
From the west to east foot of the pass it is probably 10 miles, which
will bring us to Klamath river; through the pass there is no serious
obstacle to the passage of a train of wagons.
From Klamath river to the southeast end of Rhett lake it is about
17 miles; from here to the stream supplying Olear lake it is 10 mikes;
from this to Ingalls' lake it is 10 miles. In this reach from Klamath
river to Ingalls' lake, 52 miles, the road has water and grass in abundance, and there is no serious impediment. Ingalls' lake is the first
or left-hand one seen on map 8, nearly up to the boundary line between
California and Oregon. Klamath and Rhett are not on this map.
From Ingalb' lake to the outlet of Goose lake, supposed to be Pit
river, it is about 55 miles: and until we get within 8 miles of the
south end of the lake the road is bad. The first part is through low
and muddy spots, and then we come to a rocky ridge or divide 12
miles over, upon which the stones, though not large, would be severe
upon the feet of the animals. The bend over the ridge might be
shortened, probably, by opening a road to the south of the present one.
Goose lake is a fine Rheet of good fresh water, it being the rer.eptacle
of many cool mountain brooks. The lake is 25 to 30 miles long
by 10 wide, and around its shores and in the narrow ravines of the
brooks there is an abundance of grass for almost any number of
animals at the proper season. It is in the vicinity of this lake that
Brevet Captain Warner, Topographical Engineers, and his party were
massacred while engaged in a topographical exploration of this region.
From the outlet of Goose lake to the summit of the Sierra Nevada
it is probably about 15 miles. The pass of the mountain here is by
no means a difficult one, and its extent is only about 8 to 10 miles.
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The east slope is rather steep, but comparatively free from roeks; the
lake immediately on the east of it is of bad water. Captain Ingalls
is of the opinion, from his observation, that by considerable labor in
opening a road through the heavy timber further south some distance
could be saved and the grade rendered easier than on the present track.
On June 23, 1855, the day he crossed, there was no snow in the pass.
From the east foot of the pass to the great canon it is about 45
miles, and the road is tolerably good. Through the canon it is estimated to be 25 miles, and, though somewhat tedious, the road is passable for a train, or can be rendered so by some little attention to the
bad spots.
From the southern extremity of the canon to Black Rock it is about
25 miles. On this reach, and for a distance of about 35 miles further
the country in summer is a sterile dry waste. It may be called a
desert, of about 60 miles across, in which water and grass of good
quality are not met with, and it is on this part of the route that extra
care should be taken to insure the successful passage of a train.
There are some boiling springs and a slough with alkaline water. '•It
is decidedly dangerous to permit stock to more than taste it.'' Late
in the season the condition of the water and grass is at its worst, and
it would then be a dangerous experiment for all the animals of a large
train to attempt to cross it. In early spring the desert is so much
covered with water as not to be passable without great difficulty.
From the southern point of the desert to Lawson's Meadows it is
18 miles. In this part of the route the road is good, and water and
grass of excellent quality exist in abundance.
I make the total distance on this route from Fort Lane to Lawson's
Meadows 315 miles. Captain Ingalls estimated it at 368 miles. His
detachment was 23 days marching it, though in an opposite direction,
and consisted of 122 horses, 112 mules, 17 wagons, and 50 dragoons.
The march was made between June 14 and July 6, 1855. rrhe captain says ''between Fort Lane and the desert the grass and water
were abundant and a more interesting· country at that season I never
saw.''
I have already spoken of the importance of Lawson's Meadows,
and of the probability of a wagon road diverging in this neighborhood, from the United States road across Utah to Honey Lake, to
reach the Willamette valley in Oregon. It is highly probable the
route I have just been describing is the best that can be followed for
this purpose. The desert is the only objection to it; and, notwithstanding this, it is doubtful if any route except this can be found for
feasible communication between the settled parts of Oregon and
Washington Territories.
From Lawson's Meadows the route would be common with that
already described, being up the Humboldt river, as a part of the
route from Sacramento City to Salt Lake City, if the command were
destined around by the north and east of Salt Lake to the great Mormon city.
From Fort Lane~ Oregon Territory, to Great Salt Lake .City, I make
the total distance 700 miles on this route, and it would require 66
days for a command of four to five companies to accomplish the march.
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liianner if sending troops into Utah.-Hitherto all that have been
sent into and through this Territory have been assembled, from the
departments of the east and west, at Fort Leavenworth, on the Missouri, and began their march from that post. Prior to the present
year two marches of this kind have been executed: one by the rifle
regiment in 1849, the other by a command under Brevet Lieutenant
Colonel Steptoe in 1854-' 55. The route of the former diverged at
Green river to the northward, and entered Oregon by the way of
Fort Hall and the Snake river; that of the latter was from Fort
Leavenworth, 311 miles, 21 days, to Fort Kearney; thence, 336
miles, 23 days, to Fort Laramie; thence, 290 miles, 24 days, to
Pacific springs, the west extremity of South Pass of Rocky mountains; and thence, 232 miles, 20 days, to Great Salt Lake City. The
command left Fort Leavenworth June 1 and arrived at Salt Lake
City August 31, 1854. It is believed that the stoppages were no
more than necessary to accomplish this march of 1,169 miles in 92
days, without breaking down men and animals, and that this is a
pretty fair measure of the minimum time in practice that it would
be proper to spend on so long a march over a similar country by a
body of troops of a respectable number. It seems that the actual
number of marching days was 64, making the average distance per
marching day a little more than 18 miles; or, if "\Ve include the stoppages to rest, 12-§- miles per day from the beginning to the end of the
march.
Now, this rate of marching, which was in the department of the
west, being applied to the department of the Pacific will give us
the times for the marches, including stoppages to rest the command,
as follows:
From Sacramento to Salt Lake City, 4 7 days.
From San Pedro to Salt Lake City, 54 days.
It takes 25 days to transport a regiment by steam from New York,
and 22 from New Orleans, via Panama, to San Francisco, thence one
day to Sacramento and two to San Pedro, including all necessary delays for transhipment; and it is obvious the regiment could be assembled from various posts in or east of the valley of the Mississippi at
New York or New Orleans quite as expeditiously as at Fort Leavenworth.
Hence, if it be an object with the War Department to despatch
troops in the least possible time-from posts so located, regardless of
other considerations-to Salt Lake City, the quickest way is to assemble them either at New York or New Orleans, and embark them
by steam for San Francisco, thence to Sacramento, and from there
march them to Salt Lake City.
If embarked from New York the saving would be 19 days, if New
Orleans 22 days, in the time that would be consumed in marching
them from Fort Leaven worth to the same point. If sent by steam
from San Francisco to San Pedro, and marched thence to Salt Lake
City, the saving would be 11 or 14 days in the time required to
march them from Fort Leavenworth.
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VI.- Military considerations in riference to the Oregon portion of the
department of the P acijic.
Southern Oregon, so much as to include the southwest portion, is
represented on map No. 9. The boundary between the State of
California and the Territory of Oregon is the 42d parallel of north
latitude. The town of Crescent City is in California, about 13 miles
south of the boundary.
After passing Humboldt bay this is the
next port possessing any military importance north of San Francisco,
from which, by the steamer's track, it is distant about 320 miles.
It can be safely·entered at all times, except in fogs and during the
prevalence of south and east winds; but there being no piers or
docks lighterage has to be resorted to.
It was through Crescent City that Fort Lane, while garrisoned,
was supplied. The fort is 85 to 100 miles distant from it in the interior, following the pack trail, seen on the map, which runs through
an exceedingly broken country. It was Crescent City that General
Wool selected to be made the principal centre of operations of the
troops for closing the Indian war in southern Oregon in 1856. The
results showed the wisdom of the selection.
With the exception of the Coquille and the Umpqua, the rivers
repres.e nted on map No. 9 are not at all navigable except for canoes,
being generally of rapid current, rocky beds, and in many places
running through deep canons.
Rogue river, named "Trashit" in the aboriginal tongue, was by
legislative enactment changed in name to "Gold river;" but from
causes which I omit to mention, all persons outside of the valley of
this stream still persist in the use of the first appellative. This
river, coming from the west slope of the Cascade range, is of rapid
current, and only navigable even for canoes in a few of its reaches.
Its lower half is full of rapids and canons. It has no considerable
valley until we get some 40 to 60 miles above its mouth; and then we
come to a beautiful and fertile one, of only about 30 miles in extent,
however; it is this that is called the Rogue River valley, in which is
situated Fort Lane. Great difficulties are in the way of opening a
road or passing from the mouth of the river up to this valley; the
trails are circuitous, tortuous, rough, and steep; and it is only under
difficulties that this tempting and much coveted valley can be reached
from any point on the coast.
Coos bay is important in respect to its coal veins. Small vessels
enter it to receive the coal which, being of a quality valuable for
domestic purposes, is mined in considerable quantities; but as yet it
is not profitable for sea steamer purposes, requiring too much bulk
for a given amount of heat-two to three bushels of this giving only
the heat of one of anthracite. As the veins are more deeply penetrated: however, the coal is found to improve in quality.
It is but a mere step, as it were, from Coos bay across to the
Coquille river; and it is quite probable this river once had a channel
through this bay into the ocean. The present mouth, however, is to
H. Ex. Doc. 114-3
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the south of the bay, and it is blocked by a sand bar so as to effec·
tually prevent ingress of vessels; but above the bar the Coquille
river presents the character of a beautiful deep navigable canal, fit
for steamers, for more than 50 miles of it course; and its valley,
though narrow, has much good soil to recommend it. In the autumn
of 1851 a force of our troops, under the immediate command of Lieutenant Colonel .Casey, had a smart successful conflict with the Indians
at the junction of the north and south forks of this river; one party
of the command ascended in boats while the other proceeded by land;
the pursued: in attempting to escape one, fell unexpectedly into the
fire from the other, and were effectually chastised.
In regard to the Umpqua river, its mouth can be entered by sea
steamers, under very favorable circumstances of wind and weather,
also by small sail vessels; but it is not of a character to be regarded
as a harbor, and it is only by light· draft steamers that it can be
safely ascended 24 miles or so up to near Scott~burg. Above this
there is what is called the valley of the Umpqua, which is quite an
extensive tract of most excellent soil. Should there be a good
road opened from the head of navigation of this river into the valley
it would add greatly to the value of this district of Oregon, and it
would be useful for military purposes; and I think a good military
road should be made between the mouth and Scottsburg.
Near the mouth of the Umpqua there was a Hudson Bay Company
post, but now the site is occupied as a military post, established in
the summer of 1856, by order of General Wool, when the detachment post at Port Orford was abandoned; the latter, however advantageous at the time when it was established, no longer being regarded
necessary after the close of the Rogue River Indian hostilities and the
removal of the tribes from their old homes to the coast reservations;
but during the military operations which resulted in this removal the
post at Port Orford proved of signal advantage, fully justifying the
views of the officer under whose orders it was established.
From Crescent City to Rogue river, thence to Port Orford, the
shore is broken and divided by spurs of the mountains coming quite
down to the water's edge, throwing the mule track back from the sea
up the steep sides and over the sharp crests of the spurs, making the
route a very difficult one for the animals to tread; and yet it is the
only land route connecting the shore settlements. Indeed, in almost
all the country adjacent to the coast, and back into the interior as far
as the Oregon trail, the roads generally are nothing more than pack
trails for animals or foot paths for Indians and their pursuers.
With the exception of the valleys of the upper part of Rogue river,
of the Umpqua, and of the Coquille, to which I have already made
allusion, the whole country represented on map No. 9 is extremely
forbidding to the eye of the farmer. Immediately on the coast the
ground is covered with a dense forest of cedar, inferior pine, (called
Oregon pine,) spruce, fir, &c., of trees of such gigantic size as to
preclude the idea of clearing the land for cultivation. Further inland
the back ground of this natural amphitheatral picture, viewed from
the sea, is a succession of hills, then mountains of volcanic origin,
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l'lsmg one above the other, presenting their rocky fronts and sharp
summits in beautiful shapes and variety of color, and showing their well
defined crest line in clear relief against the sky as far as the eye can
reach; and, as long as it can endure to observe, as we steam along
the coast of Oregon, it will meet pretty nearly the same picture.
The forest lands and mountain slopes of this coast will never be
brought under cultivation. They are fit only for lumbering, and
mining, perhaps, in some places. To the botanist, the florist, horticulturist, mineralogist, and geologist, they afford fields of interest,
and, if explored, would probably yield many new and valuable specimens to their respective cabinets.
At Port Orford, which is just immediately south and under the
cape bearing this name, there is a tolerable harbor, or rather, a ''Hole
in the shore,'' into which steamers of the largest class can safely enter
and approach to within a few hundred feet of the beach, when the
wind don't blow too hard from the south or south west, and the fog is
not too dense. Under a north or northwest wind, once in, vessels
may ride at anchor here in security. This is not only the best, but
it is the only place entitled to the name of harbor on the whole Oregon
coast. A coast so strikingly destitute of harbors as this can contribute
very little to the commercial prosperity of the State upon which it
may front, presenting, as it were, a barrier rather than affording
entrances to the interior.
Lumber is extensively manufactured by steam mills near Port
Orford. It is here that the Oregon white cedar is found of an extraordinary size. Boards from three to five feet in width are produced
of perfectly "clear stuff," and of such quality, for the plane, that
this kind of lumber has, in a measure, superseded the white pine for
interior finishing; for exterior work, however, it is not so well adapted.
On former official maps Cape Orford and Cape Blanco are put down
as one; but Cape Blanco, whose approximate longitude 124° 45' W.,
and latitude about 42° 45' N., is distant from the former about ten
miles. Between the two capes there is a beautiful indentation, bordered by a continuous sand beach, pass:1ble for wagons at all times,
and affording the only wagon road passing out of Port Orford; all
other routes leading out of this settlement can only be travelled on
foot or on the backs of animals.
As soon as a military post was established at Port Orford attention
was called to the advantage of having a direct communication with
the Oregon trail. Several explorations were made with a view of
finding a good route for a wagon road, but none were attended with
favorable results for such a purpose. In the autumn of 1855 Geneera! Wool directed another effort to be made, and Lieutenant Kautz,
4th infantry, was put in charge of the party. The route which he
reported most favorably upon a~ the least formidable in difficulties is
represented on map No. 10.
While about closing his field labors his party was attacked by Indians-hostilities having commenced between them and the Oregon
volunteers unbeknown to the lieutenant.
From my own reconnai.ssance: in this district of southern Oregon,
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and other sources of information, I think the best system of roads
that can be opened in order to bring the Rogue river, the Coquille,
and the Umpqua valleys into communication with a sea-port would
bel. To open a road on the direct route seen on map No. 10, from
Port Orford to the Oregon trail.
2. To open one from Cape Blanco to the navigable part. of the Coquille; also one from the head of the navigable part of this river,
following the middle fork, to the Umpqua valley.
With such a system well executed these secluded valleys could
avail themselves of Port Orford, as there is already by nature a good
wagon road from this to Cape Blanco.
Cape Blanco, although possessing no harbor or "Hole in the shore,''
is not destitute of interest geographically, it being, I shall believe
until more accurate observations prove the contrary, the most westel)n point of terrc::t firma belonging to the United States; certainly it is
iJhe most western habitable portion; not only is it habitable, but it is
actually inhabited. squatted upon, and claimed by the "Bostons."
From the fact of Captain Gray, the discoverer of the mouth of the
Columbia, and his crew having sailed from Boston, this appe1lative
was given them by the Indians, and extended to those since coming
from the east to distinguish them from the Hudson Bay Company's
people. 'Vi thin the recollection of many now living the term ''far
west'' was applied to no further than St. Louis, then the most westerly settlement of civilization. After that it became to mean somewhere about Independence, Mo.; thence climbing the eastern slope
of the Rocky mountains and looking over its crest we saw it applied
to ~he Mormon settlements of the Great Salt Lake basin. But here
it rested only for a brief period; seemingly weary of resting place
·Or local habitation, it departed from the city of pvlygamists, and with
more wonderful strides than eveL crossing entire ranges of mountains, scaling with a bound the Sierra Nevada and the Cascade, traversing California and Oregon, it came to the Pacific. And here it i:3
on the very brink of this ocean; and "far we&t" at this moment may
be most legitimately applied to Cape Blanco. It is here that the
Anglo-Saxon is arrested in his onward march by the broad Pacific.
Westward the wheels of the emigrant wagon can roll no further.
Another turn on their already well-worn axles and all are precipitated down the frightful steep of Cape Blanco a thousand feet into
the deep bosom of the ocean. It is here that the cry of '' Westward,
ho! '' by land must cease; and if on reaching this point the proneness
for migration be not satiated, the journey further towards the setting
sun must be on the ocean wave; or if migrate still our people will,
thence by land must their course be in retrogression. Further than
Cape Blanco I doubt if '' West ward the march of empire hath its
way,'' unless the '' Bostons'' can invent a bridge four thousand miles
in span, and whose abutments shall be Cape Blanco and Cape Lopatka. Although there is still an onward migratory wave from the east
to the west, a return wave has already begun to roll backward; and
between the two-the direct and reflex-if we ourselves are not, an-
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other less fortunate race will be crushed-blotted out of existenceto make the way clear for the '' Bostons.''
Gold.-From the mouth of Rogue river to Cape Blanco, the point
I have shown to be the '' far west'' of our country, the very seabeach sand is full of gold dust; and in many places it has been
washed, and a profitable return for the labor realized. In other
spots it has been tried and abandoned, not from an absence of gold~
but because of the smallness of the yield. At Rogue river and Cape
Blanco large quantities have been obtained from the sand. The gold
dust is an impalpable powder, so fine as not to be recognized with a
microscope of ordinary power. To obtain it the sand is washed by a
little stream of water, and while passing through a machine adapted
to the purpose the dust is amalgamated with mercury, and afterwards
placed in a crucible and the mercury of the amalgam driven off by
heat, and the gold is realized in a solid form at the bottom of the
crucible. Not only does this precious metal exist, in the form described, in the sea-beach sand, but it is found, in a more palpable
form, however, in sand forty miles interior to the coast, (at Johnson's
Diggins.) There is, however, a difference in the physical character
of the two; that from the interior has crystals resembling the amethyst and also the topaz, which, though in small numbers and not
perceptible to the naked eye, are brought into evidence by the
microscope. Not so, however, in the beach sand; in this all the
particles are black and the angles more rounded, owing to more
attrition caused by the surf.
Gold is also found in Rogue River valley, on the Coquille branches,
and undoub t.edly exists pretty generally in spots all over the district
under consideration; and it is this which has been the principal inducement for the whites to be willing to enter this district at so much
hazard.
Indian hostilities.-This portion of southern Oregon has been the
theatre of more Indian troubles than any other part of our Pacific
possessions. The whole district represented on map No. 9 was full
of Indians. Those more particularly occupying the valley of Rogue
river have been regarded, since first known to the whites, as treacherous, brave, and energetic; and if at that time they did not know
they were soon taught, by the whites themselves, how to use the
rifle and rerolver to good advantage. Notwithstanding all the evidences of danger staring them in the face, the whites underrated the
skill, bravery, and local advantages possessed by the several tribes
who occupied this district, as was the case in other parts of Oregon,
and the first conflicts, as might have been expected, proved disastrous to the Bostons. One, probably the very first of these conflicts,
I shall soon briefly describe; its result emboldened these Indians to
defy, and inspired them with a reliance upon their own strength to
effectually resist, the obtrusion of the whites into their country.
The scene of this rencounter was in the harbor of Port Orford.
Between the mouth of Rogue river and Cape Orford there are scattered about in the bay many lofty rocks, towering high above the
water in pyramidal form; isolated from each other by channels of
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deep sea water, they are the remaining solid portions, once of the
land, that have been able to withstand the battering of the surf for
ages. One of these is directly in the harbor, and possessed with
historical interest. It is denominated Battle Rock, a11d stands so
near in that at low tide it can be reached by wading; but it is only
by one narrow face that it can be scaled, or its summit approached
by the human foot. Once up. however, the top of the 1·ock affords
sufficient surface for a party of a score of men to stand on, or to ensconce themselves. It is probably 60 feet above the level of the sea.
Usually upon a calm sunny day its summit is densely covered with a
flock of sea birds, of all kinds, so different in color, shape, and size as
to delight the ornithologist-some sitting, some standing, some apparently sleeping, some hopping, others flapping, screaming, crowding,
and fighting, seemingly, to secure, each for himself: a momentary
resting-place upon the rock; while high above all this din the atmosphere is darkened with myriads of the flock flying in all manner of
gyrations-now ascending, next descending, some enlarging, others
contracting the orbits of their flight-all looking down the while upon
the angry strife of their fellows below, intently watching for the first
vacant spot of the rock to suddenly dart down, seize, and perch upon
it in turn, or contribute to the confusion. Such is but a feeble picture of the scenes with which the summits of these dark and towering pillars in Port Orford bay are daily animated. But upon the
summit of Battle Rock a different strife from that of the birds was
enacted.
In early times of the influx of population into California, immediately Fmcceeding its acquisition to the United States, adventurous
spirits to the number of a dozen or so chartered a schooner, and embarked at San Francisco, bent upon exploring the coast of Oregon,
for purposes in general, and the purpose, in particular, of discovering
a suitable site for a tmvn, to be laid out into lots for sale. Arrived
off what is now Port Orford, then not known to the Bostons, and
attracted by the favorable aspect the site presented through the medium of their telescope, the schooner's prow was turned to the
entrance of the bay, and when sufficiently in (about 10 o'clock, or
five bells, a. m.) her anchor was let go, and she swung head to tide,
then half ebb. The whole party, except the master and cabin-boy,
were soon seated in the yawl, pulling ashore for a more minute examination. So engrossed were they in the discussion of speculative
profits of "town lots for sale," little did they think there ever was
such a thing as an ambuscade, or even dream of anything more, in
the shape of an ~nemy, than a grizzly bear being near the handsome
site that lay so invitingly before them. No sooner, however, had
the party safely beached and secured their only boat above highwater mark, crossed the beach and fairly reached the high plateau,
and began to admire the advantages of the site, when all of a sudden
they were startled by a terrific yell in the rear, discovering the horrible reality of being completely surrounded and cut off from all access
to the schooner by a hostile band of Indians, one party of 'Nhom being
already in possession of their boat, and in all outnumbering the little
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band of adventurous speculators in ''town lots for sale'' ten to one.
Here were symptoms unmistakeable of an enemy more formidable
than grizzly bears; and if, perchance, there was a doubt of the intention of the Indians towards our little party it was but for a moment,
as they were immediately saluted, in front and flank, by a shower of
flint-headed arrows. This was promptly returned, but the Indians,
nothing daunted, rushed furiously on, pouring in volleys of arrows as
they advanced, and the fight soon became pressing. The little band
·of Bostons bravely and adroitly defended themselves, retreating until
forced to the very water's edge, as it happened, directly under Battle
Rock. The whites were not long in seeing that their last and only
hope consisted in gaining its summit. In hasty council, amid showers
of arrows poured in from their pursuers, it was decided to make the
attempt to scale the rock. The effort proved successful, and, although
possession was disputed by the countless number of sea birds which
had held it undisturbed by any but their own kind for centuries, our
friends, all eleven in number, thus separated from their schooner,
some already wounded in the onslaught, found themselves on top of
the citadel rock, and for a moment in comparative safety. The
battle ceased, however, only long enough for the parties to survey
their relative positions. The Indians, led on by their oldest chief,
renowned in savage cunning, repeatedly attempted to scale the
citadel, eager for the conflict hand to ,hand; but the Bostons defended
the rock most successfully; every redskin venturing to scale it was a
fatal mark for the unerring rifle or revolver. Their telling, well reserved fire and the flood tide at length gave the Bostons a respite, a
breathing spell, for the first time since their surprise. It was not
long, however, before they perceived their wily foe, the old chief,
preparing to add to the attack a regular siege; and on looking for the
schooner, with amazement beheld her fast sailing out of the bay.
But before charging desertion, it must be told that the master, on
discovering the ambuscade and becoming satisfied, although successful in baffiing attempts of the Indians who had seized the yawl to
board him, that he was powerless to render immediate aid by waiting, slipped his cable, and, by aid of his boy, hoisted sail and squared
away before a f,esh breeze for San Francisco, 375 miles before him,
for assistance, that being the only point where it could be obtained.
In this laudable undertaking we leave the schooner, and return to
Battle Rock.
As soon as the next ebbing tide would permit the old chief returned
to the assault of the citadel, but with no better success. In the meantime he had sent the swiftest runners to the remotest of the band,
who, to the summons, came swarming in to swell the number of the
besiegers. Every morning's dawn revealed to the unfortunate besieged a prospect more gloomy for each succeeding day. It was only
during high water that it was not necessary to stand by their arms to
prevent an escalade, which was as certain to be attempted as that
low tide would ensue. The ravenous flock so unceremoniously dispossessed of their perch came circling and screaming around, exces-
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sively annoying them during the day, and the coming of night only
afforded time for sad reflection in reference to the morrow.
For three days and as many nights, with several of their number
wounded and bleeding, the heroic little band of ''town lots for sale''
speculators held the citadel, without food, without water, without
rest, in the broiling sun of the day and in the cold damp of the night,
against fearful and increasing odds. On the eve of the last night,
their ammunition being very nearly exhausted, a council was held;
it resulted in the bold, unanimous resolve, to make, under the cover
of the dark, at low tide, the desperate effort to abandon the rock by
the same narrow face they had gained it, and each for himself to run
the gauntlet through the enemy's ranks, to seek, as a last resort, his
own safety in the dark recesses of the woods immediately in rear of
the Indians. At the proper stage of water that night this desperate
attempt was made, and none, save one, ever escaped to tell the story
of their disasters; he was two years subsequently found a poor maniac
prisoner, in possession of the Coquille band. But what of the master
of the schooner? He, true to his friends, returned with a strong
party, after a trip of ten days, only, however, to find Battle Rock
again in possession of its feathered occupants, and his friends beyond
the reach of human succor.
The discovery of gold in the Rogue River valley attracted, with
some well-disposed persons, many of the most unprincipled and ungovernable white men from all countries; ·w ith few exceptions, but
for these wretches, it is believed the Iudians of Oregon would have
been the most peaceable, friendly, and easiest managed, with proper
care, of any uncivilized tribes within the bounds of the United States.
It is very true the Rogue river tribe was one of the few exceptions
referred to; but they had felt the force of a blow administered by a
command under Brevet Major P. Kearny, captain 1st dragoons in 1851,
near the mouth of a branch of Rogue river about 15 miles north of Table
Rock, (see map No. 11 ;) and whether this was sufficiently salutary or
not, their roguish and stealing propensities afforded no just provocation,
more especially when not in the commission of crime, for the infernal
acts of cruelty committed upon them by some of that class of unprin- ·
cipled whites, such as are always known to lurk on the confines of
civilization, between the peaceable settlements and the Indian lodge,
acknowledging no law but that of force, and in their hearts and acts
far deeper down in the scale of human degradatiop, and far more
capable of producing mischief in the settlements, because, to an evil
heart, there is coupled superior intelligence, than any Rogue River
Indian was known to be, before or since the discovery of gold in his
valley.
Does any one ask what these infernal acts of cruelty have been?
and by whom have they been perpetrated? Official public documents
tell us: In the autumn of 1852, ''a party of citizens, under conduct of
one Captain Ben. Wright, massacred over thirty Indians out of fortyeight, who had come into his camp by invitation to make a 'peace.'"
It seems" Wright determined not to return to Yreka without bearing
some evidence of success in his expedition, and having failed to find
them by hunting for the Indians, he invited them to his camp by
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means of a squaw. Upon this invitation forty-eight came, and while
there Wright directed his men to charge their rifles afresh, to make a
sure fire, which was done in presence of the Indians, without exciting
their suspicion, and then, upon a signal from Wright, they suddenly
fired upon the Indians, and succeeded in killing about 38. The signal
was the discharge of a revolver by Wright, by which he killed the
two principal Indians, with whom he had been engaged in talk.
Wright's men returned to town, bearing on their rifles the scalps of
their victims, he reporting that he had demanded of the Indians stolen
property, and on their refusal to deliver it up he had thus punished
them."-(Ex. Doc. 76, 34th Cong., 3d session.)
As a natural result of this treachery, the tribe combined with the
Rogue River Indians, in the following summer, and attacked a settlement near Jacksonville.-(See map No. 11.)
We thus have what are believed to be the provocation and beginning of the Rogue river war of 1853, terminating in a fight between
the Oregon volunteers, with one captain and ten soldiers of the United
States army, under General Jo. Lane, and the Indians, on the 24th
September, 1853, on the side of the mountain seen on map No. 11,
to the south of Battle creek.
Captain B. R. Alden, 4th United States infantry, had been ordered,
in anticipation of any outbreak that might follow in consequence of
the massacre by Wright, into that district; and promptly, on the first
intimation, repaired with all the men, ten in number, of his company
who were fit for duty, and before General Lane arrived, ''the whole
country had been scoured, under the direction of Captain Alden, in
all directions, and the main body of the Indians driven to their strongholds in the mountains.''
But this did not satisfy the volunteers; so, on the next day after
General Lane joined the forces at Stewart's creek, he was elected to
take command on the 22d of September. After assuming it he divided
his force into two battalions, ''in order to better scour the whole
country,'' which he himself reports had already been scoured, and
put one battalion under citizen Colonel Ross, and the other under
Captain Alden, (who, be it observed, was an army officer, and had
ten regulars,) and the general put himself at the head of this bat·
talion, directing the one under Ross to proceed up Evans' creek, and
Alden's to go via Table Rock, thence up the same creek.
The command started from Stewart's creek at 4 p. m., 22d September, and after pursuing the Indian trail under difficulties caused
by the Indians setting fire to the woods in their rear, up Evans'
creek, thence up Battle creek; the general reports that on the morning of the 24th, while riding in front, ''he heard the crack of a rifle
in the direction of the enemy,'' and without halting he advanced
alone, and by his ear discovered their camp ''in a dense forest thick
with underbrush, which entirely obstructed the view."
When the troops came up the general announced his order of battle:
''Alden, at the head of one company, to proceed on the trail to attack
the enemy in front, and part of another company to go round and
turn their left flank. Alden proceeded to engage them in the most
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gallant manner; his well directed fire ·was the first intimation of our
approach. It being found impracticable to turn their left, the flanking party proceeded to engage them on their right. The men were
now deployed, taking cover behind the trees, and the fight became
general.''
The general also reports: •' I was delayed a few minutes for the
arrival of the rear guard; these, all but fifteen, I immediately led into
action. On arriving on the ground I found Captain Alden, who had
been shot down early in the fight, dangerously wounded, in the arms
of his faithful sergeant, surrounded by a few of his men. After
examining the ground and finding that the enemy were securely
posted behind trees and bogs and concealed by underbrush, and that
it was possible to reach them, I determined to charge them. I passed
the order, led forward in the movement, and within thirty yards of
their position received a wound. Believing the shot came from the
flank, I ordered our line to be extended to prevent the enemy from
turning it, and the men were again ordered to cover behind trees.''
In this position, which they held for three or four hours, the general
says that his "men were cool and determined on conquering."
''Finding myself weak from the loss of blood, I retired to the rear
to have my wound examined and dressed.'' While the general was
in the rear the Indians cried to the whites ''that they wished fd'r a
talk; that they desired to fight no longer; that they desired peace,"
and expressed a wish to see General Lane, who says: "Finding that
they '\Vere much superior to us in numbers, having about 200 warriors
well armed with rifles and muskets, well supplied with ammunition,
and knowing that they could fight as long as they saw fit, and then
safely retreat into a country exceedingly difficult of access, and being
desirous of examining their position, I concluded to go among them."
During this interview the preliminaries of a peace were agreed
upon. The treaty was completed at Table Rock a few days after;
but it seems not until Captain A. J. Smith, 1st United States dragoons, arrived with his troop from Port Orford: were the negotiations
for the peace concluded. General Lane says: '·This arrival ·was
most opportune.''
It was soon after this that Fort Lane was established, and Captain
Smith put in command. In speaking of the participators in this
action, the general says: ''Too much praise cannot be awarded to
Captain Alden; the country is greatly indebted to him for the rapid
organization of the forces when it was entirely without defence; his
gallantry is sufficiently attested by his being dangerously wounded
while charging at the head of his command almost at the enemy's
lines.'' And then goes on to compliment, in the most flattering terms,
the volunteers by whose voice he had been put in command; while
it has been positively asserted that when the order to charge was
given not a man of the volunteers advanced, but that Alden and his
ten regulars charged unsustained. Ross' battalion did not arrive in
time to participate in the fight, and only two companies, including
the regulars, were engaged.
It will, I think, be perceived, on a careful examination of the
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general's report, that so far from a victory of the volunteers over the
Indians having been gained, the latter were rather the victors; at the
best it will not be regarded better for the whites than a drawn battle.
The Indians asked for peace while yet in possession of the field, and
obtained it. In granting it the general undoubtedly exercised sound
judgment. He said, ''I have no doubt, with a proper care, the
peace can be strictly maintained;'' and so it would have been, undoubtedly, but from causes similar in kind to that which provoked these
hostilities.
The gallant general who figured as the hero of the closing scene of
this three days' war was elected and took his seat in Congress as
delegate from Oregon soon after, and during that Congress a large
amount was appropriated to pay the volunteers who were in this
service. The notorious Ben Wright not long after was appointed
sub-Indian agent at Port Orford, and came to his death in the spring
of 1855 by treachery at the hands of Indians on Rogue river-in
their view a just retribution for his own treachery. Captain Alden
soon after resigned his commission, and the army lost a gallant and
meritorious officer.
Having presented the provocation, the progress, and conclusion of
this affair, I leave it to others to infer what may have been the motives in superseding Captain Alden, and who were the gainers among
the principal actors.
At the mouth of the Coquille river, ''on the morning of the 28th
of January, 1854, under the conduct of one Abbott, a recently discharged sergeant of the 1st dragoons, a party of whites attacked the
different lodges of Indian families at daylight, before they were up 1
and sixteen Indians were killed and four wounded. The alleged
cause was that the chief bad threatened war; that he would not treat
with the whites; that he bad fired a shot at the house at the ferry,
&c. The chief said he had fired at ducks in the river, and not at the
house." On investigation it was found that this was a wanton, unprovoked attack upon inoffensive families.
In July, 1855, a council was to be held by the then superintendent
of Indian affairs in Oregon with the tribes in this district, at a point
about three miles up from the mouth of Rogue river. The Indians,
on invitation of the superintendent, were assembling. On the day
previous to that fixed for the treaty one, from provocation, wounded
a white man before the detachment of troops that had been sent
from Port Orford to keep order bad arrived. The whites assembled
to the number of sixty, and loudly demanded of the sub-agent the
offender, to hang him. This summary process was stoutly opposed
by that functionary, but on the arrival of the troops he agreed to
allow him to be taken under their conduct before a justice of the
peace for a hearing. The justice bound the prisoner over for trial,
and remanded him in charge of the corporal's guard to camp for safe
custody. The corporal, with two privates, the prisoner, and another
Indian as canoe-man, were returning in their canoe down the river,
when they discovered a boat containing three whites in hot pursuit,
and two others, containing whites, following. Soon the foremost came
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near the corporal's canoe and fired into his party, killing both Indiansthe prisoner and canoe-man. Not·withstanding, the council was held,
and the Indians of Rogue river and Port Orford agreed to quit their
native soil and go to reside on a tract that had been designated as
the Coast Indian Reservation, further north, represented on map No.
14. It was the design to gather all the bands along the coast of Oregon
and place them upon it, there to teach them agriculture and the arts,
and to forever prevent whites from acquiring the rights of soil upon it.
Now, it is certainly not to be denied that some of the Indians; especially in the upper part of the Rogue River valley, may have objected
to the treaty, and evinced some reluctance to comply; but they had
two years' time allowed in which they were to make preparations and
go, and it is believed that had the whites shown patience and forborne to interfere the superintendent would have had them all removed within the time specified, and Oregon would have been saved
the shame reflected upon her by the commission of those most outrageous deeds that followed; such, for example, as that perpetrated
by one Lupton and his party, ''who killed 25 friendly Indians, 18 of
whom were women and children;" and that perpetrated by one Hank
Brown and party, at Looking Glass prairie, ''in killing from 8 to 10
friendly Indians, invited there by the settlers for protection and
safety."
From such acts of cruelty can it be at all surprising that a retaliatory spirit was manifested on the part of the Indians?
We now have some of the provocations that in reality gave rise to
the Rogne river war, of 1855, which was first formally and officially
declared against the Indians, in the proclamation of George L. Curry,
governor of Oregon Territory, October 15, 1855-assigning as the
casus belli that he had been informed ''that the Shasta and Rogue
River Indians 'in southern Oregon, have, without respect to age or
sex, murdered a large number of our people, burned their dwellings,
and destroyed their property; and that they are now menacing the
southern settlements with all the atrocities of savage warfare;'' and
by this same proclamation he calls out companies of mounted volunteers, to constitute two battalions-one to be denominated the
''northern battalion,'' the other the ''southern battalion.''
The commanding officer at Fort Jones reported officially to the
United States commanding general of the department, November 2,
1855, that ''the recent murders by Indians of women and children
in Rogue River valley, were literally retaliatory of, and immediately
succeeded the massacre by Lupton and his party.''
In confirmation of which we have the official letter of the adjutant
general of Oregon, .dated October 20, 1855, in which it says '' information had been received that armed parties had taken the field in
southern Oregon, with the avowed purpose of waging a war of extermination against the 1ndians in that section of the Territory, and had
slaughtered, without respect to age or sex, a band of friendly Indians
on their reservation, in despite of the authority of the Indian agent
and the commanding officer of the United States troops stationed there.''
Now, can any conscientious man believe that the intelligent, in-
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dustrious officer, Captain Smith, who was then, and who had been,
in command at Fort Lane, in the very centre of these Indians during
the period of more than two years previous, would not have known,
and reported to headquarters, a necessity, if there was one, of more
military force than that of the United States already there to meet
the exigency in the district of which he was the responsible commandant? No report was made by him or either of the commandants
of Fort Jones or Fort Orford expressive of any such necessity.
The governor says he was moved to call out this force ''by a petition numerously signed by citizens of Umpqua valley,'' and ordered
them to rendezvous at Jacksonville, which is the identical focus of
the organization of General Joseph Lane's volunteers of 1853, who
had been so liberally paid by the United States from an appropriation
disbursed among them just previously to the getting up of this moving
petition, which, if granted, would bring occupation for eight hundred
men and as many horses for the ensuing winter, and they would only
have to ride about and kill Indians until planting time next spring.
These battalions, with the title of ''southern army,'' were under the
command of Brigadier General John K. Lamerick, and it is not surprising
that with such an array and the well known hostility of many of the
citizens, some of the Indians flew to their arms and others to the
United States military posts for protection.
On rendering his report of March 31, 1853, General Lamerick only
cites three skirmishes, in which he claims success for the several
divisions of his army; of these, one was with Old John's band of about
200, while on the trail to Crescent City, in which the enemy retreated
fighting to the mountains; 3 whites and 10 Indians killed; another,
when 100 volunteers attacked 75 to 80, on Cow creek, and drove
them; one white killed and one wounded; four Indians killed; the
third was when a company attacked 75 Indians, six miles south of
Camos prairie, and drove them, killing three. But he makes no allusion to the shameful conduct of the 250 volunteers who had agreed
to support Captain Smith's regulars in the fight of Grave Creek hills,
where, by a single blow, had these volunteers come up to the work,
the war would probably have been brought to a close in 15 days after
the issuing of the governor's proclamation; nor does he report other
affairs of more shame to the '' southern army'' during the succeeding
winter, of which some are enumerated in an official report by the
commanding general of the department of the Pacific, May 30, 1856.
He says ''no man can have felt more keenly or grieved more sincerely
than I have at the sacrifice in southern Oregon of many innocent
men, women, and children by savage warfare. But what was the
cause? No other than the massacre by volunteers and citizen of
sows 80 or more friendly Indians. As in the case of the killing,
by two companies of volunteers, a friendly chief (Old Jake) and his
band, comprising between 30 and 40 males, besides destroying their
huts and provisions, and exposing their women and children to the
cold of December, who, in making their way to Fort Lane for protection, arrived there with their limbs frozen; the killing in the most
brutal manner, with clubs, two old squaws, one of whom was lame
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and carrying a child, which was taken by the heels and its brains
dashed out against a tree; that of the same Brown who was concerned
in the massacre by Lupton, during which an Indian boy, twelve years
of age, who could speak some English, ran to him and said 'I have
done you no harm, my heart is good towards you, you will not kill me/
Brown replied 'Damn your Indian .heart,' and seized him by the hair
and with his bowie knife severed his head from his body; the determination of certain citizens to murder 400 friendly Indians at Fort Lane,
waiting there to be conducted by the superintendent of Indian affairs
to the coast reservation, but prevented by Captain Smith, the commanding officer; the similar determination in the Willamette valley to ~
kill the same Indians! and all who might accompany them, should the
attempt be make to take them to the reservation."
It has already been said that an immediate effect of the organization of the governor's southern army was to cause some of the
Indians to stand to their arm3, one of their first acts afterwards was
to attack the little party of 10 under Lieut. Kautz, 4th infantry,
when about closing the exploration for a road from Port Orford to
the Oregon trail in the direction of Fort Lane, (see maps Nos. 10, 12.)
In this attack, which occurred on the 25th October, 1855, at a point
marked with that date on the map, the lieutenant made a successful
defence without serious hurt, and the party made their way safely to
Fort Lane, this officer having, in the mean time, discovered the position
of the main bodv of Indians then under arms to be in the Grave
Creek hills, about 45 miles from Fort Lane.
All the disposable troops at the fort were put in motion. The
command of regulars consisted of 85 men and 4 officers: Capt. A. J.
Smith, 1st dragoons; First Lieutenant H. G. Gibson, 3d artillery; Second
Lieutenants A. V. Kautz, 4th infantry, and B. Alston, 1st dragoons.
At Grave creek they were joined by 250 volunteers, under Colonel
Ross. From this point they moved in three detachments by different
routes towards the position of the Indians. Unfortunately, from an
error of the scouts in regard to the location, all three detachments
came up in front instead of on different sides of the Indian camp.
About daylight 31st October the regulars, accompanied by two
companies of the volunteers, after climbing very steep and difficult
hills, came in sight of the Indians. Fires were then imprudently
built, which gave the Indians warning. At this point the baggage
and provisions were left in charge of Lieutenant Alston. The command
descending a mountain gorge, and climbing the opposite acclivity,
came upon the Indians, charged and drove them from the crest of the
hill on which they were encampP-d and some 50 yards into the brush
over the crest.
From the top of the hill for a distance of ] ~ mile it was a dense
thicket; on the left and on the right there wae a precipitous descent
into a gorge filled with large pines, with undergrowth, in which the
Indians concealed themselves, and all efforts to dislodge them proved
futile. Several charges were made by the regulars, but the men
were picked off so effectually by the Indian rifles that but little
advance was made into the thicket. The regulars stood their ground
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well, but the volunteers, 'vith the exception of about fifty, were of no
benefit in the action.
The troops continued to occupy this position until near sunset, now
and then exchanging shots with the Indians. After posting pickets
the troops descended to a spring to bivouac for the night, their loss
during the day having been thirty killed and wounded. The next
morning Lieutenant Gibson, with ten men, ':.ras sent up the hill to bring
down the dead body of one of his detachment; this had barely been
accomplished when the Indians came in large force around, and after
exchanging numerous shots, with but little effect, save the wounding
of Lieutenant Gibson, for two or three hours, were driven off, and left
the troops in possession of the field. At noon on the 1st November
Captain Smith having found by his experience the day before that no
confidence could be placed in the promised support of the volunteers,
ordered a return to Fort Lane, which was reached the next day.
r< The number of Indians was estimated at 300. The number of
troops actually engaged did not exceed 120, with every disadvantage
of position. The Indian loss, according to their own admission afterwards, was 7 killed. The greater portion of the regulars were dragoons, and their musketoons proved utterly inadequate to cope with
the rifles in the hands of the Indians.
No effort of Captain Smith could persuade the volunteers to go
round and take the Indians in the rear, while the regulars would
charge in front, and it seems only 50 out of 250 of the volunteers of
the governor's southern army could be induced to take any part in
the action, after coming to the point where, with resolution, they could
have been instrumental in capturing the whole body of Indians in
arms.
In the case of this southern army of Oregon we have the example
of a governor of a Territory organizing a military :''"rce, with a general officer at its head, and sending it into a field wit11in the command
assigned by the President to a general officer of the United States
army; the said governor in the mean while not so much as condescending to inform the President's officer of the measure, nor of the
orders, it now appears, he issued to the volunteers which prescribed
the relations they were to hold with the United States troops regularly stationed in the same field. It was only by accident, as it were,
in the following month the United States officer commanding the
department of the Pacific obtained a knowledge of the governor's
military measures. To say nothing of the question of the legality
of those measures, one familiar with military usage cannot fail to
perceive in them either a marked contempt of the authority of the
President's commander of the department, or else a total want of
knowledge of that courtesy which of right and by usage is due to
such officer.
On the 9th of the same November, while Major General Wool,
United States army, in command of the department of the Pacific,
was at Crescent City, on his way to the field of Indian hostilities,
which had broken out in the preceding month in the Yakama country
to the north of the Columbia, he received the first intelligence of the

48

TOPOGRAPHICAL MEMOIR OF THE

fight just described, and it was then that he also first received authentic information of the governor's declaration of war, and of the
southern army of his volunteers being in existence.
General Wool's presence in southern Oregon at this juncture was
exceedingly opportune. He was personally in position to enable himself to judge of the ne.cessary measures to be taken for the future
duties that would properly devolve on the troops under hif!1 own command in this district. Accordingly, acting upon the basis of humanity
towards the Indians, and at the same time having a due regard to the
safety of the settlements, the commanding officers of the United
States army in this district were instructed during the winter to
receive at their posts and protect from violence all friendly Indians
who would come in and express a willingness to go in the following
spring on the reservation set apart for them.
In spite, or more probably in consequence, of the operations of the
governor's southern army during the winter, it turned out in the
spring that the number of Indians in arms had increased; that they
had the entire command of the lower part of Rogue river; were besieging a block-house filled with citizens near the mouth, and were
really threatening the destruction of all the whites there; while many
of the friendly Indians had repaired to Crescent City, Fort Orford,
and Fort Lane for the promised protection, and to be ready to move
according to the terms of the treaty.
Several bands, deemed unfriendly, were in arms at different places
in the valley above; among these was that of Old John, ·who said
''the whites are determined to kill me and my band and we may as
well die fighting as in any other way." Indeed, this band alone had
become so formidable as to defy the "southern army;" and finally it
hecame necessary for the superintendent of Indian affairs, and for the
safety of the settlers, to call upon the regular troops to end the
troubles on Rogue river.
Accordingly, General Wool, being previously well advised of the
topography of the district, and the probable positions of the bands
in arms, devised and put into execution the following plan of military
operations for ending this Rogue river war by the United States
troops. After sending a detachment of troops from Fort Lane to
guard and conduct the friendly Indians waiting there to the reservation, there vvas left a small disposable force under Captain Smith,
1st dragoons.
One company (Captain Augur's, 4th infantry) was ordered down
from the Columbia river to Port Orford, where Captain (Brevet
Major) Reynold's company, 3d artillery, was already stationed; as
soon as Augur's could arrive there would be troops enough to protect
the friendly Indians and public stores collected here, and leave
another small force disposable for the field.
Captain Floyd Jones' company, 4th infantry, was ordered from
Fort Humboldt to Crescent City, to protect all supplies and public
property that might be landed there, also to guard the friendly Indians
who had been gathered there by the superintendent of Indian affairs
in Oregon.
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Captain Ord' s company, 3d artillery, then stationed at Benicia, was
ordered to be in condition for fielclem·vice, and in readiness to embark
at a certain time in the steamer from San Francisco to Oregon.
Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Buchanan, junior, major 4th infantry,
was selected by the general as the commanding officer to execute tho
plan of field operations.
On the 5th of l\farch the general himself embarked with Ord' s
company, Lieutenant Colonel Buchanan, and a few officers of his staff;
Captain Cram, Corps Topgraphical Engineers; Lieutenants Bonnycastle and Arnold, aids-de-camp, and Assistant Surgeon :Milhau, for
the field of operations; and while on his way up explained very fully
to Lieutenant Colonel Buchanan the plan he desired him to execute.
Lieutenant Bonnycastle subsequently relinquished his appointment
as aid, and joined the force in the field.
Ord' s company was to land at Crescent City, and the movement to
commence from there as soon as it would be judged that the force ·
from F.ort Lane under Captain Smith, he having been advitled, should
be able to reach the Illinois river, see map No. 9; and the force at
Port Orford was to proceed towards Rogue river, all three being
subject to the orders of Lieutenant Colonel Buchanan.
The general believed that by starting the three forces, all tending
ultimately to meet somewhere near the mouth of the Illinois river,
that from Crescent City moving towards the mouth of Rogue river,
that from Port Orford towards the same, or to a point higher up, and
after uniting both to ascend the river, while Captain Smith's 'ivou]d
be descending the valley, all the hostile bands would be most likely
to be encountered or ferreted out. He was aware of the natural
difficulties of the ground, and of the severe labor the troops must
apply to the task.
The field of operations is represented on map No. 12, and the points
where engagements occurred are designated by the symbol of tvi'O
swords crossed.
On the 8th of March Lieutenant Colonel Buchanan landed at Orescent City, and in one week after had his command in motion. The
force from Crescent City left on the 15th and encampPd at the mouth
of Rogue river (Ord' s company skirmishing there with the Indians)
on the 20th of l\farch.
And now it was that most. of these Indians began to show signs of
yielding, but their chiefs were tardy in coming in. The l\fc.Anooteney
band were obstinate; their town vvas 11 miles above the mouth, on
the right bank, (seen on the map,) at the entrance of a small stream
from the west. On the 26th of April Ord' s and Jones' companies,
112 men, Captain Ord, Captain Jones, Lieu.tenant Drisdale, ::-md Doctor
Millman, were sent up to raze that town; it was destroyed, but not
without obstinate resistance. The Indians were in force, and, having
the advantage of descent and cover, attacked the troops in flank and
rear. It was a spirited fight, resulting in the Indians being driven
up and across the river; then the troops withdrew in good order,
losing Sergeant Nash, however, who was shot from the bush~ and arrived in camp the next night.
H. Ex. Do~ 114--4
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On the 29th of April Captain Ord's company moved from camp at
an early hour and encountered the Indians on the Chetco river, where
he found them in force on the right bank. A running fight ensued;
the Indians, running faster than the pursuers, succeeded in crossing
the river and dispersing themselves in the hills.
Captain Smith's force had descended the valley from Fort Lane,
and the chief in command had consented to hold a council, he, as well
as the superintendent of Indian affairs, hoping that all now standing
aloof might be induced, after the lessons already received, to come
in, lay down their arms, and go upon the reserve.
Oak Flat, on the right bank of the Illinois, was designated as the
council ground, and there the council w~s held on the 21st and 22d
of May, the result of which was that most of the Indians agreed to
come in, and three days were allowed them to rendezvous at Big Meadow, above the Big Bend of Rogue river, where they were to deliver
up their arms: and thence to be escorted by the troops to Port Orford.
All but Old John's band promised to come in with seeming sincerity.
The whole eommand, except Ord' s company, were present at the
·council; that had previously been sent to Port Orford to escort a pro'Vision train to Oak Flat, and as it had not arrived; Reynolds' company
-was despatched, by the trail seen to the south of Pilot Knob, to meet
]it should it come by this route; but it came by the mouth of the river,
·thence on the east side. It was highly important to protect this train,
'W-ithout risking an attack.
On the 24th Captain Smith, with 50 dragoons and 30 of the 4th in:ffantry, 80 in all, left the council ground for Big Meadows, to receive
rthe a:r:ms and to escort the Indians to Port Orford; it was probably
1iDtende.d to conduct them thither by the most direct trail, after openling or improving it, from the Meadows. Smith had crossed the river
:and encamped at the point marked C on the evening of the 26th, Au;gur' s aompany having accompanied him nearly there to escort a train
lback. ron the day of Augur's return, probably the 25th, the chief
jn command moved from Oak Flat down the Illinois, leaving Jones'
•company at its mouth, and himself, with Augur's company, crossed
tRogue River and went up to a point marked B, about three to five
1miles west, to open or improve the direct trail, to which I have re·tferred, from Big Meadows.
Jt will now be seen that on the evening 9f the 26th of May Lieurtenant Colonel.Buchanan' s forces were situated: himself, with Augur,
,at the point B; Ord, escorting the train, on the east side of Rogue
1Ti-ver, within about ten miles of Oak Flat; Jones, at the junction of
·the Illinois; Reynolds, about ten miles from that junction, on the Port
'0rford trail; Smith, at Big Meadows, at the point C; and the main
body of the Indians were about five miles above the meadows, on the
banir of the riv.er.
Jt had rained ,v ery hard all day the 26th, and this was assigned to
Captain Smith as the reason why the Indians had not arrived at the
place of rendezvous. As the rain had rendered the trails muddy, this
seemed a reasonable excuse, and he trusted they would all be in by
the Close of the following day.
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Battle at Big JJfeadows.

As before stated, Captain Smith was encamped, on the evening of
the 25th of May, at the point C; but before many hours had elapsed,
that same night, circumstances occurred causing him to distrust the
Indians, and he immediately commenced moYing his camp, and by midnight his command were occupying a much better position-an oblong
elevation, 250 yards in length by 20 in width, represented on map
No. 13, between two small creeks entering the river from the northwest. This is a mound of low elevation, and between it and the river
there is a narrow bottom, which is Big Meadows. The southern border of the mound is abrupt and very difficult to climb; the northern
border more difficult; the west end is approachable, and can be ascended with some difficulty, while the eastern is a gentle slope, easy
of ascent. The top is a plateau of an area sufficient for one company
to encamp on. Directly to the north there is another mound, about
the same size, covered with scattering trees and brush. The summits
of the two are within rifle range, and at about the same elevation.
Early on the morning of the 27th Smith despatched an express to
apprise Lieutenant Colonel Buchanan of his new position, and that the
Indians had not come in, and said to the express, '' I think Old John
may attack me." It is to be observed that this chief had not assented
to the agreement of the others. The express reached his destination
that afternoon. The lieutenant colonel sent him back to Smith, and
requested to be informed if he desired to be reinforced. The express,
however, could not reach Captain Smith, and, finding he was surrounded
by Inrlians fighting furiously, returned, but, getting lost during the
night, did not report to Lieutenant Colonel Buchanan until 10 o'clock
the next morning, (28th of May.)
The chief in command immediately called in Augur's company,
(then cutting a road,) and ordered it to join Captain Smith at the Big
Meadows. The shortness of the time in which Captain Augur executed this order proved that gallant officer to be equal to the emergency. The distance, on the very difficult foot trail, is nearly eighteen
miles, and it was accomplished in four and a half hours. In the mean
time stirring scenes were being enacted at the Big Meadow mounds.
Smith's command had been up all night moving his camp, and, notwithstanding his men were much fatigued in consequence, by dawn of
day his position was defensible. After startiug the express off, and
as the morning light increased, numerous parties of Indians were seen
coming from all directions, and soon the north mound was occupied
by a large number.
A body of 40 warriors came up the gentle slope of the east end of
the mound, occupied by the troops, as if to enter camp. They signified a wish to see Captain Smith, as they said, to give up their arms
to him; but that officer was on his guard~ and directed them to
deposit their arms outside, designating a spot where all the Indians
must lay down their weapons. It afterwards appeared that this was
a stratagem to seize the person of Captain Smith. By the precaution
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already taken of planting a field howitzer so as to sweep that slope 1
and of stationing Lieutenant Switzer with the infantry, to defend at
all hazards the crest of the western slope, ,he was in condition to make
good his refusal to allow the warriors to enter his camp, and after a
short colloquy they retired, and were seen to hold consultation with
their chiefs on the opposite mound, where it had been discovered
Old John was very active in giving orders.
It was now apparent to Captain Smith that an attack was· meditated soon to be made upon his position. At 10 o'clock on the morning of the 27th . May, the Indians having completely surrounded,
opened a smart fire upon it, and simultaneously charges were made
up each slope, upon his flanks, but these were repulsed with the
howitzer and infantry. Now the voice of Old John rose above all
others, issuing his commands in tones so clear that they were distinctly heard in · Smith's camp, and interpreted to him. During the
day this master spirit frequently ordered a chage to be maqe by his
warriors, and it was attempted, but as successfully r(,jpulsed as the
first. The Indians were continually firing rifle shots from all quarters
into Smith's camp, and parties often boldly attempted to scale the
steeps of his mound, which protected his front and rear. In these
desperate efforts at escalade, which gave the troops ample work to
resist, several Indians on coming near enough were made to fall, roll
over and bite the dust. Only 30 of Smith's men had arms at all
adapted to long range~- the 50 dragoon musketoons could only tell
when the enemy came LBar. The Indians were much better armed
and delivered effective shots, themselves ueharmed, comparatively,
from the north mound. The battle was thus prolonged till night.
During the night of the 27th Smith rendered the position of his
men more safe from the enemy's rifles, by digging pits and erecting
breast defences, such as they were, with his few articles of camp
equipage.
On the morning of the 28th the Indians, refreshed, and augumented
in numbers, again opened fire upon the troops, and the battle was
continued pretty much in the same manner as it had been the day
previous. Old John could be heard above all the din shouting, urging,
encouraging, and even cursing his warriors to stimulate them to a
renewal of the desperate charges, which, as often as attempted, were
successfully repulsed, while Smith's men were now less annoyed by
the rifle shots of their enemies. The troops were directed by their
officers to husband well their ammunition, and never to make a shot
unless there was a fair prospect of its telling. But the shots from
the north mound had told sadly upon the little command, and Assistant
Surgeon Crane had his hands full. The dead and the wounded numbering 29.
About 4 o'clock p. m. the Indians were observed to be forming,
under the direction of "Old John," in two bodws, apparently with a
view to charge both flanks simultaneously, as well as the front and
rear, at the same time 'vith an unsual number. Smith was not mistaken in this conjecture; soon they were seen advancing, and the
flanking parties were half way up, Smith, in the mean time, while
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giving orders to his men how to act in this emergency, caught glimpses
in the distance of approaching numbers. Augur's company had
come ! and that officer gallantly entered the arena leading his men at
double quick, charging the Indians in rear. At the same moment
Smith, for the first time, ordered a charge from his right and from
his left, down both slopes of his mound, upon the advancing foes.
And now it was that the commanding voice of their chief was heard
no more, the Indians broke and endeavored to escape by crossing
the ·river, and victory declared for the troops.
The number of warriors who had arranged themselves under the
banner of Old John for this last struggle for the defence of their valley was about 400.
This chief was known to be brave and capable to command. He
had planned his operations well and extensively. After learnin~ of
the scattered positions of the forces under Lieutenant Colonel Buchanan, he counted upon destroying Smith's command on the morning of the 27th in a short time; then to immediately descend and
attack Jones, at the mouth of the Illinois, before Augur's company,
being on the opposite side of Rogue river, at some distance, and
Reynolds, at a still greater distance, could come to the rescue; and
then to cross the Illinois river and attack Ord and capture his train .
So confident were his warriors that Smith would fall an easy prey
that they had pieces of rope to the number of Smith's men in readiness to hang every one.
On the 29th, the next day after their defeat, the Indians sent word
to Captain Smith that they wanted "a talk." On the 30th the lieutenant colonel in command arrived at Big Meadows with his ·whole
force. The Indians again agreed to come in and go upon the reserve.
Old John was the last to give in, but finally assented.
About 20 miles above the mouth of Rogue river Captain Augur had
another fight with a party, about the 8th June, and brought them in;
and by the last of June the Rogue river war was at an end, and all
the Indians that had defied the :'southern army'' of Oregon so successfully were either at or on their way to the coast reservation in
western Oregon.
The expectations General \Vool had entertained of the officer who
·was selected for the command in this important service were fully
realized, and the manner in which his plan for closing this war wa,s
executed by Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Buchanan met the general's
entire approbation .
Western Oregon.-Map No. 14 shows so much of this as includes the
coast Indian reservation, and the military posts Umpqua, Hoskins,
and Yamhill, and the upper part of the Willamette. These three
posts were established by General vVool' s orders in July, 1856, for
the purpose of guarding the Indians, in number about 1, 500, whom
his humane measures had been instrumental in moving to this reservation. After the removal of these Indians from the Rogue river
valley and Port Orford district, it was no longer necessary to maintain troops at Fort Lane or Fort Orford. The positions occupied by
the new posts, considering the mountain passes through which the
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Indians could escape and return to their old grounds, were believed
to be the best that could have been selected to prevent their escape
and at the same time to afford protection to the settlements in this
part of the .Willamette and to the Umpqua valleys. The reservation is about 72 miles in length, coastwise, and 24 miles in average
width, extending from the Pacific back to the summit ridge of the
Coast range of mountains.
Should it be deemed expedient Fort Hoskins might be moved into
the reserve and placed on the Siletz, at a prairie seen marked on the
map at P.
From November to June steamers ascend the Willamette to Corvalis, and to Dayton on the Yamhill during the whole year. The
roads are passable for wagons between Fort Hoskins and the neighboring towns.

Distances.
From-

'Io-

Miles.

------------------------- l--------------------------1 -----Fort Hoskins ______________________ .
Do. ____ • _____ • _______________ .
Do . .___________ ,.-------------Do·--------------------------Do. _________ ----_._-------____
Do·--------------------------Do __ . ___ ._._. _______ • ________ .

Corvalis ______ . _ • ___________ . _....
Salem __________ • ___ • _ ____ ____ ____
Dalles--------------------------Fort Yamhill, Grand Rond__________
Dayton ________ ••••.•• ------ __ ---Portland.-----------------------Fort Vancouver ____ ._. __ .__________

15
30
20
40
40
68
75

The Willamette is tributary to and enters the Columbia about 6
miles below Fort Vancouver. Its general course is north, parallel to
the seacoast. Sea steamers of 10 feet draught ascend to the city of
Portland, 12 miles above its mouth, and 144 miles by the steamers'
run above the bar of the Columbia. A.bove Portland the Willamette
becomes of less depth, so that small river boats are used to ascend
12 miles to Oregon City; at this point navigation is interrupted by
the "Willamette falls." Here the whole river comes tumbling in
majestic grandeur over the rocky barrier, making the total fall 30
feet vertical in a short distance. A.bove these falls, for a distance of
50 to 55 miles to Salem, the stream is navigated by light draught
steamers in favorable stages, and even to Corvalis between November and June.
The valley of the Willamette is about 120 miles in length, north
and south, and about 36 miles in breadth, east and west, giving about
4,100 square miles, most of which is good for agricultural purposes.
This valley is the trough between the parallel mountain ranges, the
Cascade on the east and the Coast range on the west side, and it is
one of the very best in Oregon, whether we consider its magnitude,
climate, soil, or facilities of outlet. Wheat, barley, oats, potatoes,
apples, and pears are raised in great abundance, and it would sustain
a population of 150,000. Its products might be immense in proportion to its area; but where would a market be found for its surplus?

DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC.

55

Distances by the roads.
From-

To-

Fort Lane, (Rogue river valley) ------- Booneville-----------------------Booneville • _. _. _______________ • ___ . Corvalis _. __ • ____ •• _______ • ___ . _. _
Corvalis ______ --------------------SAlbany---------------------------1ntiam ___ . _____ • ________ ..•• ___ •.
Salem _____ •..• ___ • ____ -- _________ •
Oregon City _______________ . __ • ____ .

Miles.

181
5

Albany------------·-------------Santiam
-------·-------------·---Salem • _••
__ • _____ •.•. __ •• _______ .
Oregon City_._. ____ • __________ •. _.
Portland __ .• ______ . ____________ ._.

10
8
15

Portland---------------------·---- Fort Vanco~ver ferry, Columbia......

8

36
11

The military connexions by road between northern California, and
southern and western Oregon, are as follows going north inDistances.
From-

To-

Miles.

Fort Jones, via Yreka, California .•.• _ _
Fort Lane .••••••••• ------._- •• _•• _.
Jacksonville--------------·--·-·--Evans' ferrY-----------------------Grave creek-----------------------Cow creek .• ---.·.-----_ •.••• _•• --._.
Eliff _______________________________

Fort Lane, Rogue River valley, Oregon_
Evans' ferry, across Rogue riv __ .do...
Evans' ferry-----· ___________ do...
Grave creek ------------------do...
Cow creek, Umpqua valley ••••. do...
Eliff, south extremity eafion __ •• do...
Cailonville, north ext'y cailon .•• do...

19

Cafionville ------------------------Myrtle creek--------- .•••••• :. •••..
Round Prairie---------------------Roseburg----------------·--------Winchester .•.•• . ------------------Catapooy creek--------------------You Calla __________________________
Fort Umpqua.·--------------------Scottsburg------------------------Elkton---------------------------Mouth Pass creek .• _. ___ • _.___ , _•• _..
You Calla·------------------------Eliuslaw ---- ----------------------Starr's Point----------------------Jennyapolis -----------·-----------Booneville------------------------Fort Jones ____ . ___ • _______________ .
Fort Lane .•. ______________ • _______ .
Fort Lane·-------·----------------Fort Yamhill, Grand Rond ___________
Fort Umpqua----------------------

Myrtle creek -----------------do...
Round Prairie ----------------do...
Roseburg, (Deer creek)---------do...
Winchester------ ____________ do...
Catapooy creek _______________ do...
You Calla ____________________ do...
Mouth Pass creek-------- ______ do...
Scottsburg -------------------do...
Elkton ----------------------do...
Mouth Pass creek -------------do...
Eugene City, Willamette valley .do.·._
Siuslaw, (Long Tom creek) ••••• do...
Starr's Point_ ----------------do...
Jennyapolifl------------------do...
Booneville -------------------do...
Fort Vancouver, (ferry, Columbia)....
Fort. Lane .• _______ ••. ______ •• ___ •.
Fort Hoskins _.• ____ . ___ •. __ • _____ •
Fort Vancouver, (ferry)------------Fort Vancouver, (ferry)------------Fort Hoskins----------------------

10
8
7
5
9
11
7
24
20
15
30
30
30
8
3
93
69
201
274
55
146

69
11
23
9
7
11

There is a wagon road from Fort Jones to Fort Lane, crossing the
Ciskiou mountain, which is bad to pass before the 1st to the 1Oth
June. When it is in good condition it takes three days for a wagon
to pass between the two forts.
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From Fort Lane a company of dragoons marched to Fort Vancouver ferry on the Columbia river, by the route above given, in 21
days in the month of November, when the roads were very heavy,
taking its wagon train along. This was at the rate of 13 miles per
day.
From Fort Umpqua, via Scottsburg and the Long Tom creek, to
Fort Hoskins the road in many places on the first part of the route
would be very difficult to march a command over. I have already
referred to the importance of improving this part by an expenditure
from the public treasury for military purposes. I ·have no doubt if a
good road were opened on this. route one of the three posts now
required to guard the c.oast reservation might be dispensed with.
Northern Oregon.-'rhe part of this as far to the eastward as Fort
Dalles is shown on map No. 16; thence to where the parallel of 46
degrees of north latitude strikes the Columbia is shown on map No.
20. The length of the portion of the Columbia which is in part the
northern boundary of Oregon is about 345 miles; that is, from its
mouth up to the point where it is met by that parallel 5 miles below
the old Hudson Bay post, Fort Walla-Walla. This same portion also
makes a part of the southern boundary of Washington Territory.
From the said point, about 5 miles below Fort Walla- Walla, in going
eastward, the boundary betvveen the two Territories is that parallel
of latitude continued to the summit of the Rocky mountains.
The Columbia is l:iuccessfully navigated by a sea steamer, entering
its mouth under the charge of a pilot in fair weather at high tide,
drawing 18 feet water, up to Fort Vancouver, a United States military post on its right bank, 138 miles above the bar; and by one of
10 feet draft up to the Cascades, which are 45 miles further up the
river. At the Cascades all navigation is effectually stopped by rapids
and falls, in which, for an extent of 4~ miles, the total fall is 27~
feet. In the pool of the river, extending 45 miles from the head of
these falls to Fort Dalles, on the left bank, · the river is again navi~able by small river steamers.
From Fort Dalles up to the head
Des Chutes for 15 miles navigation is stopped by rapids; thence the
river is again navigated by oar boats about 100 miles, to Fort WallaW alla, and this reach is not interrupted by rapids for 60 miles further up.
From the mouth to Fort Dalles, 233 miles, the valley of the Columbia seems to partake more of the character of a crack or cleft in
the earth produced by volcanic violence than by any other cause.
There is very little of the soil that is at all desirable for cultivation.
There is plenty of timber of poor quality, fir, and Oregon pine and
miserable oak on the islands, but not a tree grows there that is fit for
ship building, except for small spars or yards. The lumber that is
made from these forests is of a coarse kind, answering for only the
frame work of buildings.
To one who has personally examined the physical character on the
ground, rather than judged by the physical geography as presented
by the few maps,- which are only distinguished by their paucity of
information of the vast region drained by the Columbia, the idea is
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irresistible that it can nev0r become one in which civilization can
flourish. This is the general view to be taken of Oregon from the
Pacific to the summit of the Rocky mountain range. It is true there
are valleys and spots, and even some hill-sid0s which, but for the
formidable physical barriers separating them, would be desirable.
Such obstacles as the Sierra Nevada, the Cascade range, and the
Coast·range of mountains running across a State, render all intercommunication almost impossible without vast expense, and their sterile
sides and broad bases leave but a small fraction of the total soil fit
for cultivation. The number of square miles in Oregon is nearly
172,000. Of this area there is not more than 40,000 square miles at all
fit for cultivation, even supposing good markets for surplus and easy
intercommunication. But from the eternal barriers separating the
little fertile valleys, the difficulties of access, the want of harbors and
markets, not mor'e than one-eighth part of the whole soil of Oregon
can be regarded as at all adapted to agricultural industry of any
profit. These isolated valleys are exceptions to the general. rule of
barrenness or sterility which attaches to the vast region drained by
the Columbia-a region only fit, as a general rule, for the occupancy
of the nomadic tribes 1vho now roam over it, and who should be
allowed peacefully to remain in its possession.
.
The Columbia river is important for military purposes in connexwn
with these tribes. On this line we are now keeping up a post at
Vancouver, Cascades, Dalles, and Mill creek; the last, however,
being some 30 miles to the south of the Columbia, in the vaUey of the
Walia-Wall a.
Only one of these, Fort Dalles, is in Oregon; but it is an important
point. It is to the Pacific slope what Fort Leavenworth is to the
east slope of the Rocky mountains in its military aspect. In all the
country above the Dalles mounted troops may be used to advantage;
but to give the employment of such more economy a communication
should be made from Fort Vancouver along the banks of the Columbia of a nature to allow a troop of dragoons to pass along it by their
?wn feet, without the necessity, as now, of transporting the animals
In bo~ts. On this subject I here quote what I have said on a former
occasiOn : '' Congress appropriated for a military road from Fort
Vancouver to Fort Dalles. I am satisfied, from my o·yvn reconnaissance, a good wagon road on the banks of the Columbia between
these two points cannot be well and properly made short of $450,000.
And even supposing it made at this cost, the principal part of the
transportation for military purposes would continue to be done by
steamboats. But there is an improvement that could be made in the
?ad places on the existing trail, consisting in improving this trail
Into a road that will enable dragoons to pass readily over it at all
seasons. It would then save the great cost now incurred for the
transportation of horses, mules, and cattle upon steamers for military
purposes. The sum of $25.000 would be ample for this kind of improvement; and it is precisely what is wanted by emigrants and
stock growers to drive their stock on down the Columbia."
I have already said there are no steamboats now navigating any
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part of the Columbia above Fort Dalles, and above it, in any direction
into the Indian country, transportation must be by land for all military purposes, except in that direction which would be accommodated
by row boatsabove Des ·chutes.
The district of northern Oregon, lying between the bases of the
Cascade range and the Blue mountains, has much sameness all the
way from Fort Dalles to the Umatilla, (map No. 20.) It is high and
rolling prairie and bears good grass. It cannot be said to be well
watered, although water occurs at convenient distances along tne
road. The streams are approached by steep descents, and are generally fringed with cottonwood. In all other places the country is
destitute of timber. In the immediate valleys of the streams the soil
is often fertile, but these valleys in no case exceed half a mile in
width. The tributaries of the Umatilla become almost dry in the
fall, and that river itself becomes a mere rivulet in September-.
Along the base of the Blue mountains are numerous springs, which
always yield a supply.
The whole region of country embracing the valley of the Umatilla,
and those of its tributaries, is well adapted to grazing.
The road between Fort Dalles and the west base of the Blue
mountains is as good as natural roads generally are in hilly prairie
districts. This is the road followed in passing between Fort Dalles
and the military post in the Walla-Walla valley. A judicious expenditure of $25, 000 on this road would make it good for all purposes.
The distance between the two posts is 164 miles to go round by McKay's, on the Umatilla. From Fort Dalles to the Indian agency on
the Umatilla it is 111 miles; and from Fort Dalles to the spring at
west base of Blue mountains it is 143 miles.
Distance from-

To--

Fort Dalles •.•• -------------------Des Chutes river·-----------------John Day's river ••••• -------------Cedar spring _________ _____ . ______ .
Willow creek ••••.• _•• _•••• ____ ••• .
Butter creek·---------------------Umatilla Indian agency .••••••••••••.
Spring on Umatilla ..................
McKay's --------------------------

Des Chutes river .•• ·-------------John Day's river-----------------Cedar spring--------·----------- ·
Willow creek ____ • __ •• ____ • _•• _...
Butter creek. ____ •• __ ._. __ . ______ .
Umatilla Indian agency-----------Spring on Umatilla-----··--------McKay's, on Umatilla______________
Spring west base Blue mountain-----

~

Miles.

15
28
6
18
33
8
5
15
15 ·

Eastern Oregon is shown, on map No. 15, so far as to include an
extensive district of country lying between the Blue mountains and
the Rocky mountains, presenting the lower part of the Snake river,
and the headwaters of the Salmon river. This map exhibits the
topographical features of a considerable extent of Indian country
hitherto little known, except at a few points along the emigrant road.
In the summer of 1854 a party of emigrants, on their way towards
the Pacific, were attacked and several massacred by Indians in the Fort
Boise district. In May, 1855, Major General Wool, commanding the
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department of the Pacific, repaired to Fort Vancouver, on the Columbia, and organized an expedition consisting of an equivalent of
two mounted companies, with instructions to proceed into the Fort
Boise district, with a view to protecting the immigrants that might
be on their way; also to apprehend and bring to justice the Indians
who committed that massacre. Lieutenant Mendell, Corps Topographical Engineers, then serving in my party, was designated as the
topographical engineer officer to accompany the command for the
purpose of making a reconnaissance of the country. This map (No.
15,) gives the topography obtained during all the movements of the
command. All the objects contemplated by the general in organizing
and sending out this expedition, under Brevet Major G. 0. Fuller,
captain fourth infantry, were fully realized through the energy of the
officers and men composing the command. Not only were the offending Indians apprehended, tried, convicted, and executed, but protection was afforded to immigrants and much valuable information of the
tribes and country they occupy was obtained. The moral effect produced upon the Indians in this region of country was decidedly
beneficial in restraining their subsequent conduct.
From the west base of the Blue mountains to Po't!Jder river.-In going
eastward, after leaving the Umatilla, we begin immediately the crossing
of the Blue mountains, which divide the waters flowing into the Snake
from those running into the Columbia _ The road is hard upon both
animals and wagons. After attaining to a height of 1, 500 feet we
come upon undulating table lands, heavily timbered, with occasional
prairies of good grass. From the snow and rain falling upon these
mountains the Columbia derives no insignificant share of her waters
conveyed to her by many streams heading in them. Locked within
these mountains is the valley called Grand Rond, of irregular shape,
from seven to twelve miles wide. Its soil is good, bearing excellent
grass, and it is well watered by a river bearing its own name. It is
the best valley in the whole country shown on this map ; it is the
favorite summer resort of several tribes of Indians whose, winter
homes are on the west side of the Blue mountains. It was in this
valley that, in the summer of 1856, the ''strike," to use his own
word, was made by Lieutenant Colonel Shaw of the Washington volunteers. He reports that "with 160 men and officers he charged
the Indians assembled there on the morning of the 17th July, near
their village, and dispersed them, following and killing them, until
they hid themselves in the rocky canons.'' From his own report of
his killed and wounded, however, it may be a question whether his
party obtained a victory, especially considering his previous threat :
''If I find them I will strike them, and follow them until I drive them
out of the country;" the fact that he reports "it impossible to state
how many of the enemy were killed;'' and the remaining fact that he
did not follow them into their hiding places, although his men were
mounted and armed.
This exploit may be regarded as the last ''strike'' of the Washington volunteer army raised by the governor of that Territory, and
sent June '8 to the Walla-Walla valley. Unfortunately for the glory
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of this achievement, ·it has been reported that ''the whole object
was to plunder the Indians of their horses and cattle, and provoke a
prolongation of the war.'' On learning the destiny of Lieutenant
Colonel Shaw's force the general officer of the United States army
commanding the department instructed Colonel Wright, 9th infantry,
to ''order all the volunteers out of the country by the way of the
Dalles, and if they do not go immediately they will be arrested, disarmed, and sent out."
Distance from-

To-

Spring, west base Blue mountains _____
Lee's encampment.------·---------Grand Rond river _____ . __ • _ _.::. ____ •
West end Grand Rond valley. ______ ••
South end valley ___ ••• ____ ._ ••• ___ •
Divide of Rond and Powder rivers---W:est base Blue mountains ___________

Lee's encampment_________________
Grand Rood river__________________
West end Grand Rond valley _______ •
South end valley ________ • ___ • ____ .
Divide Rond and Powder rivers .••• _.
Powder river crossing------·-·----Powder river______________________

Miles.
14:
17
6
7
4:
13
61

It is apparent that the Grand Rond valley affords an excellent position for a number of troops to remain in, should occasion require it,
for some time.
F1·om Powder river to Kamas Prairie.- The artemisia, or sage bush,
is found in profusion over the whole of this district, giving a most
desolate aspect to the landscape in which it prevails. It grows in
light, sandy soil, that produces nothing else.
On Burnt river the hills are high and grassy, leaving narrow
valleys between. The road is very hilly and circuitous, crossing the
stream nine times before leaving it, at very rocky places; the road
follows down the stream to near its mouth, and then strikes Snake
river, \vhich is the south branch of the Columbia, and drains all the
country lying to the south and east of the Blue mountains even to the
Rocky mountains.
Fort Boise, on the right bank of the Snake, is but a small adobe
house, with a few articles of traffic. It is regarded as an important
station. There are several small islands here in the river, which are
fertile and well timbered.
Boise river enters the Snake just above the fort. It is large, and
not fordable here at high water. The emigrant road is along this
river. Fifty miles above the mouth the road leaves the river to
avoid a deep canon ; still further to the eastward, where the road
again comes to the river, it is again seen running through a similar
chasm of basaltic rock 300 to 500 feet deep.
Seventy miles from Fort Boise a road called '' J effrie' s Cut-off"
departs from the old emigrant road, and runs via Kamas Prairie to
Fort Hall, an Indian trading post. It is a new route, and compares
unfavorably with the old, except in grass, in which it is superior.
Between the old road and Kamas Prairie, it is very rugged and
broken.
Kamas Prairie is a long narrow plain, of irregular width, from 15
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miles at its western to a narrow neck at its eastern extremity, and
about 68 miles long, from east to "\vest. It is bounded on the north
by a high range, separating its waters from those running into the
Boise~ and on the south by another ridge of less height.
The plain
has some timber at its eastern end; it is watered by numerous streams
uniting and discharging themselves into the .M:alade river, which
passes by its eastern extremity. Most of the small streams of this
prairie become nearly dry in summer: "One, upon which the command encamped in the afternoon, was found perfectly dry next
morning; shortly, however, it commenced to run again with undiminished vigor.'' The mountains to the north of the prairie are well
timbered, but in the plain there is only birch and willow. Kamas is
found here in great abundance, which is so much used as food by the
Indians; it grows spontaneously in low, moist, light soil. This p1~airie
is a great resort for Indians, there being good grazing and plenty of
animals; such as foxes, rabbits, and grouse.
From our military post on Mill creek, in the valley of the WallaW alia, established by direction of General Wool, in 1856, via
.M cKay's, to the spring at the west base of the Blue mountains, it is
about fifty miles, and the road is good for wagons. ':rhis post is the
nearest military position we have occupied to the Indian country in
eastern Oregon. The distance between it and thP. west end of the
Grand Rond is about 80 miles. A command of mounted men could
perform the march in four days with its appropriate train.
From the same post to Fort Boise it is about 224 miles. This could
be marched by a command of two or three companies in tYfenty days
with its appropriate wagon train. Good camping grounds with excellent grass and good water would be met at convenient distances
for the daily marches all the way any time between 1st June and
15th November.
Distance from-

To-

Crossing of Powder river ____________
South slough Powder river ___________
Fork of Burnt river---------------Last crossing Burnt riyer -----------Snake river. _____ • _________ • _• ____ .
Birch creek. _____ . ___ ---.-.----____
Sulphur spring __ .. ______ .• _____ ._..
Malheur river _________ • __ ._________
Fort Boise ____ . __ ._. ______ •• ____ • _ _
West extrelllity Jeffries' Cut-off_______
West extremity Kamas Prairie ________
Powder river.____ ____ ____ _____ ___ __
Fort Bojse _________________________
Fort Dalles._._ •••• _. __ .• _. _______ .
Fort Dalles-----------------------East extremity Kamas Prairie .••. ---·
Godin's river---------------------Fort HalL-----------~------------Fort Dalles .• ------------------ --Fort Dalles---------------·--------

South slough Powder river__________
Fork of Durnt river________________
Last crossing Burnt river----------Snake river. _________ -----------Birch creek _____ •• _______________ .
Sulphur spring----- __ .. ______ •• ___ .
Malheur river. __________ ._. ______ .
Fort Boise________________________
West extremity Jeffries' Cut-off __ . ___ .
West extremity Kamas Prairie-----East extremity Kamas Prairie-----FOTt Boi'lEL ____________ ••• _ _____ __
West extremity Kamas Prairie-----Fort Boi~e .••. __ • ___ • ___ • ___ • ___ •.
West extremity Kamas Prairie-----Godin's river, (via Jeffries' route) ---Fort HalL________________________
Great ~alt Lake City_______________
Fort Hall-----------------------·
Great Salt Lake City_--------------

Miles.
12
14
39

4
3
10
13
18
!7 0
30
65
113
110
317
417
60
43
183
583
768
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From Kamas Prairie to Salmon Falls, on Snake river, 40 miles, the
route is by a trail impracticable for wagons. Along the south base
of the south ridge bounding the prairie is a remarkable belt of huge
basaltic rocks, of more than one mile in width and of length unknown.
The rocks are of grotesque shapes, standing at distances from 20 to
30 feet apart, and in height from 10 to 40 feet. They are worn smooth,
as if by the action of water. The trail winds through the belt. Froni
this to Snake river it is a pavmnent of basalt cut up by deep ravines,
or a stretch of artemisia.
A few miles before reaching the Snake we come to the Malade
river, flowing between vertical walls of basalt, no fringe of timber
marking its presence.
There are two falls on the Snake called Salmon Falls; they are five
miles apart; the lower has a descent of 25 to 30, and the upper of 10
to 12 feet. Here the Indians catch large quanLities of salmon and
dry them for winter use.
From Kamas Prairie to Lemhi, on Mormon river, 125 miles, the
route is impracticable for wagons. The larger portion of the country
is mountainous, the trail often very rocky, and none but well sho<l
animals should attempt it. Good camping spots, water and grass are
plenty. From the eastern extremity of the prairie the route is up
the Malade river, at the headwaters of which it crosses a mountain
range thickly timbered with fir, at a considerable depression, which
is 2, 500 feet above the valley, and then strikes the headwaters of
Godin's river. The valleys of both of these streams are narrow but
gro,,r wider as we descend them. Godin's runs in a northeasterly
direction over a pebbly bed until deflected by mountains at right
angles to its former course, and then runs towards the largest of the
'' 1,hree Buttes,'' near which it sinks.
A high divide pierced by two low gaps separates Godin's river from
the Pash-a-mu-rah river. At the north base of this divide there is
':a stream of ice-cold water rising vertically from the ground and
flowing in different directions and uniting below: forming an island a
mile in length and several hundred yards in width. The eye can
distinguish no dividing ridge between the streams, each of which was
4 feet wide and 6 inches deep. As they flow further they are increased probably by fresh accessions rising from the ground.''
Pash-a-mu-rah is a tributary of Salmon river, and waters the valley
called McKay's Hole, signifying a valley surrounded by mountains.
This is 8 to 10 miles broad and 30 miles long, bearing excellent grass
at its northern extremity, and there it has a fishery.
The next considerable valley is that of the most easterly of the
large tributaries of Salmon river. In this the Mormons, at a distance
of 320 miles from Great Salt Lake City, have established their settlement Lemhi, on Mormon river, 20 miles above its junction with the
Salmon, and 136 miles northward of Fort Hall.
f~ Mormon River valley, though several thousand feet above the lev I
of the sea, is fertile, and the settlement promises to be of some importance. The grazing is excellent and winter mild. Limestone
and coal are said to exist. The mountains are timbered, and cotton-
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wood grows in the valley. A wagon road, nearly level, connects it
with Salt Lake City, via Fort Hall. Lemhi is a missionary station
among the Indians, and is furnished with a stockaded enclosure.
The settlers, to all appearance, are orderly and certainly very industrious, and devoted to their peculiar principles of religion.
The situation they have selected is eminently favorable. Nume·
rous Indians winter in this valley, while many more pass through in
transitu for the buffalo grounds east of the Rocky mountains.
This valley would be a good location for a military post, should
future exigencies demand one in this part of Oregon. The Mormons
think a wagon route is practicable from Lemhi to the Flathead Indian
country, where it is also their intention to establish a mission.
Nature has furnished this region more abundantly with game than
is her custom along the eastern tributaries of the Columbia; such as
bears, including the grizzly, deer, antelope, P-lk, and mountain sheep;
the latter is much in favor as food for the Indians. One band of the
Shoshonees is called Tu-chu-re-kay, meaning sheep-eaters. Various
kinds of grouse are among the smaller game. It is not long since
buffalo fed in the valleys of this region, but the improvident Indians
have either exterminated them or driven the herds to the ranges east
of the Rocky mountains.

F1·om the mouth qf the JJiormon up to the head qf Salmon river, 100 miles;
thence to the Pash-e-wah-kite, 58 miles; thence via Payette river, 87
miles, to Fort Boise.
The trail on this route is only practicable for pack trains. Good
camping places and good water and grass occur at convenient distances for daily marches.
At the junction of the Pash-a-mu-rah the Salmon river has a wide
valley bearing luxuriant grass. On ascending, however, the valley
is found more contracted and the trail more hilly. The river heads
in a lake, one mile or so in circumference, on the top of a very high
ridge, upon which there was snow in August.
The country on the Salmon is the best of any on the route followed
by the command, except the Grand Ron d. "But it is only a good
country by comparison. In a region where most of the earth's surface is either rugged mountains or desert plains a strip of alluvial
soil, be it ever so narrow, is apt to be over-appreciated.''
From the head lake of the Salmon a dividing ridge is to be crossed
to reach the Moo-rum-ba, which heads in several small lakes. It is
but a short distance across the ridge. The mountains here are covered with dense forests of fir extending down the plain.
The Moo-rum-ba was followed down to where it emerges through
the mountains to the north. Thence the route was up one of its
tributaries; leaving which it crossed several others of its tributaries
and entered the valley of the Pash-e-wah-kite. The west branch of
this is about fifty-eight miles from the head lake of the Salmon. In
this reach the route is necessarily tedious and circuitous, in consequence of numerous high rugged_ mountains, obliging the traveller to
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follow th"B water-courses. In these valleys the nights were cold,
producing ice in A.ugust.
The Pash-e-wah-kite is one of the prettiest of all these valleys.
It is a plain some fifteen miles long, in some places with excellent
soil, in others it is pebbly and sandy. It is watered by a bold stream
15 to 20 yards wide, of delightful cool water. Pines and firs are scattered through it, giving an abundance of shade. The mountains on
all sides are high and covered with dense forests. It was in this valley
that Lieutenant Day's subdivision of the command killed several of
the pn,rticipants of the Fort Boise massacre. This was an important
event, teaching the survivors that our troops could penetrate their
most remote recesses and inflict deserved punishment.
From the west branch of the Pash-e-wah-kite to Payette river it is
twenty-eight miles; thence following down this stream to the fishery
it is twenty-four miles; thence the route continued still down the
valley fifteen miles tQ a point some twenty miles above its mouth;
from that point it is an artemisia plain for twenty miles directly
across to Fort Boise.
Indians in eastern Oregon.-Lieutenant Mendell thinks it a matter
of congratulation for ourselves that the districts of country just described are not inhabited by a bold race of Indians disposed to war
on the whites. The high rugged mountains of their country would
afford a thousand refuges to them, while interposing great obstacles
to pursuers. Nature provides them with food, which they have only
to stretch forth their hands to receive, even to the very sources of the
streams. Free from hunger, with such a country extending very far
in every direction, with every foot of which they are familiar, it would
be exceedingly difficult to carry on hostilities with them from our remote settlements with success. They resort to the buffalo country
in summer and return in the fall. They are much inferior in energy
and intelligence to those west of the Blue mountains. They are believed to have once been a powerful nation, occupying the waters of
the Missouri, but a long and bloody strife with the Sioux drove them
to the west of the Rocky mountains, and here they have deteriorated.
They still cherish their enmity to their old enemies, the Sioux, and
live in great fear of the Blackfeet tribe. They steal many horses
from the Cayuses, who occupy the west base of the Blue mountains,
and from Nez Perces, and are in turn robbed by the Blackfeet. They
are of filthy habits, eating beetles and vermin 'vith gusto, and are
very poor, often suffering hunger in winter from their improvidence.
On such occasions they live upon their horses, and a case is known of
one who in a season of want killed his squaw and five children, and
jerked them for his winter provision.
MILITARY CONNEXION BETWEEN NORTHEASTERN OREGON AND UTAH.

~-,rom the interesting journal kept by Major 0. Cross, of the Quartermaster's Department, of the march of the rifle regiment from Fort
Leavenworth, via South Pass and Fort Hall, to Fort Dalles, on the
Columbia, in 1849, I am enabled to present some practical information
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in reference to a march of a command, if required from northern Oregon
to Great Sa.lt Lake City.
From Fort Dalles to south extremity of Grand Rond Prairie the
march would be 187 miles, which could be accomplished in 14 days;
from Grand Rond to Fort Boise, 130 miles, in 10 days; from Fort Boise
to Fort Hall, 268 miles, in 22 days; from Fort Hall to Great Salt Lake
City, 183 miles, in 15 days.
A regiment leaving Fort Dalles with its train could reach Salt Lake
City in 61 days. The proper time for starting would be from the 1st
to 15th June.
A regiment could be despatched from New Orleans by steamer, via
Panama~ and conveyed to San Francisco in 23 days; thence to Fort
Dalles in 7 days; thence, if the train were held in readiness there to
start immediately, the same regiment could start the following day,
and march to Salt Lake City in 61 days, after arriving at Fort Dalles,
making 91 days from New Orleans, by the way of the Atlantic, the
Pacific, and Columbia river, to Great Salt Lake City. Lieutenant
Colonel Steptoe's command was 92 days marching from Fort Leavenworth to Salt Lake City in 1854.

Vll.-Military considerations in riference to the Washington Territory
portion qf the department qf the P acijic.
Map No. 16 shows all that portion of the Territory lying west of
the Cascade Mountain range.
Leaving the mouth of the Columbia, and proceeding along the coast
northward, we pass Shoal Water bay and Gray's harbor, and arrive
at Cape Flattery without perceiving anything at all that would invite
one to become a settler on this part of the coast. From Cape Hancock, at the mouth of the Columbia, to Cape Flattery, by the steamer's
shortest run, it is 149 miles. From San Francisco the latter cape is
793 miles. Just around on the inside of the cape there is an Indian
village, in which the houses are built of stone. These Indians have
the character of being pretty honest and peaceable.
Passing up the Straits of Fuca we leave Vancouver's Island on our
left; at the head of these straits, turning south, we come to Port
Townsend, where we have a military post, about 110 miles from Cape
Flattery. Opposite this post is Whidbey' s island, one of the most
important of our own in all these waters.
Leaving Port Townsend, and going still further south, we pass through
Admiralty inlet and come to Fort Steilacoom, a military post on Puget's
Sound, 215 miles by the steamer's run from Cape Flattery. From
Fort Steilacoom, 30 miles by the road, to the northeast, is the military
post at Muckle Chute prairie, on White river. From Fort Steilacoom,
by the road, it is 25 miles in a southeast direction to Olympia, the capi·
tal of the Territory, situated at the southernmost extremity of the
Puget' s Sound waters.
H. Ex. Doc. 114-5
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After running up the Straits of Fuca for about 90 miles, if we turn
north and pass through the Straits of Haro, we enter the Gulf of
Georgia; thence turning east we come to Bellin~ ham Bay, where is
also a military post, which, by this route, is about 160 miles from
Cape Flattery.
From Port Townsend direct, by water, to the post at Bellingham
Bay, through the Rosario straits, it is from 60 to 70 miles; and from
Fort Steilacoom, through these straits, to the Bellingham Bay post, it
is about 150 miles. These posts can easily communicate with each
other by water, as also with San Francisco; but the communication
with each other by land is very difficult, owing to dense woods, the
want of roads, and the. very circuitous routes that have to be followed
in consequence of the numerous little bays and watercourses.
The waters in this part of Washington may be assimilated to inland
seas in some respects, and in others to broad navigable rivers. They
open by the Straits of Fuca and Gulf of Georgia into theN orth Pacific,
and have directly in their front the British island, (Vancouver,) of
which Victoria is the principal town and harbor. The numerous
channels, bays, straits, and inlets, form an extent of navigable waters
of several hundreds of mile.3 either for sail or steam vessels and Indian
canoes of great size. There are many excellent harbors. In these
waters canoes are used capable of carrying from 20 to 80 warriors 1
with their arms, and they are adapted either for catching the whale
or for war, and are of such speed that a sail vessel is of no use in ti1e
pursuit. In case of difficulties with these Indians, a steamer of the
capacity to carry two companies of troops, and of a speed of 10 to 15
miles per hour, would be of more service than a whole regiment without such means of rapid transit.
The shores of these waters are very generally covered with heavy
timber-fir, cedar, and pine of inferior quality for everything except
spars, yards, piles, and the frames of buildings. In all Washington
Territory it is yet to be ascertained whether there is a tree growing
fit for ship-building purposes, other than for those named 1 or fit for
the lumber required for floors and the finishing of buildings.
The clearing of the timber lands for farms is not to be thought of;
and those who expect to find extensive prairie tracts in this part of
the Territory, for agriculture on a large scale, will he egregiously
disappointed. I do not mean to say there are no spots, for there are
some that will produce well in this part of the hitherto much overrated tenestrial strip called Washington Territory, extending from
the 113th to the 125th degree of longitude, and from the 46th to the
49th degree of latitude, in all containing 130,000 square miles of
the earth's surface. Of this whole area not more than one-eighth
paTt is at all adapted to general agrieulture. Similar causes to those
explained for Oregon prevent intercommunication between the parts
separated by mountain ranges as we go eastward to the summit ridge
of the Rocky mountains, wl1ich is its eastern boundary.
In the acquisition of this strip of territory, it is certainly not to be
denied, by any sensible man who has examined it carefully, that the
United States realized from Great Britain but very little that is at all
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valuable or useful to civilized man. For the Indians, but for the
presence of the whites, it would ever have remained well adapted.
In Bellingham Bay coal mining is successfully carried on to some
extent; the coal i8 light in weight, burns freely, and the quality of
the article is altogether similar to that at Coos bay, in Oregon,
described in the preceding chapter. This business at Bellingham Bay,
the lumbering and fishing business in other parts of the Washington
coast, are about all that occupy the people, except so many as are
engaged in the cultivation of soil sufficient to produce what may be
needed for home consumption, and except those engaged as government officials. The whole number of white male inhabitants in the
Territory does not exceed 1, 700. The lands on the river bottoms,
west of the Cascade range, are so densely timbered that, no matter
how rich, they will not be brought under cultivation for many generations to come, if ever. Cereal grains, except Indian corn, grow well
in many places, and the wheat is excellent in quality.
From Fort Ste:lacoom, 25 miles by the road, in a southeasterly
direction, the capital of the Territory, Olympia, is situated at thwe
southernmost extremity of the Pu~et's Sound waters. There are two
ways of reaching this from San Francisco-one by sea, 1, 038 miles,
through the S~raits of Fuca, Admiralty inlet, and Puget' s Sound; the
other is by sea to the mouth of the Columbia; thence up this river
65 miles to Rainier; thence by the Cowlitz river 28 miles to its head
of navigation; thence by land 60 miles; the total distance by this
last, which is the mail route from San Francisco to Olympia, is 775
miles. The part of this route from Rainier is the main channel of
communication between the Columbia river and Olympia. The distance from Fort Vancouver by this way to Fort Steilacoom is 186
miles; and it is a very difficult one for troops to pass over at any
season, more especially at all times other than midsummer.
It is very evident that in a Territory a scattered population, not
exceeding that of a respectable sized village, cannot be expected to
defend themselves in their peaceful occupations against so large a
body of Indians as are known to exist in W ashigton, without the
presence of United States troops in considerable numbers.
The
question then arises as to the most effectual way of rendering adequate
defence?
For the purpose of the most perfect and economical defence for the
portion west of the Cascade range, I am of the opinion that a permanent post should be established on Puget' s Sound, near old Fort Nis·
qually, of sufficient accommodations for two companies. There is an
excellent harbor here, at which a good dock could be built: and from
the dock to the post a good road should be constructed, the length of
which would not exceed one mile. At Port Townsend there should
be stationed two companies, and a post of two companies maintained
at Bellingham Bay.
These troops, with the use of such a steamer as suggested, would
hold in check not only the warlike Indians, who come down in their
great war canoes from the British possessions, but they would preserve
peace between those within our own limits and the whites.
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"In the end it will prove a great extravagance in the government
to neglect the proper defence of a remote frontier like this; and one
chief reason is, that, if so neglected, a pretext will always be afforded
to a territorial executive to incur an extravagant and unnecessary
expenditure" by calling· out the volunteers.
After the Indian troubles had been closed by the United States
troops in this district, in the summer of 1856, the commanding general of the department directed the posting of one company at Port
To·v\Tnsend: and one at Bellingham Bay, these being all the troops
that could then be spared to place there.
Passes qf the Cascade Range qf Mountains.-There are four of these,
viz: the Klikatat, the Cowlitz, the N achess, and the Yakama, (or
Snoqualme,) having Indian trails by which communication is held
between the tribes occupying the districts on both sides of this range.
These passes are impassable in winter on account of snow, and not until
about the lOth of June are they practicable for troops. r..rhe Na.chess
andY akama are the most important. They connect the Puget' s Sound
with the Yakama district.-(See map No. 17.) A military road was
improved so that wagons could pass from Fort Steilacoom through the
N achess, via Selah fishery, to Fort Walla-Walla. But it has been so
.much neglected and damaged by floods that it is now impracticable
Jor wagons in many places.
For military purposes it is highly desirable that a road should be
lkept in condition across the Cascade range for communicating between
;the Yakarna valley and Puget' s Round. The best pass for this purpose
:is the Yakama, and not the Nachess. The road should follow the
'valley of the Yakama river, down through the Kittetas, to the Selah
fishery. It could probably be opened through the pass, and other
•difficult places improved sufficiently to allow a wagon to pass, for the
sum .of $125,000, with the aid of a body of troops for escort service .
. i'\.. road opened as suggested, and the post at Muckle Chute prairie
advanQed up to the base of the mountains near the Yakama Pass,
and one established in the Kittetas valley, we should be in a position
to holtl 1the Indians in submission throughout all the Yakama country,
.as well ·as those all along the west base of the Cascade range .
. ForkSimco, seen a little to the north of the Topinish, the proposed
post
in the Kittetas valley, and Fort Dalles, would be in easy commu1
1aaication.. !From Fort Simco, 50 miles to the point where the Yakama
wtver i,s ccut by the 47th parallel of north latitude, in the Kittetas
walley, a good wagon road ·would cost $50,000, and from Fort Dalles,
.\60 miles to ~F ort Simco, such a road would cost $15,000 .
.The :·Be1ah fishery and the Kittetas dis;trict may be regarded as the
'lheart :, of the lYakama Indian country, in which there are excellent
grazing, good fishing, and an abundance of water. This fishery is
the lPTincipal (one on the river, and the Kittetas is a good valley, 20
to 25 .miles in.•·diameter, and well watered by several branches of the
Yakama: and;I doubt if there will ever be any necessity for a military
post further north than the point referred to in this region of our
P.ossessions; it would be within 1° in latitude of the British possesswns.
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The whole Yakama country should be left in the quiet possession
of the Yakama and Klikatat Indians. Colonel Wright, 9th infantry,
who, while in command of this district, carefully examined the question, on the ground, among these very Indians, says: ''They require
all this country: they cannot live at any one point the -vvhole year.
The roots, the berries, and the fish, make up their principal subsistence; these are all obtained at different places and in different seasons
of the year. Hence they are frequently changing their abodes until
fall, when they descend from the mountain districts, and establish
themselves in the lower valleys for the winter."
In reference only to the tribes occupying the valleys of the Yakama
and Klikatat, Fort Simco is sufficiently advanced in a direction north
of Fort Dalles, (map No. 18.) But, in reference to the great Indian
thoroughfare from Selah fishery, through the Yakama Pass, and the
communication that ought to be kept up with the Puget' s Sound district,
the post recommended to be established in the Kittetas will be important. The only objection to the site indicated may be a deficiency
of building timber immediately on the spot; but excellent yellow pine
is found in abundance on the Yakama just above, which can be floated
down.
From the spot which would probably be selected for the post,
through the pass to a position proper for the post on the west side,
it would probably not exceed 70 miles. The distance by the valley
from the point of the river where it is cut by the 47th parallel to Lake
Kitchelas, near the summit of the Yakarna Pass, is about 60 miles 1
and the valley is well wooded with pine, fir, and cedar; below that
point, for 50 miles down, cottonwood and willow; thence for 40 miles
to the mouth of the Y akama there is no wood.
Distance from-

To-

Fort Steilacoom ____________________
Puyallup river--------------------White river, Porter's prairie __________
White river, (1st crossing)----------Green river, (1st crossing) __ ••• - ____ • .

Puyallup river-------------------White river, (Porter's prairie)_______
Post at Muckle Chute-prairie ••• ---Green river, (1st crossing)---------Green river, (last crossing, base mountains) ______ •• __ -- __________ ••• _
Last prairie on summit-------- ---First crossing Nachess river .• _____ ._
First crossing N achess river_ . __ • ____
La.st cros~ing Nachess river __ _ __ _ ___
Wmass nver______________________
Leaving of Winass river ____ ----____
Selah fishery, Yakama river_________
Topinisb, (Haller's field)-----------Fort Rim co _. __________ • __ •.• ___ _ _
A-tah-nan Mission_________________
Selah fit:!hery._____________________
8elah fisherY---------------------Hudson Bay Co.'s post, Walla-Walla.

West base mountains---------------Prairie, summit N achest> Pass __ • _ ____
Fort Steilacoom, through N achess Pass.
First crossing Nachess river_ ___ --- •• _
La~t cros~ing Naches~:! river---------Wmass nver _. ---.------- ___ • ___ • _.
Leaving Winass -------------------Fort Dalles-----------------------Fort Dalles. __ ._._. ___ •• _. __ ._._ •• _
Fort Simco-----------------------·
A-tah-nan Mis;;ion ------------·----Fort Steilacoom-·-------------·---Selah fisherY-----------------------

Miles.
23
9
3
30
12
6
2
85
27
10
16
4:

58
60
12
30
142
95

With regard to the posts now on the Columbia river, at Vancouver,
and the Cascades, (map No. 19,) it is to be remarked that, as a
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military point in reference to the command of the river, in respect·
to Indian difficulties, the l<1.tter is of more importance than the former.
This is a great Indian fishery, and there should be no hindrance
offered to prevent these people from resorting here for this purpose,
at the same time order should be preserved. It is a point where all
supplies by water have to be transhipped and carted over a portage
five miles in length; there should be two companies stationed here.
Fort Vancouver is well adapted for depot purposes, and one company
stationed there for a guard will be amply sufficient.
Portland, on the Willamette, will eontinue to be, as it is now, the
commercial centre in this district, unless it shall prove, on a proper
survey of the Columbia, that sea steamers can at all times ascend to
the foot of the Casc.ades.
The general commanding the department directed a military topographical reconnaissance to be made of the valleys of the Walla-Walla
and Touchet. The report was such that the practiced eye of this
officer at once perceived that not only for the then existing war,
but likewise for future operations and disposition of troops, one of
these valleys should be occupied as a military post. Accordingly
one was established in the first named, five miles below Whitman's old
mill site, (map 20,) on Mill creek.
The importance of this post cannot be questioned by one familiar
with the topography and ,localities of the many tribes in advance of
this po:sition, and of the disposition of the encroaching whites, ever
prone and ever ready to thrust themselves into the Indian country in
advance of the proper frontier line. The War Department may rest
assured this post will have to be maintained for years to come, and
the sooner a good wagon road be made between it and Fort Dalles,
the more money, in the end, will be saved to the quartermaster's.
department.
I here quote from an able report of the late Secretary of War
what I regard as especially applicable to the Walla-"\Valla valley:
''Instead of dispersing the troops to form small garrisons at numerous.
posts, where they exhibit only weaknes::; to the savage foe, it is.
suggested that, within the fertile regions, a few points accessible by
steamboats or by railways should be selected, at which large garrisons
should be maintained, and from which strong detachments should
annually be sent out into the Indian country during the season when
the grass will suffice to support cavalry horses and beasts of draught
and burden.''
.At present there is little need of a post furthe1· advanced from Fort
Dalles into the Indian country than the one now on Mill creek, in
that direction, provided this be properly garrisoned.
General Wool reported, October 23, 1854, a post beyond the
Walia-Walia valley ''would subject the government to a very heavy
expense to keep it properly supplied. I would prefer a company of
dragoons to traverse the country in the neighborhood of Fort Boise
during the summer, and at the approach of winter return to Fort
Dalles and remain till spring. To supply the company with effective
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(American) horses, such as the service requires, would cost in this
country a Yery large sum of money."
The post in question is on the trails leading into the Fe louse, Nez
Perce, Spokane, Snake, and other Indian countries, and it should be
occupied with six companies at least. This would allow of two
detachments (two companies in each) to be sent out every season from
here into the vast Indian country lying east of the meridian of this
post, on the various routes explained under the heads '' Eastern
Oregon," chapter VI, and Eastern Washington, chapter VII. A
garrison to the number suggested once posted here, it would not be long
before a river steamer 'ivould be plying between the Des Chutes and
the mouth of Walla- Walla. In connexion, I offer one more suggestion: which is, that the breed of Indian horses now in the Walla- Walla
country, being inured to grass alone, shall be fairly tried by the
mounted troops in those annual expeditions. With proper treatment
these horses may be foraged all winter without grain, and do good
service in summer upon their native grass.
Distance from-

To-

Fort Dalles-----------------------Fort Dalles-----------------------McKay's, on Umatilla _______________
Military post, Mill creek •• _._._ •• ____
Fort Dalles---------·-·------------

Indian agency on Umatilla__________
McKay's, on Umatilla______________
Military post, Mill creek____________
Mouth Walla- Walla river __ •• _ •• _. _ _
Military post on Mill creek__________

Miles.

Ill
129
40
20
169

To make the road good from Fort Dalles, via McKay's, to Mill creek
post, for wagons, $15,000 would be required. A more direct route
could be opened between the two posts, but it would cost more and
would not subserve so many purposes as the one named.
It will be perceived that the foregoing suggestions for keeping
peace in all Washington Territory and all along on the north border
of Oregon involve1. The maintaining of a two company post at Port Townsend, and
a like one at Bellingham Bay; the moving of the Steilacoom post
to the Nisqually, and here establishing a two company post ~md depot,
the moving of the Muckle Chute post to near the west extremity of
the Y akama (Snoqualme) Pass, to a point commanding the pass, the
valley of Cedar river, and the trail from the pass down the Snoqualme
river. In this position of the post there should be two companies to
garrison it. The town of Seattle would be the nearest seaport, and
60 to 70 miles distant.
2. The keeping of a suitable government steamer in the Washington
waters capable of carrying two companies, and running (faster than
the northern war canoes) at least 10 miles per hour.
3. The maintaining'"of Fort Vancouver as a depot with one company,
and a two company post at the Cascades; the establishment of a new
post in the Kittetas valley. with two companies; the maintaining of
Fort Simco, with two companies; also Fort Dalles, with two companies;
and }fill creek post, with six companies.
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4. Appropriations of money: $125,000 to open a road through
Yakama Pass from Snoqualme falls, or from a point on Cedar river
to the Kittetas, on the Yakama river; 50,000 for one from Fort Simco
to the Kittetas; $15,000 for improving the military road between Fort
Dalles and Fort Simco; $25,000 for rendering the trail from the Cascades, on the bank of the Columbia, passable for dragoons to Fort
Dalles; $15,000 for improving the military road between Fort Dalles
and the Mill creek post; in all, $230,000 for military roads, all in
Washington Territory, except a part of the last one named.
It will be seen I do not propose to increase, except by one, the
number of posts now occupied; there are nine now, and the plan
proposes ten; one additional and a change in the localities of two,
furnishing each with a proper number of troops, 23 companies in all,
and opening proper roads to enable communication to be kept up
between them.
With the 23 companies located as proposed, and such communications, peace may undoubtedly be maintained for a long time to come
throughout Washington Territory, the eastern and northern portions
of Oregon, for the whole extent of the Snake and Columbia rivers.
With a less number of companies, I am willing to admit, Indian
hostilities might be suppressed after breaking out, as has been proved
by the result of General Wool's plans for terminating so successfully
those of 1855-' 56 in this region. But it is certainly much more
economical to have sufficient force to prevent a war between the
Indians and whites than to suffer it to be created, thereby affording
a pretext for volunteers to be called out by the territorial governors,
and afterwards be obliged to bring the regular army into requisition
to suppress it. The truth of this will be fully sustained when the
bills for the services of the Oregon and Washington volunteerg are
rendered to Congress.

Eastern portion qf Washington, and its connexion with the northwest portion of Nebraska, shown on map No. 21.
I have already referred to the importance of having six companies
stationed in the valley of the Walia-Walla, and assigned, among
other reasons, that of despatching two commands, consisting of two
companies each, every year into the Indian country.
In chapter VI I have described the route to be followed in going
from the Walla-Walla valley across the Blue mountains to Fort Boise,
on the Snake river. The routes which I shall now consider are
marked A, B, C, on the map. Before describing these in detail,
however, it will be well to consider somewhat the valley of the WallaWalla river.
Fort Walia-Walla, situated at the junction of this river with the
Columbia, was an old Hudson Bay Indian trading post. It was
pillaged by the Indians in the war of the fall of 1855. It is now of
no account, except to mark the miserable sandy spot where once it
stood-as a place, among other purposes, used by explorers of the
upper Columbia for rendezvous. From the mouth up the Walia-
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Walla for 12 miles the banks are sandy and sterile. Ascending
higher, however, we come to cottonwood and good land; and the
valley, being cut up by many small streams, and having a mild
climate, is inferior to none in the Territory for agricultural purposes.
The whole country from this valley to the Snake river affords excellent grazing, and good timber grows in abundance at the headwaters
and along the streams coming down from the Blue mountains.
Following the trail from the mouth up the river for about 20 miles
we come to }fill creek, the present position of our military post,
established by order of General Wool in 1856. The position is not
far from where the treaty was held with the Indians by the superintendents of Indian affairs of Oregon and Washington, June, 1855,
the practical fruits of which ·will be noticed more fully in another
place.
ROUTE A:

From the mouth of the Walia-Walla to the mouth of the Snake
river it is about 10 miles, following the bank of the Columbia, and
the road is over a sandy soil, giving little difficulty in the passage.
The Snake has to be crossed by boats. From its mouth the trail is
on the Great Plain of the Columbia river for about 10 miles, when it
strikes the Columbia ·river; from that point it bears a little east of
north through a sandyaistrict to a lake about six miles long and one mile
wide, distant from the mouth of the Snake 62 miles. Following along
this lake, and crossing a small feeder, the trail continues over the
said Great Plain through a small coulee, from the northern extremity
of which to the Grand Coulee it is 6 miles. The distance through
the Grand Coulee is 20 miles. In it the soil is sandy, and there is a
pond of good water. The northern extremity of this coulee is 10
miles wide; the southern is wider. Its walls are estimated at 800
feet in height, and consists of basaltic rock, seemingly cemented
together with a kind of lava. On emerging we are immediately on
the bank of the Columbia, at a distance of 140 miles from Old Fort
Walia-Walia. On this whole extent not a tree occurs to relieve the
eye from the continued monotony of grass and sand. On the southern
part of the route, after leaving Snake river, the marches would be
long between watering places, and there would be an insufficiency of
grass for the animals of a train. Between the northern portion of
this reach and the Columbia the country is full of coulees. From the
northern extremity of the Grand Coulee the trail is on the east bank
of the Columbia, through rough ground on the northern border of
the Great Plain to the Spokane river, for a distance of 50 miles, on
which timber and water are found. The Great Plain of the Columbia
is but an extensive high table prairie. The mouth of the Spokane is
is 200 feet wide, with a rapid current and a rocky bed. The banks
are well timbered and the soil good. The crossing has to be made
in canoes. From the Spokane, by the river trail, to Fort Colville,
an old Hudson Bay Company Indian trading post, the distance is 50
miles, through a well wooded and well watered district; but without
much labor it could not be rendered passable for wagons. The length
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of the route A, from Fort Walla to Fort Colville, is about 240 miles.
It would not be a good route for troops to march over, nor would it
be practicable for wagons beyond the Grand Coulee, except partially.
Lieut. R. Arnold, 3d .artillery, passed over this route with a small
party in the last half of November, 1853. He does not report having
met with any snow south of Fort Colville.

Distances on route A.
From-

rro-

Fort Walla-Walla .•••••••••••••••••.
Fort Walla-Walla .••••• -----------Mouth Snake river ••.•.••...••.••••.
Columbia river.··-----------------J,ake ----------------------------North extr(;lmity small coulee.________
South extremity Grand Coulee •••• ---·
North extremityGrandCoulee .•••••..
Spokane river ______ •••••.••• _______
Fort Walla- Walla .••••••. ___ ••.••••.

Whitman's Mission •••••• ---------Mouth Snake river.................
Columbia river....................
Lake-----------·---------------North extremity small coulee........
South extremity Grand Coulee •• __ .__
North extremity Grand Coulee-----Spokane river.-----------~-------Fort Colville •••••• ---· ___ ••••.• . -Fort Colyille .•••••••••••••. _•••• _

Miles.

25
10
10
52
42
6
20

50
50
240

ROUTE B.

This leads from the Walla-Walla valley, by the Pilom:e river and
over the Great Plain of the Columbia, to Fort Colville. From the
Mission site, proceeding a little east of north to the Touchet river, it
is about 18 miles, over a high rolling prairie bearing good grass and
affording a tolerable passage for wagons. The Touchet is but a small
tributary to the Walla-Walla. The valley is good for grazing and
other farming purposes, and it is from one to two miles wide. There
is an abundance of excellent pine building timber as we go up the
stream towards the base of the Blue mountains.
From the Touchet to the mouth of the Pelouse-22 miles-it is
a high rolling prairie of grass, but destitute of timber. The ascents
and descents of the hills are easily made by winding along the slopes.
The crossing of the Snake at the mouth of the Pelouse is difficult; it
has to be made with boats, and the animals swim; it is 150 yards
across, deep, rough, and rapid. The Snake has no valley here, and
high hills on both sides come quite down to the water's edge. A
rope scow-ferry could easily be arranged · here. 'l'he valley of the
Pelouse is well wooded, except for the first 10 miles above its mouth.
The immediate valley and adjacent country are good for grazing.
Should circumstances require it, this valley will afford a good military
position.
From the mouth of the Pe1ouse-95 miles over the Great Plain to
the Spokane-there is no timber. The plateau is generally high and
rolling, of light soil, unfit for productive cultivation; grass is found
on the least sandy parts. About 60 miles north of the Pelouse is a
basaltic formation 24 miles wide, running east and west, which is the
highest part of the plateau, much broken, and furnished with many
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little fresh water lakes. Further north some willows and cottonwood
fringe the streams in small patches. Over the Great Plain on this
route wagons can be passed without much difficulty from the 1st of
June to the 15th of November. A good stopping place can be had
at Lake Sil-kat-ku. '
The district of country embracing the lower part of the Spokane
has plenty of timber, and excellent grazing and good water exist
within accessible distances for animals sufficient for a large command.
The mouth of this river is a great centre of Indian trails from all
points of the compass, and there is an important fishery near by on
the Columbia. The lower portion of this river will afford a good
position for a military post when the proper time will arrive for its
use. The stream is fordable where this route crosses it, except in
very high stages.
From the Spokane to Fort Colville the scene changes materially
from that presented to the south. After passing through a scattering
wood for five miles '"'·e ascend the Che-ma-kane river to its head
waters in a low mountain range; crossing this divide the trail descends the valley of the Slawn-te-hus river. This valley is thirtyfive miles long by one or two in width; the soil is generally quite
good, and there are some settlements in it; the banks are subject to
overflow; the stream is fordable in summer. The dividing ridge is
timbered, and no difficulty is in the way of making a good wagon
road along these two streams and across this divide. At present,
from the Spokane 60 miles to Fort Col ville, pack trains only can pass,
and even these should not attempt to pass before the 1st of June.
Fort Colville would be a first rate point to occupy with troops in
reference to British Indians to the north. Owing to the existence
of gold, which attracts so many to this place: and who seem to be
increasing every season in numbers, the War Department should not
be surprised soon to find it necessary to send a command into this
region, more for the purpose of preventing outrages upon the Indians
than from them. The mountain trails from various parts centering
at the fort are practicable for pack animal trains in summer.

Distances on B. and other routes.
From-

To-

Fort Walla-Wttlla -----------------·
Whitman's Mission----------------Touchet river---------------------Mouth of Pelouse ___________________
Lake Sil-kat·ku -------------------Spokane river ______________________
Summit of mountains _____ •• _____ ___
Fort Colville _______ ·--------------·
Fort Colville. _______ .---. ___ ._.---Fort Colville .••• ________________ ··-Spokane river ______________________
Spokane river _________________ .. ____

Mouth of the Pelouse -------------Touchet river.-------------·......
Mouth of Pelouse__________________
Lake Sil·kat-ku ------------------Spokane river_____________________
Summit of mountains-------------Fort Colville._._ •• ______ • ____ •••••
Osoycos lake·--------------------Mouth of Clark's Fork ••.. ______ •• _.
Pend d'Oreille lake________________
Pend d'Oreille lake________________
Coeur d'Alene--------------------

Miles.

50
18
22
45
50
22
38
66
35
!W

70
36
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of

the Col?lmbia, between Fcrts Walla- Walla and Colville.

As I have referred to the fact of there being good sites, in case of
a necessity for their use, for military posts on the Pelouse and the
Spokane, the question naturally arises as to the advantage that can
be taken of the Columbia for the purposes of transportation. This
puts me to the task of giving some reliable information on the navigability of the upper Columbia.
Between Forts Walla-Walla and Colville three serious obstacles occur,
viz: Priest's rapids, approximatively located 60 miles above Fort WaliaWalla; Buckland's rapids, 66 miles higher up; and Kettle falls, 296
miles still higher up, which are just below Fort Colville. Around
all three portages would have to be made. These natural barriers,
as in other rivers, serve to divide the stream into pools or reaches 1
which are navigable for light draught boats and canoes. But in
regard to the sand bars, shoals, deposits, snags, sawyers, sunken
rocks, and swift places, which might be hindrances, nothing is known
from which we can form an estimate of any reliability. George
Suckley, eBq., late assistant surgeon United States army, descended the
Columbia from Fort Colville in a canoe, (four persons,) leaving November 17 and arriving at Fort Walla-Walla December 1, 1853. He
is of the opinion, derived from his own observations during this descent, that in these reaches or pools a steamer drawing from 20 to 30
inches could navigate in low stages of the river. The average speed
of his canoe was 3j miles per hour. This does not indicate a very
swift current. He does not report having encountered snow or ice.
Between Fort Walla-Walla and the mouth of the Spokane only two
of the named obstructions occur. Ross and Thompson's rapids
(located from Wilkes' map) are regarded by Dr. Suckley as affording
no material obstacle to steam navigation. There is no timber whatever growing on the banks of the Columbia between a point 34 miles
below the mouth of the Spokane and Fort Dalles, which is 115 miles
below Fort Walla- Walla. Above Fort Colville Lieutenant Arnold,
3d artillery, made an examination to a point 3! miles above the mouth
of Clark's Fork in the first part of November, 1853. He reports the
current swift, and numerous small rapids; his canoes were four days
ascending 25 miles. Clark's Fork enters at a point very near the
49th parallel, which is the boundary between us and the British, if
not exactly on it. This fork debouches through a mountain gorge,
which is a short distance above its mouth, where there is a fall of 3
feet, and directly at the mouth there is a fall of 15 feet. 'rhese preclude the idea of ascending the lower part of this stream by boats. I
submit the following table of distances, prepared from the best data
obtainable until actual surveys shall be made of the upper Columbia,
confining my table to the portion within our own possessions-that is,
from its mouth to the 49th parallel of north latitude:
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From-

Columbia.
To-

Mouth of Columbia _________________
Head of Cascades ••••••• _••• __ ••••• _
Head of the Des Chutes.------------Head of Buckland's rapids. ---- •• __ _ _
Head of Kettle's falls _________ •••••.
Head of Little Dalles. __ • __ •• _•••• _._
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Foot of Cascades-----------------Foot of the Dalles _ • ________ • __ • __ _
Foot of Priest's rapids.---- __ __ __ __
Foot of Kettle's falls • __ •• _. ___ •• _.
Foot of Little Dalles--------------49th parallel, Clark's Fork._________

Miles.
183
45
160
66
296
33

The aggregate of all the portages would be about 25 miles in
length. Hence the total approximate length of this river within
our own possessions is 818 miles. The first two named reaches are
now successfully navigated with steamers. A portion of the reachfrom Des Chutes up to Walia-Walia, 100 miles-is now being used for
transporting supplies in oar-boats for the post on Mill creek. The
results of this experiment have not yet been given sufficiently in detail to determine the saving of this mode of overland transportation
betv\reen Fort Dalles and that post.
I by no means regard the problem of the navigability of the Columbia above Fort Dalles, for military purposes, as having yet been
solved. What I have here given in a condensed form em bodies all
that we know pertinent to this interesting question; nor can the
problem be solved except by results from proper surveys of the pools,
portages, rapids, &c., under a competent officer, with ample funds
for the purpose. The sum of $25,000, with orders for the troops to
afford protection, would be required for the accomplishment of the
object.
ROUTE C.

From the Walla- Walla, via Omur d'Alene, thence to Fort Benton, on the
JYiissouri river, in Nebraska.
From the treaty ground to Snake river, 61 miles, it is a rolling
prairie, with cottonwood on the banks of the streams; there are plentiful supplies of water and grass for auy number of animals; the
streams are easily crossed, and it is a good district for dragoons or
infantry to operate in. The Snake has to be crossed by boats. It is
here that we come to the Nez Perces Indian country, and this is
known as "Red Wolf Crossing." The banks of the river are low.
The creeks in the vicinity are well wooded.
From the Snake to the Pelouse river, 39 miles, it is a prairie easy
of passage; it grows the camas, indicating a moist, rich soil. The
valley of the Pelouse is well filled with good pine timber, and the
stream is fordable in summer.
From the Pelouse, 50 miles to the Coour d' .Alene river, the passage
generally is easy, the country well wooded, and water and grass are
met in abundance. There is, however, a range of hills to cross_where
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it would be difficult for a wagon to pass without labor, just south of
Nedlehualk creek; and a mountain to cross before reaching St. Joseph
river, requiring considerable work to make the road good for loaded
wagons. After this, there is a lake that would have to be bridged.
There is plenty of timber on the spot to bridge wherever required
in this reach. The Coour d'Alene is easily bridged. Any number
of animals may be grazed all the way from the starting point on this
route for 123 miles, to near the mountain just mentioned.
From the crossing of the Coour d'Alene river, via the :Mission, to
the foot of the Coour d'Alene mountain pass, it is 60 miles, following
the north trail seen on the map as we cross the mountain. In this
long reach there is much timber, through which, however, a good
. wagon road could be made with little difficulty, except for six or seven
miles, where the trail is seen to bend away from the river before
reaching the entrance of the pa::;s. This pass is only 4! miles through
from stream to stream. In it there is a steep hill to go over; it is
heavily timbered, requiring much labor in cutting fallen timber and
in side-hill digging, to make a tolerable road through it, and probably
some rock blasting -vvould be required.
From the east extremity of said pass to Hell Gate it is 106 miles,
in which there are two difficult places to make a road through: one,
marked a, between where the trail leaves the St. Regia Borgia and
the Bitter Root river, 13 miles in extent; the other, marked b, 20
miles long, in which blasting would be necessary in several places.
Possibly a better route for a road could be found through the timbered bottom on the south side of the stream.
From Hell Gate to the west foot of Cadott's Pass, in the Rocky
mountains, it is 89 miles, and there would be no serious difficulty in
making a wagon road. In the valleys of the Hell Gate and St. Mary's
rivers any number of animals could be grazed all summer. There is
a great deal of prairie as well as timber land in these, also in that of
the Blackfoot Forie Through Cadott's Pass, for 26 miles, I estimate
that two companies of troops could open a good wagon road in 10
days; the ridge is very steep and much work would be required.
We have now come to the boundary between Washington and N ebraska, and from the west extremity of the pass it is 133 miles to
Fort Benton; between the foot of the pass on the east side to the
fort, there is very little in the way of the passage of a wagon train.
I have mentioned the difficulties in the way of moving a wagon
train over the whole route. In the present condition of the trail
starting by the 15th June, with one or two companies of dragoons,
and plenty of pack animals, the whole march from the treaty ground
in the valley of the Walla-Walia (543 miles) to Fort Benton could be
performed in 32 days, and from the treaty ground (250 miles) to the
Bitter Root river in 22 days. Grass would be found sufficient for the
subsistence of mules and Indian horses. But if American horses be
used, they should be accustomed for two seasons to live on the grass
before starting. The only streams to be ferried or swam would be
the Snake, Po-vvn lake, Cceur d'Alene river, Bitter Root, and the Hell
Gate-all the others would be found fordable. Pown lake could be

DEP.A.RTMENT OF THE PACIFIC.

79

avoided by diverging, so as to cross the Cmur d'Alene rivee below
Camr d; Alene lake, but it would increase the distance 35 miles.
Returning the same year from Fort Benton to the Walia-Walia
valley with the same commarjd, the circumstances would be different.
On this point we have the data of Governor Stevens' return trip in
the fall of 1855. Leaving Fort Benton 5th November, his travelling
time continued to 20th December, but his party were under march
only 36 .days. It was a very cold season, snows had commenced to
fall at Fort Benton on the day of starting, and it was found in Cadott's
Pass, on the Cmur d'Alene mountains, at the Clear Water river, and
in the Walla-Walla valley, where the party arrived 20th December.
The Columbia had frozen over that same season, and there ·w ere deep
snows on the trails in the Yakama country in November. The animals of the party ·w ere worn down and much distressed for the want
of sufficient grass, many were exchanged for others on the route in
trade with the Indians.
I regard the route C the best, all circumstances considered, for
opening a wagon roan upon, between our military post in the valley
of the Walia-Walia and Fort Benton. It combines more advantages
than any other route; the total distance is 543 miles. After arriving
at the Pelouse, for the whole of the remaining distance this route is
common with that designated by the late Secretary of War, Jefferson
Davis, for the 4th regiment of infantry to open a ·wagon road upon
during an overland march from Walla-Walla to Fort Benton. It is
quite certain the road, if opened, would seldom, if ever, be used by
emigrants to the Pacific; its principal use would be for military purposes, and in this point of view it would be of some importance in
affording communication between the departments of the west and
Pacific, if the road were well opened and afterwards kept in repair.
It would also serve the desirable end of connecting, as it were, the
valleys of the Walla-Walla, Coour d'Alene, and St. Mary's, each of
which being well adapted to the growing of stock and agricultural products, and possessing good climate and an abundance of good water,
may, in time, be coveted for settlement by the whites. These valleys,
however, afford no moro than is needed by the Indians, who occupy
them. To construct the road by the labor of a regiment of troops,
as contemplated in the orders of the late honorable Secretary, would
require two to three years in the field, and it ·would cost vastly more
than to do it by contract, under a special appropriatio12. The proper
use of troops, in connexion with such an undertaking, would be to
perform escort duty, and to protect the laboring parties against the
Indians.
With such 8,id from the troops, and an appropriation of $350,000,
the road could probably be opened all the way, and the necessary
bridges constructed, and the whole line put in such condition that a
team could haul a reasonable load over it at the usual rate of teaming
on a pretty fair country road. But, after being put in this condition,
annual repairs must be made upon it, or else in two years it would be
found impassable in many places.
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Distances on route G.
From~

Treaty ground, (Mill creek)---------Touchet river • _••••••••••••••••••• _
Tout'l-fion creek-------------------Snake river-----------------------Pelouse river.---------------------.
Nedlehualk creek·-----------------St. Joseph river-----··-------------Creur d'Alene river ••••• _•• _. _. _ _ ___
Creurd'Alene Mission _______________
Fork of trails.----···--·----------West foot Creur d'Alene Pass ••• __ ____
East foot of pass .••• ____ •••••••• _...
Junction of trails.-----------------Leaving St. Regia river .••••••••••••.
Military post, Walla- Walla valley.____
Bitter Root river·------------------East foot Creur d'Alene Pass ••••••••••
Hell Gate------------------------West foot Cadott's Pass------------East foot Cadott's Pass •••• _____ •••••
Military post, Mill creek, Walla-Walla.

To-

Miles.

Touchet river.....................
Toutaiion creek _ ••••• _. _. _ ••••• _..
Snake river.·--------------------·
Pelouse river---------------------Nedlehualk creek •••••••••• ---·---St. Joseph river------------------Creur d'Alene river---------------Creur d'Alene Mission._. ____ ._ ••• _.
Fork of trails_____________________
WestfootNorthernPass............
East foot of pass ______ •• __ .•• _....
Junction of trails ••••• __ •.• _. _....
Leaving St. Regia river-----------Bitter Root river-----------------Bitter Root river __ • __ • __ •• ____ • _..
Hell Gate-----------------------Hell Gate-----------------------West foot Cadott's Pass_____________
East foot Cadott's Pc1ss ------------Fort Benton __ •• __ • __ ------- .• _.__
Fort Benton __ •• _ •• _••• ___ •• ___ •. _

23
16
22
39

18
20
12
15
29
16
4~

5
18
13
250
70
106
89
26
107
543

VIII. Indian treaties and their ejfects in Washington Territory .
.Ascending the Columbia for about 7 5 miles above Fort Dalles (map
20) we reach the mouth of the Umatilla, which, coming from the
east, drains a valley occupied by the Umatilla tribe.
Higher up, at a distance of about 120 miles above the fort, is the
mouth of the Wall a-Walia river, which drains a district east of the
Columbia and south of the Snake river, (Lewis's Fork of the Columbia.) This district is the home of the Walla-Walla tribe. It ·also
contains that of the Cayuses, who, however, occupy the portion
towards the Blue mountains, while the former occupy that nearer the
Columbia and the Snake .
.Ascending the Columbia still higher, for about twenty miles abov,e
the mouth of the Walla- Walia, we come to the mouth of the Y akama
river, which, with its tributaries, drains a large district to the north
and west of the Columbia, belonging to the Yakama tribe, (maps 17,
20.)
The Snake river enters the Columbia between the mouths of the
Walla-Walia and the Yakama about ten miles below the latter. The
localities are readily comprehended by observing, at a few miles below
the entrance of the Walla-Walla, the Columbia makes a right angle
in its course; down to this elbow it comes from the north, and below
its course is westerly to the Pacific .
.Ascending the Snake river 130 miles above its mouth, we come to
the Koos-koos-ky river, (map 21.) To the south of this and to the
east of the Snake is the Nez Perce Indian country.
On the 29th May, 1855, the superintendents of Indian affairs (Stevens and Palmer) for Washington and Oregon, as commissioners on
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the part of the United States, met the assembled tribes above named,
and others of lesser note, for a council, at the treaty ground already
mentioned, on Mill creek, in the valley of the Walia-vValla. About
eight tribes, with their chiefs and headmen, were present. The
whole number was about 5, 000 ; at the sittings of the council, however, there were present only about 1, 000.
The tout ensemble of each tribe, on this occasion, was magnificence
in the extreme; while that of the whites, on the contrary, was meagre
and insignificant. It was humiliating to witness the contrast, so unfavorable to the success so earnestly hoped for. The Indians, as they
advanced in bodies of from three to twelve hundred warriors from
their distant homes, were all mounted upon fine horses, having their
equipments, though of Indian taste, most richly and gorgeously ornamented. The riders strode their steeds with grace and skill. Not
so with the whites ; the retinue of the commis~ioners was shabby,
diminutive, and mean in appointments generally, and deficient in all
those points of show, in particular, that are so well calculated to
strike the fancy or command the respect of an Indian. The pitiful
escort of the commissioners of only thirty to forty United States in·
fantry Roldiers, mounted on lame, gaunt horses and mules, literally
fed on nothing, furnished by the quartermaster at the Dalles the
previous winter, and having no show in equipments, nor riders possessing skill in horsemanship-this escort, we say, contrasted most
unfortunately with the splendid array presented by 1, 200 Nez Perce
horsemen. In short, there was not a tribe that did not outnumber,
outshine, and outdo the whites in all those points so well calculated,
and which should never be disregarded, to produce a favorable effect
on the savage mind when assembled in council. To argue the opposite of this would be tantamount to confessing ignorance of the Indian
character.
By allowing themselves to go into council under such circumstances
the commissioners, at the outset, jeopardized the very object of the
nogotiation. Even the Cayuses, the smallest in 1mmbers, manifested
utter contempt for the military escort, and their young· braves even
dared to turn the cold shoulder to the young officer commanding
the paltry troop of infantry. On such an occasion, when so much was
pending, there should have been four full companies of dragoons at
least, well mounted and fully uniformed and equipped. The prudence
of the officer at the critical moment is to be commended; his cool
personal daring saved him; had he attempted to rely on his handful
of soldiers to avenge the insult, probably every white man of the
embassy would have been made to bite the dust. Your escort at a
grand council of assembled tribes should be able to outdo the Indians
if you expect them to be impressed with a sense of your superiority;
otherwise the moral cil'ect is all against you. If the United States
troops at the Dalles and Vanconver had not so early as May ''emr~rged
from the lethargy ot winter quarters," or were too few or deficient
in kind to affonl a suitable escort, surely, in virtue of his gubernatorial power, one of the commissioners could have commanded the
at.tandancc of four companies of Washington mounted volunteers; or
H. Ex. Doc. 114--(-i
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perchance the paucity of numbers in that Territory not furnishing that
force, then his brother governor, of the adjacent Territory, would unquestionably have accommodated him ·w ith a battalion of Oregon volunteers. Be this as it may, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that, in
military preparations, there was an oversight little to have been
expected in the chief of the embassy, considering his military antecedents. vVe are willing, however, to believe that he was not alone to
blame, and that an obstacle was interposed by the Secretary of War
declining to authorize a sufficient military escort from the United
States troops, on the ground of a deficiency of numbers then in the
department. There may have been another reason for denying a
suitable escort, which may be attributed to that unfortunate jealously,
or something worse, existing between the Indian Bureau and War
Department, the fruits of which are most pernicious. To the effects of
this want of unity I shall more particularly refer in another place.
The object principally designed in assembling these tribes in a
grand council was, to engage them to abandon the la.nds upon which
they had been born, and grazed their herds of cattle and horses, and
lived and hunted; to quit forever the streams on which their canoes
had been paddled by their squaws and children, and in which they
had fished for the salmon from a period long antecedent to the descent
of Lewis and Clark; and to exchange all their possessory rights to the
soil of extensive tracts over 1-vhich they had roamed for many a generation in undisputed dominion for other more cirr.umseribed lands
called ''Indian reservation,'' 'vhich were to be designated and agreed
upon in council.
It cannot be denied that the object of the whites in holding this
-treaty was one of grave import, involving the future destiny of no
:less than five tribes of intelligent, warlike, well armed, and well appointed savages, all of which tribes, except one, (the Cayuses,) had
been on friendly terms with the whites up to the meeting of this
.council; and one of them, the Walla-Walla, headed by their distin:guished chief, the late Pee-pee-mox-mox, had done good service in
battle in aid of the conquest of California-a service not readily forgotten by those engaged in that enterprise.
Neither is it to be denied that the Indians may have had some ·
general ideas of the objects of assembling them, though previously to
the opening of the council it is not to be doubted their ideas of the
principal object in view were exceedingly vague and indefinite. The
tribes were undoubtedly stimulated with the prospect that the commissioners would come loaded with numerous fine Indian goods and
much money to distribute among them. It was more from a desire
to become the recipients of these as gifts than from any other influence that they allowed themselves to be assembled. Very far was it from
the intention of their chiefs to relinquish or exchange one square rod
of their lands upon any consideration whatever.
Proceedings qf the council.-The sessions commenced May 29 and
terminated June 11, occasionally adjourning over one day to allow
time to digest what had been said previously.
Unmistakable repugnance to the treaty was evinced throughout,

DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC.

83

not only by the chiefs, but by the individuals composing the tribes,
almost to a man. Lawyer, the head chief of the Nez Perces, was the
first to apparently give in to the views of the commissioners, but not
until the tenth day of the sessions; and then· he had the boldness to
couple his sanction with expressing his want of confidence in the fulfilment of the brilliant promises held up to his people by the commissioners, twitting them with a breach on the part of the whites in
non-complying with a former treaty.
The Cayuse chiefs were strongly opposed to the terms proposed,
alleging they had no right to sell the ground God had given for the
support of the Indians, except for good reasons, and that they could
not clearly see the things promised on the part of the whites as compensation.
Pee-pee-mox-mox and Five Crows, chiefs of the vValla- Wallas, opposed the treaty. The former urged strongly upon the commissioners
the bad effect of bringing a treaty like this to a hasty conclusion; he
plead for more time for his people to consider it, and offered to mee-e
the commissioners in another council, if their Great Father (the President) should desire it after knowing the sentiments of his red subjects
against removing from their lands; and he would give the commis·
sioners one day to consider his proposition.
Kameakin and Schloom, chiefs of the Yakamas, were so indignant
at the object proposed that they would not speak in council when invited, except to say "we have nothing to say."
Ow-hi, for the Umatillas, acknowledged his obligation to the Great
Spirit, and to no one else, for the right of the Indians to the soil they
()Ccupied, and refused to steal it away from his people by selling it,
as the commissioners proposed, to the whites.
Up to the tenth session all the chiefs, except Lawyer, strongly and
openly opposed the treaty; and one knowing this crafty old chief
could easily perceive he was playing a game diplomatique, and whatever his hand might do in the making of his mark on a piece of paper,
his heart was opposed to its contents. So strong was the opposition
()f the chiefs in council, of those outside, and of the tribes collectively
and individually, that on the eleventh session the commissioners receded in some measure from their first demands and essentially modified the treaty. To this modification they gained, apparently, the
reluctant assent of all the chiefs then present in council, except those
of the Yak:una tribe; and, with this exception, all seemed going on
\veil until, just before adjournment on this same day, Looking-Glass,
the great war chief of the Nez Perces, (who up to this time had not
been present,) made his appearance on the ground-first sending a
runner to herald his approach-escorted by a well mounted war band,
and, before dismounting, denounced to the superintendent for Washington the selling of the Nez Perce country to the whites. It is to be
observed this chief, though second in rank to Lawyer, has much in·
fluence with the people of this tribe.
The next day the senior commissioner opened the proceedings in a
Bpeech, in which he labored most assiduously to convince LookingGlass, who was now seated in council, of the advan~ages to his people
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and to himself held out in the treaty, in which it was demanded that
there were ''to be three reservations, one upon which the Cayuses,
the Walla-Wallas, and the Umatillas were to go; one upon which the
Nez Perces were to be placed, and one upon which the Yakamas were
to be confined; and that they were to be removed from their present
possessions to these reservations in the course of two or three years."
To this, Looking-Glass immediately rose, and, in a well set speech,
replied against the policy of the treaty, and with such an effect that
all the chiefs, Lawyer inclusive, refused to submit to it. Both commissioners rejoined at length, urging him to chang-e his decision; convinced that, unless Looking-Glass were gained over, all would be lost;
but their arguments in council were in vain, and it was in this state
of the proceedings when the council was adjourned over Sunday (that
being a religious day .·with the Nez Perces) to meet again on Monday.
On Monday, June 11, the senior commissioner opened the council
with a brief address, at the close of which, on invitation from his excellency, all the chiefs came forward and signed the treaty, apparently
without opposition. After which, the presents were distributed to
the chiefs, and the council was dissolved; the superintendent for
Washington leaving, with an escort only ofN ez Perces,for Fort Benton,
543 miles distant, to hold another treaty; the superintendent for Oregon leaving for Port Orford, to hold the treaty spoken of in chapter VI,
on Rogue river ; the mounted troop of forty infantry returning to
Fort Dalles, their further services as escort being ended, and the
tribes were dismissed to their several homes.
The questions naturally arise, how and by what means, during that
adjournment over Sunday, were the chiefs operated upon to induce
them to sign a treaty to which the commissioners knew all, except
Lawyer, were so violently opposed? What potential consideration
was brought to bear with such talismanic effect as to cause so wonderful a change in the dispositions of the chiefs'? What was it that had
more influence on the savage mind, during that adjournment, than all
the speeches the commissioners had made during the eleven previous
days? Let the commissioners answer. We go on to adduce some of
the effects of their diplomacy.
There is little doubt that Lawyer and Looking-Gla3s had a previous
understanding that the former was to cajole the commissioners to
believe him favorably disposed to their views; and, in the nick of
time, Looking-Glass was to appear, as he did, suddenly on the ground,
and oppose the negotiation; this for the double purpose of making the
whites believe in the friendliness of the Nez Perces, and at the same
time to throw obstacles in the way to prevent a clutch upon their
lands from being realized. In these respects, events have shown that
the crafty La'ivyer \Vas the ablest diplomatist at the council; for the
friendship of his tribe has remained, and no hold upon their lands has
yet inured to the whites.
No disinterested witness to the proceedings believed that a single
chief signed that treaty with the slightest possible intention of
abiding it. They all regarded it as a paper to which they affixed
their marks without their hearts being with their hands ; and the
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commissioners, in their cool and rational moments, ought to have
known there was no intention on the part of the tribes to fulfil its
stipulations; and they also ought to have known that all the tribes
(except, perhaps, the Nez Perce) left the council ground with feelings
much less friendly than they entertained before being summoned to
this council. Were these commissioners so heated by the anxious
desire of fame in the diplomatique field as to have been blinded to
the fact that it was a question among the tribes whether they would
not then rise in arms upon the commissioners' party and seize all the
goods they had brought, and that the scheme was not executed was
<>wing to the policy of old Lawyer?
The effects of the Walla-Walia treaty are summed up as follows :
1. The meagre escort and shabby appearance of the commission
created in the minds of the warriors an idea of military weakness on
the part of the whites; and this was helped to be confirmed in their
minds by the fact that a band of Cayuses, eight years previous, had
gained a decided victory in an open field fight over a battalion of
mounted Oregonians, in equal numbers to the Indians, but quadrupl<>
the infantry escort at the council.
2. The refusal to allow time, as urged by Pee-pee-mox-mox, for
individuals of the tribes to consider the proposition of moving from
their father lands to new homes, convinced the Indians that they were
to go or not to go, to be or not to be, at the pleasure of the whites,
and that the wi:shes, conveniences, or welfare of the Indians were but
as dust in the balance.
3. The small number, small size, and allotment of the reservations,
viz : one for the Nez Perces, one for the Yakamas, and only one upon
which all the other tribes and fractions were to be condensed, created
a perception of the want of fairness and liberality on the part of tho
commissioners. It is not to be supposed six tribes of Indians could
l1ave been contented within the limits of one reservation, without
just apprehension of serious collision among themselves, which even
they would have good reason to dread.
4. The manner in which the head chiefs were ultimately brought
o0ver to sign the treaty was calculated to cause discontent in the
minds of all less favored in the tribes-necessarily begetting dissatisfaction, engendering opposition, and determination to disregard what
the favored chiefs had signed.
5. The hot haste and grasping disposition evinced by the senior
commissioner in his speeches in council, and, as shown by the terms
<)f the treaty, requiring in Ro short a time the relinquishment of so
much country of their birthright, and the threatening argument that,
if they did not leave their lands, the whites would come and take
them, must necessarily have produced bitter feelings, akin to despair,
·Or a resolution to defend those rights to the last.
6. The marked preference shmvn in the selection of the body of
the N es Perces for an escort to Fort Benton was calculated to produce
envy in the minds of the other less favored tribes; and yet, if Indians
were to be employed for military service, it will be conceded by all
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acquainted with the Nez Perces that a better band could not have
been chosen for a body guard on this occasion.
7. The recollection, still operating in the minds of some of the
tribes at. this council, of a breach of faith on the part of the white s,
in reference to a treaty negotiated on a former occasion, was sufficient
to teach that if a treaty was broken by the whites, with equal fairness one could be disregarded by the Injians; and hence their opinion
that the mere act of signing a treaty was not necessarily to be regarded
as binding themselves to execute it; and when afterwards intorme c?
that a failure to comply with its conditions would bring the armed
vengeance of the whites upon them, it is not surprising that they regarded this an additional bitterness poured into their cup, already fuH
to overflowing.
We now perceive how it was that the hearts and minds of thesetribes were wrought up to a pitch of desperate determination to resist,
being, as they thought, driven or cheated into the scheme of despoliation of their lands. And here .we perceive the chief if not the primary
cause of all these tribes, except the Nez Perces, joining in a war
commenced in the Yakama country only three months after the
dissolution of this council.
Quitting the council ground, as stated, for Fort Benton, the superintendent for vVashington left in his rear a vast extent of Indian
country, in which the proceedings of the council had stirred up little
else than strong dissatisfaction in the Indian heart; advancing so far
into an Indian country, leaving the country behind upon the point of
blazing into open hostilities, and pursuing his way without an adequate
escort of United States troops seems surprising; it certainly was an
act which, though a bold one, cannot be too strongly condemned.
What effect could it have ~ut that of an exhibition of military ·weakness on the part of the whites?
Gold had been discovered by some "half-breeds" in the neighborhood of Fort Colville, high up on the Columbia, and the announcement
of it was made about the time of holding thi8 council. As is usuat
on such events, hundreds of whites went flocking to the auriferous
district. The rush commenced soon after the close of the council.
The routes thither led directly through the Walla- Walia and Yakama
countries, and as the whites passed, some of them committed excesses:
and outrages of the grossest kinds upon the hitherto unoffending
Indians of the very tribes the proceedings of the council had so much
and so recently disturbed. The bare recital of some of the crimes
committed by these Anglo-Saxon devils, in human shape, is sufficient
to cause the blood of every virtuous man, whether of red or white skin,
to boil with deep indignation. They were not satisfied with stealing
the horses and cattle of the Indians, but they claimed the privilegeof taking and ravishing Indian women and maidens ad libitum.
What wonder, then, that the Indians who had been so grossly outraged
should have retaliated, as they did, by killing some half dozen of
these miscreants?
Sub-Indian Agent Bolon, yet swelling with the importance he had
acquired by the part he had played at the recent council, threatened
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the Indians who had retaliated, as described, with the vengeance of
the United States government, and actually started on his way, and
told the Indians he was going to Fort Dalles to fetch the troops against
them. Whether this was a mere threat, meant to frighten the Indians,
is not known. Be this as it may, they believed him in earnest. Three
of their number followed, and . overtaking him, demanded to know if
he intended to send the United States troops against them? On
answering in the affirmative, as the Indians say, they killed him, and
afterwards, as reported, some miners on their way to Colville.
However much we may regret the death of Mr. Bolon by the savage
hand, it cannot be denied his own gross imprudence, in threatening
the Indians with a hostile visit of the United States troops, was more
the cause of his death than any prejudice or ill will against him. It
was an act committed, probably, to save themselves from chastise~
ment at the hands of the troops. These views on the subject under
consideration were formed in the month of November, 1855, two
months after the occurrence, while engaged in a reconnaissance in
that portion of the country. They are the results of my own invos~
tigation at that time into the first causes of the hostilities commenced
there in October. I have not officially reported these views until
now, having· preferred to wait for such additional evidence as naturally
would be subsequently developed calculated either to confirm or
refute them. From all lights I have since, fi·om time to time, been
able to obtain, I am more and more convinced of their correctness.
Colonel Wright, 9th infantry, in command, reports from his camp
on the N achess river, Yakama country, (map 17,) May 30, 1856,
and says: ''I believe most of these chiefs desire peace, but some of
them hold back in fear of the demands that may be made upon them
for their murders and thefts. They seem to think and say that they
had strong and good reasons for the murders they have committed,
both of the miners and Indian agent, (Bolon;) the outrages of the
former and the injudicious and intemperate threats of the latter, if
true, as they say, I doubt not maddened the Indians to murder them."
I have given what I regard as the causes of and acts immediately
preceding the Indian war in Oregon and Washington in 1855-' 56.
It was at the time clearly shown to my own mind, by my own investigations of facts, that the principal cause is to be found in what I
have stated in reference to the Wall a-Walla council and the treaty
there made.
Since that war commenced, I know it has been said by those
holding high positions that it was one determined upon, a long time
previous to the council, in a secret combination of tribes resolved upon
exterminating the whites; but upon examination of this opinion,
whenever and by whomsoever expressed, I find it to rest on ipse dixits,
mere s~yings without proof. In the annual report of the Secretary
of War, December 1, 1856, it is said: ".A. combination embracing
most of the tribes inhabiting those Territories (Washington and Ore~
gon) was entered into, and the extermination of the whites seemed
to be their purpose.'' 'fhis is a most comprehensive charge against
the very many tribes occupying those Territories, and it comes from
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high authority. But I have hunted in vain for credible evidence to
substantiate it to the extent of its declaration. I think the Han.
Secretary may have forgotten the number of tribes in those Territories.
On the 11th June, 1856, Colonel 'Vright reports from his camp on
the N achess: ''The chiefs all sent the most friendly messages. I
answered, they must come and see me. Ow-hi and Te-vi-as came,
and we had a long talk about the war, its origin, &c. Ow-hi related
the whole history of the Walla-Walla treaty, and concluded by saying
that the war commenced from that moment--that the treaty was the
cause of all the deaths by fighting since that time. Ow-hi is a very
intelligent man. He speaks with great energy, is well acquainted
with his subject, and his words carry conviction of truth to his
hearers." Ow-hi, though a Yakama chief, it will be remembered~
spoke at that council for the U matillas; his speech not only conveyed
the sentiments of his tribe, but it was likewise an index to the minds
of his own people.
It is not to be doubted that during the council some of the chiefs
were secretly plotting. The occasion afforded them too good an
opportunity to be lost for talking over their grievances and concocting
plans. In this sense, it may be, there was a combination of some
of the eight bands assembled;
Is it to be presumed the commissioners were not aware of the
temper in which they left those Indians? Is it to be believed they were
cajoled into the idea that the chiefs meant to comply with the stipulations? It.. would be passing but a poor compliment upon the discernment of the President's ambassadors to answer those interrogations
affirmatively.
Was it not, then, the duty of these gentlemen to immediately inform
the military commander of the department of the bad temper existing
among them? Instead of which, on the contrary, one of the commissioners, soon after coming from the council, sent a message to
General Wool, assuring him all was quiet there; that the Indians
attending the council were all friendly disposed, and that happy
results "\vere anticipated immediately to flow in consequence of the
treaty. This message was communicated to the general at his headquarters about the 1st September, and it was the only communication
to him, direct or indirect, after the holding of the council, from
either commissioner on the subject until the war commenced.
rrhe commanding general of the department had returned from
his inspection of the posts on the Columbia in the preceding June,
after organizing and sending a command from Fort Dalles into the
Fort Boise district, under Brevet Major Haller, 4th infantry, as explained under the head of ''Eastern Oregon,'' and had then left all
peaceful in the whole of Washington Territory, as well as in Oregon.
Major Haller's command returned to Fort Dalles about the last of
September with his animals much worn down after so long a march.
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IX.

.11iilitary operation9 during the Indian ww·
Washington and Northern 0Tegon.

of

1855-' 56,

~n

In chapter VIII the cause of this war has been given. In this
chapter I sball record the procedings and operations of the troops,
regulars and volunteers, as briefly as consistent with a clear nan·ative of the principal circumstances.
Up to the time of the murder of Sub-Indian Agent Bolon, in September, 1855, there were only three military posts in all this country,
viz: Fort Steilacoom, garrisoned with two companies 4th infantry;
Fort Vancouver, with two companies 4th infantry and on ecompany
3d artillery; l!.,ort Dalles, with two companies 4th infantry and a small
detachment of dragoons; the troops at the latter post having-, as
before stated, quite recently returned from the Snake River expedition,
were under the immediate command of Captain (Brevet Major) Haller.
:Major G. J. Rains, then commanding the 4th regiment infantry, was
the senior officer in all these districts, with his headquarters at Fort
Vancouver.
On being informed of the murder of Sub-Agent Bolon, and on a
call upon him for troops by the then acting Governor Mason, of
Washington, l\fajor Rains reports, 3d of October, 1855: ''We have
sent 40 men with two officers from Fort Steilacoom, and 102 men with
five officers from Fort Dalles, into the Yakama country, and shall follow,
if necessary, with all our force."
Here it will be seen that the call from the acting governor (in the
absence of Governor Stevens, who was then on the Missouri, about
] , 000 miles distant from Olympia) upon the army for troops was
most promptly met by Ma.ior Rains.
At this time General Wool, commanding the department of the
Pacific, was at his headquarters, Benicia, California, more than 1, 000
miles distant from the scene of threatened hostilities. It is here to
be observed that the only direct means of communicating from Fort
Vancouver to his headquarters ·was by the semi-monthly sea steamer,
whose trips were so regulated that she arrived at San Francisco on or
about the 4th ~nd 19th of every month; and as in good weather she
required five to six days to make the run, she would leave Portland,
bringing despatches from the Columbia river, about the 29th of one
month and the 13th of the following month. These despatches could
only reach the general on the nights of the 5th or 6th and 19th or
20th of each month. And in transmitting despatches from his headquarters, they had to leave Benicia not ]ater than the 4th and 19th
to reach the Columbia river and Puget' s Sound posts. I have put in
this explanation to show how it was that information of l\fajor Rains'
action, October 9, calling for volunteers, did not reach General vVool
until the 19th of the same month.
The little force under Lieutenant Slaughter, from Fort Steilacoom,
was to proceed through the Nachess Pass, (maps 16 and 17,) and that
from Fort Dalles, under Major Haller, by the route seen on map 19,
into the Yakama country. The former started and vvas far on its way
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when, learning of the Indian force in front, it judiciously returned to
White river. On the afternoon of October 6 Major Haller's command
fell in with the Indians, and commenced an action with them in the
brush on the Pisco river, and, after fighting some time, drove them at
the point of the bayonet. and took possession of a hill; he was surrounded by Indians, and called for a. reinforcement. This call reached
:Major Rains on the 9th, and the next day Lieutenant Day, 4th artillery,
started from Fort Dalles with 45 men and a mountain howitzer to
reinforce Major Haller.
Major Rains reports the same day, October 9, to the governor of
Oregon, and says: "As commanding officer, I have ordered all the
United States disposable force in this district into the field immediately, and shall take command. As this force is questionable to
subdue these Indians-the Yakamas, Klikatats, and may be some other
smaller bands-I have the honor to call upon you for four companies of
volunteers, composed according to our present organization. This is
just enough for a Major's command, and would authorize that officer
also. They can be mustered here, (at Fort Vancouver)."
Such was the call for Oregon volunteers, made by Major Rains, by
what authority it doth not appear, except perhaps from what he
derived in virtue of having assumed, being "commanding officer;"
it will he perceived there were only four companies called for, and they
were intended by Major Rains to he mustered into the United States
·service at Fort Vancouver.
Whether there 'iYas any real·necessity for such an additional force
to Major Rains' command I will not pretend to decide, hut that the
call for these volunteers proved an embarrassment to him there can
be no doubt. After events must have convinced him that his call
was turned to a very different end from what he contemplated.
On the lOth October Major Haller's command, after much hard
fighting, succeeded in retreating to Fort Dalles, with severe loss in
killed and wounded, in pack animals and one howitzer. 1'he field is
marked on maps J 7-19. It was a brave fight, in retreat gallantly
covered by Captain Russell's company.
Major Rains says in his remarkable official address (13th November, 1855) to the Yakama Indians: "I sent this handful of soldiers
into your country to inquire into the facts of the murder of Indian
Agent Bolon; it was not expected that they should fight you." From
this it would seem that Major Haller attacked the Yakamas without
authority of his commanding officer.
The effect of this defeat-for such it must he considered-was to
embolden the Indians on the immediate east of the Cascade range;
and the news of it spreading like wild-fire, extended through the passes
to the Indians west of it, even to the Puget' s Sound district; to the
east it went with equal celerity across the Columbia to the WallaW alias, Spokanes, &c.
As before said, and for the reasons assigned, the commanding general of the department did not receive until the 19th October information of events that had occurred in the order related up to the
13th October. The action of the governor of Oregon upon Major
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Rains' call for volunteers was not made known until after the steamer
left Portland.
On the 19th October the general ordered two detachments-one
from Benicia, the other from Presidio, composed of 1 captain, (Ord,)
2 lieutenants, and 70 rank and file, 3d artillery-to proceed in the next
steamer (21st October) to reinforce Major Rains. This force reached
its destination and joined in time to take an active part in the campaign.
Action qf tlte gouernor of Oregon.-M:ajor Rains' call of the 9th October for volunteers was answered on the 16th. Although within a
very few hours' reach of each other, eight days elapsed before the
governor answered; and then he says to Major Rains, developments
after the date of his requisition for four companies of Oregon volunteers to be mustered into the service of the United States had determined him (the governor) "to call into the field a regiment of mounted
volunteers, under the command of J. W. Nesmith. brigadier general
of Oregon militia. It is wholly impracticable to induce the citizens
of Oregon to enrol for service in the suppression of any Indian hostilities under the organization prescribed by the rules and regulations
of the United States army. I am therefore constrained to preserve
a distinct military organization, under the authority of the territorial
government, of the force in the field in pursuance of my proclamation."
The proclamation referred to calls for eight companies, and assigns
as a reason that ''the chief in command of the military force of the
United States in this district having made a requisition upon the
executive of Oregon for a volunteer force to aid in suppressing the
attacks of hostile Indians." In assigning this reason the governor
leaves one to infer that the number of companies called out in his
proclamation is in accordance with the call of Major Rains; whilst,
in fact, Major R. only called for half the number the generous executive organizes into an independent northern Oregon volunteer
army.
The volunteers from Washington, and their acting governor, were
less fastidious. T\VO companies of these promptly came forward at
the call of their executive, and enrolled themselves in the United
States service under the banner of :Major Rains. In reference to
their services General Wool says: ''These truly patriotic officers,
(Captain Newell and Captain Strong,) with their companies, have
rendered important services in restraining the Klikatats from joining
in the war with the Yakamas."
Major Rains left Fort Dalles on the 30th October, with about 350
regulars, for a campaign into the Yakama country, with twenty days'
provisions. On the 4th November, when about twenty-five miles
from the Dalles, (map 19,) he broke up some large caches of Indian
provisions, taking a'vay about ten mule loads and destro)ring twenty
more, having captured a spy who revealed these caches. Acting
Governor Mason visited him at Camp Yakama, opposite Fort Dalles,
and conferred on him the rank of brigadier general of Washington
Territory, and returned to his capital.
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Simultaneously with the movement of these regulars, six companies
of the independent northern army of Oregon volunteers, under Colonel
Nesmith, moved into the Yakama country; and a battalion of this
army, under :Major Chin, filed off from Fort Dalles, taking the direction of Fort W alia-Walla, (map 20.)
On the return of Lieutenant Slaughter's little force to his position on
White river, after the defeat of Major Haller, Captain Maloney, 4th
infantry, took command, having increased the force in the field of the
Puget' s Sound district so as to number about 100 regulars, and one
company of mounted Washington volunteers, under Captain Hayes,
and started to cross the Cascade range, through theN achess Pass, for
the purpose of forming a junction with Major Rains, who, it was expected, would have simultaneously left Fort Dalles. As some delay
necessarily occurred in the time of the starting of the latter, Captain
:Maloney was advised, and accordingly returned to White river 2d
November. This proved a fortunate movement for the scattered
population of the Puget' s Sound district. After the departure of the
regulars from this district for the Y akama country, the Indians on the
west slope of the Cascade range, being in free communication with
the victorious Yakamas on the east, through the Klikatat, Cowlitz,
and Yakama (Snoqualme) Passes, had risen in arms-stimulated, no
doubt, by the success of their brother Yakamas in their fight with
Major Haller-and compelled a detachment of citizen rangers to resort
to a house for defence. Captain l\{aloney sent a party with an express
to Fort Steilacoom, which was attacked, and some of the persons
killed by the Indians within one day's journey of the fort.
On the 3d a party of 50 regulars and 50 volunteers, under Lieutenant
Slaughter, 4th infantry, detached for the purpose, attacked a large
body, numbering, it was said, 150 or 200, and killed 30 Indians. On
the 3d November, General Wool reports to the headquarters of the
army as follows: ''In addition to Captain Ord' s company, which went
by the last ste~mer, I have ordered to the scene of hostilities, in
Washington, Captain Ke) es' company at the Presidio, also a company
from Fort Humboldt, and Captain Fitzgerald's company 1st dragoons,
at Fort Lane, Oregon, to pm;h on as fast as possible for Fort Dalles.
Ample stores and ammunition have been forwarded, and I shall leave
in the steamer of the 6th instant for the scene of ''ar, where I 'vill be
able to explain more clearly the position of affairs. It will not be
safe to move any more of the troops from their present positions, but
I shall endeavor to avoid the necessity of recognizing volunteers in
the United States service. We require more troops in this department, at least one regiment." On the 3d December the 9th regiment
of infantry was ordered to reinforce the department of the Pacific.
General Wool started with his staff as soon as possible, after receiving (19th October) Major Rains' report, and having made all
necessary arrangements with regard to forwarding supplies, &c., in
the steamer California, taking Captain Keyes' company along, which
left San Francisco 6th November, 1855, having on board._ Major General Wool, commanding department Pacific.
Major Townsend, assistant adjutant general.
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Major Cross, chief quartermaster.
Major Lee, chief commissary.
Captain Cram, chief topographical engineer.
Lieutenant Bonnycastle, aid.
Lieutenant Arnold, aid.
Captain Keyes, 3d artillery.
Lieutenant McKeever, 3d artillery.
Brevet Major Reynolds, 3d artillery 1 (intending to land at Fort
Orford, to take command of his company at that post.)
Mr. Ferguson and :Mr. R. Lee, clerks to Major Cross and :Major Lee.
It 1vas the intention of the general to have the boat stop in at Fort
Humboldt and take one company, and with two companies proceed
as fast as possible to Fort Vancouver, the military centre of operations then going on in the Paget's Sound and Yakama districts.
On the evening of leaving San Francisco a storm commenced, the
first one of the rainy season. This was a severe storm for the Pacific
coast. It was impossible to laud at Humboldt, or even to enter the
bay. After beating off and on 24 to 36 hours, and the storm increasing, it was decided to proceed without the company of the 4th
infantry. The next day it was found equally impossible to land at
Fort Orford, owing to the same cause, and Major Reynolds was obliged
to continue ou board.
The steamer was th0n put towards the Columbia river, and nothing
disastrous occurred until we reached the offing at the mouth of that
river; the storm continuing with unabated fury, it was found impossible: without ~xtreme risk, to cross the bar. Accordingly the boat
was kept steaming off and on, all anxiously waiting for a favorable
condition to allow an attempt to be made by the pilot to put her across
the bar. While in this state of things one of the boilers burst and
the boat took fire.
The scene was awful in the extreme. There we were in the very
midst of the tremendous breakers of the mouth of the Columbia: that
cau only be appreciated by being seen, in a raging storm, with a boat
in flames. The elements were all against us. The cool, collected
conduct of Captain Dall, commander of the boat, and the cheerful
obedience of his officers and crew, saved us, under Providence, from
wreck and from fire. He ordered the pilot to put the boat directly
for crossing the bar, and all steam to be crowded that could be generated in the other boiler, himself taking the helm from the pilot after
the latter had announced to Dall that the boat and all on board must
be lost. For one half hour in that awful state of suspense, Dall
calmly, with a cheerful smile on his countenance, issued his orders
for extinguishing the fire, directed his officers how to act, and himself
the while steered the boat.
Captain Keye~' company of soldiers and their officers were very
instrumental in extinguishing the fire. There was a large quantity of
gunpowder on board; that nearest the part of the boat in flames was
thrown overboard, lest the fire should reach it and blow us up.
During the struggle between the power of the engine and of the
opposing waves and breakers, a tremendous reacting wave from the
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sea struck the boat in her stern; this, with the force of the steam,
carried us over the bar into comparatively safe water; now redouLled
energy was applied to extinguish the flames, and in a few minutes
more it was announced "the fire is under."
For one hour and more all reasonable men on board expected we
must be burnt to death, blown up by an explosion of gunpowder, or
wrer.ked among the breakers. All three causes threatening simultaneously to destroy all on board. Besides the military, there were
many passengers; all those intending to land at several places
having been brought by, from the impossibility of entering the ports.
By night, however, the steamer had gained a position inside of the
bar, where anchor was cast, her disabled condition not allowing her
to stem the tide now against us, and we retired to rest as we thought
in sufficient safety to allow us to hope seeing the light of another day.
But during the night the wind: blowing strong down the river, caused
our anchor to drag, and the current swept us back -vvithin half a boat's
length of the dreadful breakers, into which if we had gone nothing
within the power of man could have saved us; but before actually
reaching the jaws of this danger, again the courage and decision of
Captain Dall ·were brought into requisition. He ordered hogsheads
of bacon, which were on board, to be broached; and this fatty sub··
stance used for fuel raised steam so quickly that headway was given
to the boat, and we escaped the devouring breakers and steamed 10
miles up the river to .1-lstoria. Here we remained 24 hours for the
engineers to patch the boiler, then started for Fort Vancouver; but.
as bad luck seemed yet determined to attend the California, she got
aground, and ViTe were 24 hours getting off; after that ·we reached
Fort Vancouver on the 17th November, having been 12 days making
the run from San Francisco; a run, under ordinarily favorable circumstances, that would have been accomplished in five or six days.
Immediately on the arrival of the general, he reports: ''Finding a
reinforcement more necessary at Steilacoom than in any other section,
I have ordered Captain Keyes there with his company. Finding it
impossible to cross the bar at Humboldt, I did not bring with me a
company from that place; I shall order it to Crescent City, to guard
and escort the supplies to Forts Lane and Jones."
It is to be observed that the commanding general of the department of the Pacific at this time had much on hand demanding his
attention. There were four fields in which active operations ':vere
going on, viz: the Rogue River country, of which the operations have
been described in chapter VI; the Puget' s Sound district, in which
Captain Keyes had now to take the immediate charge; the Yakama
district, in which Major Rains was operating ·with the regulars, and
Colonel Nesmith with the volunteers; and the country from Fort
Dailes, towards the Wall a- Walia valley, in which another body of the
independent northern Oregon volunteer army were acting under
Major Chin. To these may be added a fifth field, in which it was
expected hostilities would be immediately commenced, the southeast
part of the State of California. Indeed, the difficulties there threatened
to be of such a nature that the act of leaving his headquarters for
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the Columbia river country, in the minds of some, was of questionable
propriety in a strictly military point of view, irrespective of personal considerations of soldierly ze~l.
The general commanding the department, however, was now at a
point where he was enabled better to judge for himself of the wants
()f the service, and of the plans to be pursued in this portion of his
command, than if he had remained at Benicia.
In our chronicle of events up to 30th October, ·we left Rains and
Nesmith penetrating the Yakama country, the former with 350
regulars and two companies of ~r ashington volunteers, who mustered
into service under his command, and the latter with six companies of
the northern Oregon army, who would not muster into the United
States service, and for this reason the former had no authority over
the latter; the Oregon volunteers, however, would go ·where went the
regulars, and their presence greatly embarrassed the campaign; one
of the exploits of this volunteer force consi.sted in burning the
Catholic mission on the A-tah-nam, (map 19.)
So large a force as the regulars and volunteers in the Yakama field
at the same time was calculated to frighten the Indians, and the consequence '\Vas, no battle could be had; some skirmishes occurred,
amounting to nothing decisive.
In reporting upon this campaign General Wool says: ''I regret the
destruction of this mission by the volunteers who followed under the
command of Colonel N esmitl;, and ordered into the field at an enormous expense by Governor Curry, where they ·were not required,
without my sanction or that of l\iajor Rains."
:Major Rains in his march, 300 miles, going and returning, drove the
Indians beyond his reach, over mountains covered with snow; they
fled to tho northern part of their country, but did not in any considerable numbers cross the Columbia into the Nez Perce or Spokane
country. This was in reality a ·winter campaign for the regulars; the
snow had fallen to a considerable depth, and the troops were severely
frozen in the feet; in several places the snow was waded through five
feet deep, the animals were worn out, the men had become reduced
in clothing, particularly in shoes a11d stockings; and those troops were
de~titute of aU the necessary means to make another winter campaign.
The volunteers under Colonel Nesmith returned to Fort Dalles,
from the Yakama country, 19th November.
General Wool reports, ''Major Rains could follow the Indians no
further on account of snow, then rapidly falling, being several feet
deep; the intervening mountains covered with snow from two to
three feet deep. He left the greater part of his regulars about 25
miles from Fort Dalles on the 20th to build a block-house, and arrived
himself at Fort Vancouver on the 24th November."
After receiving tho report of Major Rains, the general directed
that the regulars of the Yakama campaign should be assembled at
Fort Dalles for subsequent operations.
Three officers of his staff, Major Cross, :Major Townsend, and Captain Cram, were directed to proceed to Fort Dalles, aud :Major Lee,
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with Captain Keyes, to Fort Steilacoom, each with instructions to
inspect in reference to his appropriate department, and report upon
the condition of the troops, the means of making another expedition
that season, and the nature of the country into which the expedition
should penetrate, the best to accomplish objects in a manner to be
productive of some practical benefit.
It was apparent that little had been done, except to break down
the command, in Major Rains' expedition, in company with volunteers. It was also apparent to the general, as well as to every intelligent army officer who had seen the operations of this independent
organization of volunteers, that as long as they were permitted to
remain in the field, very little, if anything, could be accomplished
towards an effectual closing of troubles in that quarter.
General Wool also reports: ''Unknown to Major Rains or myself,
it would seem that the governor of Oregon, when he authorized or
ordered Colonel Nesmith to follow Major Rains in his expedition to
the Yakama country, he ordered four companies in the direction of
Walla-Walia. These companies, under Major Chin, left Fort Dalles
November 10, marched to the Umatilla, where they built a blockhouse and there waited reinforcements. After the return of Colonel
Nesmith from the Y akama field, he ordered several companies (17 0
men) to reinforce Major Chin. During this period of more than two
weeks, although the volunteers reported more than 1, 000 Indians at
or near Fort Walla-vValla, they were not attacked 01.: molested by the
Indians.''
The superintendent of Indian affairs of Oregon writes to General
Wool, November 21, 1855, as follows:
''The strong desire of a portion of our citizens to involve the tribes
(Walla-VVallas, Cayuses, and Umatillas) with those (the Yakamas and
Klikatats) now unfortunately engaged in hostilities against us, leads
them to circulate exaggerated reports of the intentions and actions,
well calculated to exasperate our people to acts of violence, with a
view of provoking retaliation, which may afford an excuse for making
war upon them. My confidence in the chief, Pee-pee-mox-mox, head
chief of the Walla-Wallas, is such that I am unwilling to believe that
he will engage in hostilities against us, unless driven and provoked to
do so by overt acts of aggression on the part of our citizens. I am
also satisfied that the Cayuses as a tribe are desirous of maintaining
peace, and that there must be, on the part of the 'vhites, a departure
from the principles of justice, and a violation of the rights secured
to this tribe by the treaty, before they will become a hostile party in
this war. This is a] so true of the Nez Pen~es. Their uniform good
conduct and friendship for our citizens render all intention on their
part to make ·war on us as quite improbable. The reported combination of all those tribes with intent to wage a war of extermination
against the whites is, I apprehend, but a phantom conjured up in the
brains of alarmists, unsupported by one substantial reason."
On the same date (November 21) as the foregoing, Colonel Nesmith,
-of the independent northern Oregon volunteer army, made a requisi-

DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC.

97

tion on the commanding general of the department of the Pacific, as
follows:
''It is reported that Pee-pee-mox-mox, with his 1, 000 warriors,
had taken a strong position. To dislodge him it is desirable to have
the service of artillery. I have therefore to request yon will furnish
me with two or three howitzers, or other equivalent artillery, with
officers and men requisite to manage the same, for that purpose."
To -which the general replied, November 24, ''I have not the power
to give you the assistance you ask for."
The careful reader will here observe that the responsible officer,
viz: the superintendent of In<.lian affairs, presents a very different
view of the case to the responsible general commanding the department from that presented at identically the same time by the irresponsible officer of the volunteers, in relation to the very grave
question of carrying the swurd into the Umatilla country. The
responsible officer makes no requisition upon General Wool, while the
commander of the governor's independent northern army seeks to
induce the general to ern bark the regulars in the enterprise.
Now, what was the real condition of the settlers in theW alla-Walla
and Umatilla valleys at this time? A few whites had been permitted
to go there on sufferance by the Indian agent, for, be it observed,
none of that countt y as yet had had the Indian title extinguished;
but in granting this permission to the whites to enter it, it was well
understood by them that they were to depart at any time at the bidding of the agent.
All the whites bad left those regions and come into places of safety
nearly a month before Chiu' s command started thither from Fort
Dalles, and this, too, on warning of Indian .Agent Olney, immediately
after learning of Haller's defeat. The half- breeds, however, of whom
there wore a few families, having nothing to fear, remained. There
were two houses belonging to the 'vhites that had been thus deserted,
also the Hudson Bay Company store at the mouth of the Walla-Walla.
There is proof to show that it was not Pee-pee-mox-mox, but Yellow Serpent, who pillaged the store, and that it was a Nez Perce, at
the instigation of the Yakamas, who burnt the houses.
It was well kno·wn to General Wool that the report of Chin being
threatened with 1, 000 warriors was an exaggerated fabrication, for
the warriors of the Walla- Wallas, the Umatillas, and Cayuses, all
together could not exceed 300.
The g-overnor of Oregon had called out volunteers to send to the
Walla-'Valla country before the pillaging of the fort and the burning of the deserted houses, and that the Indians there had nothing
favorable to hope at the hands of these volunteers was the common
belief in all that country.
The houses had been plundered and burnt and the stock driven off
before Chin's command left Fort Dalles, but not until after the war had
been carried into the Yakama country by Major Haller, contrary to the
expectations of his commanding ofiicer who sent him, and not until after
Chin had received orders to march through the Umatilla and WaliaWalla countries. His orders were (as he informed the writer) to
H. Ex. Doc. 114--7
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march to the Walla-Walla, thence to the Snake river, to the assistance
of Governor Stevens; and if he met Indians hostile to treat them as
such, but to treat friendly Indians with favor.
When a governor, who is not the superintendent of Indian affairs
in his Territory, sends an armed force of volunteers into a fertile valley
in ·w hich the Indians are known to have fine. fat beeves and excellent
horses in herds of great abundance, it wil( be readily inferred that
with such very general orders, so loosely given as were those to Major
Chin, it would be a very easy matter, upon the smallest pretext, to
draw or provoke the Indians into a fight, and afterwards justify the
act, particularly as in such cases there is only one side whose story is
seldom, if ever, told to the world. Now, I do not mean to say that
these volunteers were sent into the valley of the Walla-vValla for the
purpose of plundering those Indians of their beeves and horses, but
it is fair to conclude that they never would have gone with the almost
certain prospect of being obliged to winter there, but from the fact,
well known among them, that there would be plenty found there to
subsist themselves during the winter, to refit themselves with horses,
and to make themselves comfortable and warm.
If the governor's independent northern Oregon volunteer army
were rtally desirous of making another winter campaign against
Indians known to be hostile, they had only to follow the Yakamas into
their winter retreats, and then they would have received some credit
for disinterestedness.
Major Chin having been reinforced, as stated, Lieutenant Colonel
Kelly took command, and started from the Umatilla., where they had
named their block-house Fort Henrietta. on the night of the 2d December, and encamped on the vValla-vValla, three miles above its
mouth, and scouting parties were sent out.
Here is a point for inquiry, Was it the Indians or volunteers who
fired the first shot? Lieutenant Colonel Kelly has never answered
this ; but Indian Agent Olney, who was all the while with this expedition, reports '' that soon after they arrived here a party of Indians
were seen on the hills, when a detachment of volunteers commenced
a fire upon them."
On the 5th, Lieutenant Colonel Kelly divided his force, sending
Major Chin with 125 men to escort his baggage and pack-trains to the
mouth of the Touchet, (map 20,) and himself started with the remainder for a point fifteen miles above, on the same stream, where
Pee-pee-mox-mox, chief cf the Walia-Wallas, and his warriors were
encamped. Lieutenant Colonel Kelly himself says : ''When within
three miles of the hostile village, that chieftain, with about seventy
or eighty armed warriors, made his appearance, approaching towards
us. An order was at once given to attack them; but as -vve moved
rapidly up I observed six or seven Indians, a short distance in advance
of their main body, bearing a white flag. Halting my command, I
went where they were with Agent Olney, an interpreter, and three
or four others. One of these Indians was the chief, Pee-pee-mox-mox,
who asked why we had come armed into his country, and was told we
carne to chastise him and his people for the wrongs they had done to
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the whites. He said he desired peace; that he did not wish to £ght,
and that he had done us no wrong. I recapitulated the wrongs, the
pillaging and destruction of Fort alla-Walla, and appropriating the
goods, the burning of the houses, and the driving off the cattle. .At
first he denied having done these, but afterwards said they we"~"e done
by his young men, and that he could not restrain them. He said he
would make his people restore the goods taken by them so far as they
could be restored, and pay for the balance. I stated to him that this
would not be sufficient; that, in addition, he should make his people
surrender their arms and ammunition, give us cattle for bBef, and
horses to remount my command. To these terms he consented, and
:s aid he would come on the morrow and comply with them. I told
J1im that we came to wage war against him, and that he could not go
without exposing his villages to immediate attack; I told him he
might go away under his flag of truce, but that if he did so we would
without delay commence an attack on his villages ; that if he and
his six followers would consent to remain and fulfil the terms his
tribe would not be molested.''
Lieutenant Colonel Kelly held the chief and his companions prisoners,
and, while holding their chief as prisoner, tried to induce the people
to comply with his demands; but finding his negotiations to compel them
to despoil themselves of arms, ammunition, beeves, and horses, and
seeing no hope of coming to terms, he marched down to the mouth of
the Touchet, taking his prisoners along, and tied them on the night
·of the 6th, one having attempted, but unsuccessfully, to escape. It
is also in the evidence of two captains of these volunteers, that ''on
the morning of the 7th a party of Indians appeared on the bills in
front of our camp. Here Lieutenant Colonel Kelly sent another
messenger asking them to come in and give up their arms. They again
refused, but demanded of us their chief, and ordered us to pass no
further up the river, or they would fight us."
Disregarding this warning, the volunteers started about 8 o'clock
the same morning to march up the W alia-Walla river, and had gone
about three-fourths of a mile ''when the Indians fired at two men
who were driving up some loose beef cattle." It is not reported
whether these beeves belonged of right to the volunteers or the
Indians ; but the report goes on to say ''the fire was returned and a
general fight ensued.''
Lieutenant Colonel Kelly accuses the Indians with firing £rst this
1norning, but Mr. Olney reports : ''I am forced to believe the firing
was first commenced by the volunteers, as it was evident the Indians
·did not meditate an attack, for they were at the same time preparing
the morning meal ; in several places the volunteers dismounted and
partook of the roast beef found at the fires where the Indians were
·e ncamped.''
The Indians were driven ten miles up the Walla-Walla, to La Rogue's
house, (now called Fort Bennet,) when they were reinforced and made a
stand. The prisoners, Pee-pee-mox-mox and his companions, were
brought up by the guard. Kelly says : "On the sergeant of the
guard saying to me they were greatly excited while the battle was
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raging, and that he feared they would escape, I told him to tie them
aU; and if they resisted or attempted to escape, to kill them.''
After giving this order, the commanding officer says he "rode on,
and when about 200 yards distant, heard the report of fire-arms at
the place where the prisoners were, and was shortly informed that
when my order to tie them was about being carried into effect, they
resisted, one having drawn a concealed knife from his coat sleeve,
with which he wounded Sergeant Miller in the arm. Pee-pee-moxmox attempted to wrest a gun from the hands of one of our men,
when he was knocked down with the butt of a rifle, and put to death,
as 'vere also all the other prisoners, except a Nez Perce youth, who
made no resistance at being tied.''
· After the foregoing evidence from his own mouth, it may be pertinent to ask if Lieutenant Colonel Kelly will again accu::;e, to the governor
of Oregon, ''an officer of the United States army at Fort Vancover'' of
putting in circulation untrue reports concerning the capture and death
of the late chief of the Walia-"\Vallas?
''After coming to a stand at La Rogue's, the Indians fought the
volunteers desperately until dark on the 7th; on the 8th the battle
was rene\ved, and the fight continued until night, when both parties
again withdrmv; on the 9th the Indians again made their appearance,
when they were attacked by our party. This day's fighting was not
so hard ae the former. Early on the morning· of the lOth the Indians
had got possession of our trenches; a party was sent out to attack
them; a hot fire was kept up five or six hours, when the Indians were
routed, and all were driven far above their camping ground, left the
:field, and were seen no more. On the field, our loss was 16 wounded
and 6 killed. The loss of the enemy was not definitely ascertained."
The Indians during thi:3 fight were removing their effects across the
:Snake river, and after the battle the warriors who had so bravely
covered the retreat also crossed it. The northern army of Oregon
-volunteers went into winter quarters, and there rested upon their
laurels, regaling themselves upon the beeves of the luxuriant valley
of the Walla-Walia.
The Cayuse chief, Hmvlish Wampum, the very friend and identical
man whom Lieutenant Colonel Kelly brought forward to sustain his accusation against Pee-pee-mox-mox. says: ''We had thousands of horses
and cattle; the hills and valleys were covered with them; where are
they now? Not an animal is to be seen over this wide expanse.
Between the hostile Indians and the (volunteers) we are stripped of
everything.' '
In regard to the operations in the Puget' s Sound di~strict.-On the
4th October the United States sloop·of-war "Decatur,'' Commander
J. S. Sterrett, anchored off the little town of Seattle.
On November 22 the Decatur 'vas at Steilacoom.
On November 24 Captain Keyes, with his company, arrived at Fort
Steilacoom, having been despatched by General Wool, as before stated,
from Fort Vancouver.
On the 25th, Lieutenant Slaughter's camp, on the Puyallup, 21 miles.
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fro:n the fort, was surrounded, his sentinels fired on, and in the night
..32 animals were stolen.
On the receipt of this, Captain Keyes took the field, leaving Captain Maloney, with 100 men, in command of the fort. The hostile
Indians in this district were principally located in a densely wooded
country admirably adapted to ambuscade, and full of trails crossing
in every direction. Pack animals had to be used for transportation.
'T he Captain says, ''as our padr animals are small in number, and
nearly broken down by hard work, and as there is a lack of feed in
the places where the troops have to operate, we may be reduced
shortly to the necessity of acting entirely on the defensive, and must
wait for summer and a larger force before we can subdue the Indians."
On December 1 the Decatur again anchored at Seattle, where her
commander received a request from the citizens for protection against
the northern Indians.
Commander Sterrett reports, December 5: ''After several interviews with these Indians, I have the satisfaction to state that they
have consented to depart, and have promised not to return during the
Indian troubles.''
For the opportune arrival of the Decatur in these waters, and the
timely assistance rendered by her to the citizens, the Hon. Secretary
·of War tendered his acknowledgments to Commander Sterrett.
On the evening of 5th December, while encamped near the junction of Green and White rivers, (map 16,) Lieutenant Slaughter was
picked off by Indians, who crawled up near his camp, guided by the
light of a fire he had imprudently allowed to be kindled. In reporting
his death, also that of two corporals, and the wounding of six privates
on that occasion, the commanding general says: "Lieutenant Slaughter was a gallant and enterprising officer, and had rendered important services in the defence of the inhabitants or the Puget' s Sound
,district."
Captain (Brevet Major) Fitzgerald's company 1st dragoons arrived
at Fort Vancouver about the 1st December, havin; made the march
-from Fort Lane , 278 mileH, with their wagon train, in 21 days, under
the most unfavorable condition of the roads.
On the 13th December the commanding general reports: "The
Indians will not engage in a field fight with any considerable number
·Of regulars. Their mode is one of ambush and surprise. Their
country, both in Oregon and Washington, except near Puget' s Sound,
being mountainous, is well calculated for this mode of warfare.
U ncler these circumstances it would be exceedingly difficult, with
my present limited force, however well prepared, which is not the
case, to either conquer or bring these Indians to terms in this region
by chasing them-all being well mounted-through the mountains;
and certainly not at the present moment, the mountains being gen--erally covered with snow several feet deep. They can only be con~ quered or brought to terms by occupying their country in such
,positions as to command their fisheries and the valleys where their
cattle and horses are grazed. This I propose to do; and I am now,
with my staff, actually preparing an expedition for this purpose.
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This, however, after a critical inspection of troops, supplies, ana
means, I find cannot be accomplished as soon as I could wish, owing
to the want of troops, means of transportation and clothing for the·
4th infantry. The several expeditions-viz: to Fort Boise, returned
the last of September; the recent one of Major Haller to the Yakama
country; and the more recent one of Major Rains into the same
country-have reduced the greater part of the horses and mules of
the command, including those of Major Fitzgerald's company, just
arrived from Fort Lane, to a condition which renders them for the
time being unfit for service. As soon as the animals are fit for
service my present force will be ready to take the field; and if I
should receive, in the meantime, an additional force of one regiment,
which would :~:upersede the necessity of employing so expensive·
a force as volunteers, I have no doubt I will be able in a short time
to conquer the Indians in Oregon and vVashington, or compel them
to sue for peace or abandon their country. I have in no instance
received or authorized the raising of volunteers. I have adhered to·
this rule because I applied to the Secretary of War for the authority,
which was not granted.
''When this war was sprung upon us the regular force under my
command, in order to give equal protection to the inhabitants, was
dispersed in small commands from the northern to the southern
extremity of the department, extending over more than 1, 600 miles;
but not a sufficient force at any one point to overcome a combined
attack of several tribes of Indians. If the Indians in the southeast
portion of the department should make war on the people in that
section, I could send no relief besides the troops at Fort Yuma and
San Diego, which would not exceed 250 rank and file, except by
withdra·wing troops from the Yakama field, the Puget' s Sound field, or
the Rogue river field. This could not be done at the present time
without endangering the settlements in Washington, Oregon, and
northern California.
''In conclusion, it is justly due to make kno\vn that the sudden,
unexpected, and arduous duties which the officers of the line, as well
as of the staff, have been called on to discharge, were zealously,
promptly, and efficiently executed. All deserve high commendation."·
On the 18th December the United States Coast Survey steamer
Active, Commander Alden, having volunteered for the service of the
war, appeared in the Puget' s Sound waters. At this time operations.
in this district had for the most part ceased for the winter, owing to
the small force which could be brought into the field and the condition of the country, which, from incessant rains, had become almost
impassable. The regulars and volunteers had been drawn in around
the towNs to act on the defensive, making occasional demonstration&
against the Indians.
On the 25th December the general reports: ''Since my communication of the 13th instant winter has fairly set in, the ground is.
covered with snow, and the Columbia river is frozen over as low
down as the mouth of the Willamette, six miles below this place,
[Fort Vancouver.] This cuts off all communication with Fort Dalles:
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and the whole country above until the river is clear of ice. Owing
to the high \Vater in the streams it has been impracticable to send
reinforcements by land to Fort Steilacoom. I intended to have sent
Captain Ord' s company, 3d artillery, but have failed in my efforts
to procure transportation until the ice breaks up. I can send no
reinforcement to Captain Keyes.''
With the two vessels-of-war in the Puget' s Sound waters, and the
regulars and the volunteers in that district, the general was satisfied
the inhabitants could be defended until he would be able to send
a reinforcement; but he did not expect the troops would be able to
take the offensive until Captain Keyes could be reinforced.
The general says: ''In my communication to the headquarters
of the army, 13th December, I mentioned that I was actively engaged
in preparing an expedition for the Indian country. I soon found it
would be impracticable to execute my intentions as soon as I desired.
I could neither obtain in this country the means of transportation nor
forage without paying enormously for them, which the state of the
war in this region did not call for. This state of things has been
caused by the extraordinary course pursued by the governor of
Oregon, who is making war against the Indians on his own account,
and without the slightest reference to myself, not having received
any communication whatever from· him on the subject. rrhe quantity
of supplies required for his volunteers and the enormous prices paid
in scrip by his agents have rendered it necessary for me to resort to
Benicia for horses and mules, a11d to San Francisco for forage."
The governor of Oregon says: ''On my return from southern Oregon
I learned fi·om those representing me, who had made General Wool
an official visit in my absence, of the inauguration of a plan utterly at
variance with my own, which obviated the necessity of a personal
interview. The wisdom of my plans it remains only, in part, for time
to vindicate.''
The governor was very mueh in error in supposing any official
communication, by any one claiming to represent him, was made to
General Wool, or to any officer of his staff.
It is true, that as soon as the war commenced, then, indeed, were
the general and his troopf3 vociferously called for in Washington and
Oregon, but not by the governor of the latter Territory. Their
papers, teemed with articles, as if to convince the readers that the
only duty of this veteran soldier, whose head had become hoar in the
service of his country, now consisted in standing, in person, at every
man's door, in both Territories, with his drawn sword to defend its
inmates from the ruthless savage ! And when the general promptly repaired with the vigor of youth to the very military centre of the scene,
and dared to issue his commands and express his opinions, as it well
became an officer clothed with responsible trusts of honor and authority, and ready to exert that authority without the aid of the army
of volunteers whom the governor of Oregon had called out and thrust
into the field, then it was that these papers in Oregon were lavish
with abuse of the general and the regular army; and the legislature
of that Territory, as an everlasting monument to its members, passed
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a memorial requesting the President to recall General Wool from the
command; and this, too, while he was personally superintending, and
in the very act of devising those judicious means which 1vill be shown
in the sequel did give defence to the frontier t:lettlements and terminated hostilities.
The governor of Oregon forwarded this memorial to the President;
but finding that no action vvas taken upon it, the governor afterwards
sent his approval of the memorial, and requested again the recall of
the general, but with as little effect as before. I venture to say a
more unjust document never emanated from a legislative body. I
will not pollute this paper with its contents, except to quote one
passage, which runs, ''we [the memorialists] are compelled to say
that General vVool has hitherto remained inactive, and has refused to
send the United States troops to the relief of the volunteers, or to
supply them with arms and ammunition in time of need."
The first point of this accusation is totally refuted by what I have
already detailed in !"elation to the action of General Wool and the
troops under his command.
The second point gives us the key to the policy of the governor~ s
plan; it leaves one to infer that it consisted in using the regulars as
"hewers of wood and drawers of water;" in short, to play second to
the volunteers who would not serve under United States officers, but
would have these and the soldiers serve under the volunteers; in other
words, for carrying on the war, the plan of the governor of a Territory
contemplated making the President's military commander of a department and his troops subservient to territorial executive influence.
In relation to the third point, ''refusing to supply the volunteers
with arms and ammunition,'' the answer is, that the volunteers had
been supplied with arms and ammunition from the United States depot
at Fort Vancouver by the storekeeper, who, by so doing, acted contrary to law made and provided; and it was to this law that the
general had reference when he declined to send artillery to Colonel
Nesmith.
In this remarkable legislative memorial we have the best possible
evidence to show that the commanding general's measures for restoring
peace and suppressing hostilities were very much in the way of what
has been alleged of the designs which animated the zeal of some of
the officers and of the advocates of the governor's northern volunteer
army, whose origin, organization, and acts, in some measure, have
been explained.
The country and the War DepartmAnt have reason to congratulate
themselves on having one in command of the department capable and
bold enough, while performing his military duties, to prevent them
from being perverted at so critical a juncture of affairs in that quarter
to other than the legitimate objects of the honor and trust confided
in him.
The President did not see fit to recall his general, and leave the
military operations of the United States army in the hands of the
executive of Oregon; and General Wool continued to pursue the even
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tenor of his way, quite undisturbed by the petulancy of the Oregon
legislature, of the members of whom it may be said truly tl1at in this
memorial they exhibit themselves as an apt illustration of the fact
that the people of a colony, after all, are but children of the home
government.
In his report of the 3d December, 1855, the Ron. Secretary of
War, in alluding to these volunteers, says: "And it is hoped that
their continuance in the military service, to the great interruption of
their ordinary pursuits, will be limited to the shortest possible duration by the arrival of reinforcements, which have been ordered to
the regular troops of that department.''
''In regard to what volunteer reinforcements to the regular troops
may be necessary, this is a matter which must be necessarily left to the
military commander in the department of the Pacific, who has repaired
to the theatre of hostilities."
After the foregoing gentle hints to his excellency of Oregon, it
might have been supposed his northern army of volunteers would
have been disbanded; not so, however. 'fhe governor still kept them
in their winter quarters in the Walla-Walla valley, and, instead of
limiting their time to the "shortest possible," found it more consistent with his own plan to extend their services to the longest possible duration.
On the 21st December T. B. Cornelius was made colonel of the
volunteers, after which, in February, his command was increased by
four companies, making it now one regiment, numbering about 550
persons.
The governor of Oregon took up his headquarters at Fort Dalles
on the 15th February, whence he issued his commands. Whether he
consulted on the present occasion that ''vigilant officer of the efficient
4th infantry," by whose information the governor professes to have
been influenced on a former occasion, I will not pretend to say. It
seems to have been here that he planned a spring campaign for his
volunteers, and directed Colonel Cornelius to follow it. The sapient
governor presumed to know that the ''main body of the Indians
were between the Snake and Pelouse rivers, on the south side of the
Columbia, and it was there that they might be drawn into a pitched
battle," (map 21.)
The ambition of Colonel Cornelius was stimulated by being urged
to open the campaign and conquer the Indians before the United
States troops could take the field, which the governor says, ''I anticipate will be about the middle of April, and confidently expect, before
that time, the volunteers will have achieved the purpose for which
they were called out.''
His excellency refers to his admirable organization of the staff, who
·would furnish the colonel with ample supplies, &c.
The new colonel, obedient to the governor's orders, begins to shell
his volunteers out of their comfortable winter quarters as early as
the 9th of March, determined to anticipate the regulars. I haYe
carefully studied the colonel's report of this campaign, and find that
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from the 9th of March to the 2d of April they went. groping along
the lower parts of the Snake, Pelouse, and Y aka rna ri verB, occasionally killing a straggling Indian, but without finding the ''main body
of Indians'' which the governor had said were there. Colonel
Cornelius reports that there were no ''manifestations that tbe country
had been occupied during the past winter by any large body of
Indians.''
During this campaign the volunteers were reduced to the strait of
living on horse flesh, the governor's boasted commiRsariat having
failed to supply them, and, alas, discontent arose among the volunteers. Indeed, they were so much reduced in means of living and
in horses, that on the 30th of March the colonel ordered part of his
command to Port Dalles, via the south side of the Columbia, an1d himself, with the other portion, proceeded through the Yakama country,
via the north side, towards the fort, intending, as he said, to scour the
Klikatat valley. And thus this campaign ended in perfect nullity;
and all will agree with the governor in his assertion that ''the wisdom
of his plans it remains for time to vindicate."
On the 11th of January, 1856, the mail steamer brought to General
Wool, then at Port Vancouver, important despatches in reference to
the threatened Indian hostilities (alreatly referred to) in the southeast
part of California, and the pleasing information of the arrival of the
9th regiment of infantry at San Prascisco to reinforce his department.
Orders had been issued previously for the disposition of this regiment.
The despatches were of such a nature as to make it necessary for him
to return to Benicia to give his personal attention to the wants of the
southern portion of his command, not only in California, but in
southern Oregon likewise. Accordingly the general left Fort Vancouver the same night, (11th January,) and on his way passed the
colonel's (Wright's) portion of the 9th infantry going up to take post
temporarily at Fort Vancouver, and met the other portion, under
Lieutenant Colonel Casey, which was to operate in Puget' s Sound.
A personal interview was had by the general, on the Pacific ocean,
with the lieutenant colonel, to whom orders were given.
The last report from Captain Keyes had informed the general that,
"in the region of Puget' s Sound, there were not to exceed 200 warriors in arms against the whites."
The general reports, headquarters Benicia, January 19, 1856 :
''You will perceive that I have returned, after being ice-bound
three weeks. 'rhe severity of the season has cut off all communication with Fort Dalles. Owing to the snow on the Cascade mountains
there is no route during the winter to that post other than by the
Columbia; and that, for several weeks past, has been frozen over as
low down as St. Helen's; it is, however, now open to Fort Vancouver.
The 9th infantry has passed on to Fort Vancouver and Puget' s Sound;
the colonel ·with eight companies to the former, and the lieutenant
colonel with two companies to the latter. Captain Ord' s company 3d
artillery is ordered to return, to be sent, if necessary, to the Colorado,
where an Indian war is threatened. I shall also order Captain Keyes~
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company to return from the Puget' s Sound district, for the same destination, if it should become necessary.
''With the 9th and 4th infantry I have no doubt of being able, in
a short time after we can take the field, to terminate the war in the
north and in southern Oregon, unless the crusade of the governor of
Oregon against Indians inhabiting Washington Territory should prevent. By sending his volunteers against the Wall a-W alias, who had
not made open war against the whites, he has added several tribes to
the ranks of the enemy."
It will be perceived that Colonel George Wright and Lieutenant
Colonel Silas Casey, of the 9th infantry, were now in command, the
former in the Columbia River district, and the latter in the Puget' s
Sound district.
On the return of Governor Stevens to his capital, Olympia, January
19, he says : ''In obedience to my own convictions of duty, and in
response to the sentiments of this entire community, I issued my
proclamation calling for six companies of volunteers for the defence
of the Sound, and three companies to operate east of the Cascades,
&c. -t:- -t-~ Since my arrival the tovvn of Seattle has been attacked,''
&c. -r.- *
Previously to Casey's taking the command, the Indians suddenly
appeared in the woods immediately back of and fired upon that town.
There were guarding it at the time one company of volunteers and
the sloop-of-war Decatur. There were probably as many whites in
the village as there were attacking Indians. It was reported that by
the Decatur's guns 36 Indians were killed and 35 wounded, and
that the hostiles numbered all the way from 300 up to 1, 500. Subsequent investigations, however, showed that they only numbered
70 to 75, and that there was no proof of one being killed. The
Indians had secreted themselves behind trees and logs before firing,
and, as they were not charged, there they remained till the sport
beeame stale, and then deliberately walked away.
At this time the inhabitants of Puget' s Sound were in a straitened
condition indeed; the whole country from Green river south to within
five miles of Fort Steilacoom, had been conquered, and was occupied
by hostile Indians.
Lieutenant Colonel Casey at onee commenced his work, by opening
a communication from the fort to Muckleshoot prairie, where he established a block-house.
On or about the 27th February the principal chief, Kanasket, of the
hostiles was shot by a sentinel (Private Kehl, D company, 9th infantry,) while endeavoring, in the night, with four others, to steal
into Lieutenant Colonel Casey's camp. He was the most savage of
all the chiefs.
On the morning of 1st :March a detachment under Lieutenant
Kautz, at the crossing of White river, about two miles above Muckleshoot prairie, (map 16,) found himself cut off from camp by a body of
Indians in his rear. The lieutenant determined to hold his position,
and despatched a note to camp, to apprise the commanding officer,
and put his men for safety behind drift wood. About 1 o'clock a
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party of Indians, from the other side of the river, fired into Kautz's
party and wounded two of his men. .At 2 o'clock, Captain Keyes'
command appeared on the left bank, and found Kautz~ s party, under
cover of drift wood, engaged with the Indians on both banks.
Keyes drove the Indians who were on the left bank, then returned
to a point above, crossed his command over the river by fording, and
then cb.arged the main body from their position behind logs and trees,
on Kautz's side of the river, and completely routed them; then wheeling his company to the left, deployed as skirmishers, and charged on
through the woods, sending orders to Kautz, as soon as they should
arrive opposite his position, to leave his drift and join, which he did;
and the two bodies of troops all moved forward rapidly, and drove
the Indians from the point of woods they occupied below. The Indians continued to retreat and the troops to pursue for two miles, till
they reached the bluff which borders the river bottom, at the top of
which they made a stand.
The bluff is 150 feet high, with a slope of about 45°, and free from
underbrush, with but few trees. .As the troops advanced the Indians
taunted and defied them to come on, vvith many vile epithets. The
troops rushed forward, routed, and completely dispersed the enemy.
Here the action terminated at dark, after five hours' duration.
Keyes' loss was one killed, nine wounded, including Lieutenant
Kautz. The loss on the part of the Indians could not be ascertained.
The number of Indians engaged 'Yas about 200, and the troops numbered 116, officers included.
This was an important action; it broke the spirits of the Indians;
it was the opinion that all the hostile warriors, except their sentinels
who were guarding trails, were present. Captain Keyes, iu his report, says : ''We have now the good fortune of having completely
routed the Indians; our next difficulty will be to find them."
On 5th :March Captain Keyes was sent, with 120 men, to attack
their main camp, which was found to be from Muckleshoot about six
miles towards Porter's prairie, in the middle of a swamp, defended
by a breastwork of logs with loop holes, but the Indians had fled the
night before.
After their defeat by Keyes, the Indians in Puget' s Sound district
began to scatter in small parties, taking to their hiding places.
On the 21st February the general notified Lieutenant Colonel
Casey of his intention to reinforce him with two companies.
vV e must now leave the Puget' s Sound district for a while, and pass
to the Columbia river operations.
On the 29th January, 1856, the general commanding the department directed Colonel Wright, 9th infantry, as .follows:
'' J~s soon as the season will permit, preparatory to operations in
the Indian country east and north of the Cascade mouutains, you
will establish the headquarters of your regiment at Fort Dalles,
where all the troops intended for said country will be concentrated.
''The points which I intend as the base of operations are the
Selah fishery, on the Yakama river, (map 19,) and some point in
the neighborhood of Fort Walla-Walla, (map 20.) It is my intention
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to establish a permanent post in this region at the most eligible point
for controlling the surrounding Indian tribes.
''Between Fort Dalles and Selah fishery an intermediate post
with one company may be necessary to prevent the Yakarnas from
taking fish on the tributaries of the Yakama and Columbia. Herewith you will receive a memoir and sketches (17, 18, 19, 20, 21,) by
Captain Cram, chief of the Topographical Engineers, of the ~ountry
in which your commann will be required to operate. I would recommend it to your attentive perusal. From this you will perceive it is
100 miles from Fort Dalles to Selah fishery, and 70 from the Fort to
the At-ah-nam mission. rrhis latter position may be important as
the intermediate post between the Dalles and the fishery.
"From Fort Dalles to Fort \Valla- vValla it is 142 miles, and from
the latter place to Selah fishery it is 95 miles by the road to Fort
Steilacoom. With boats to cross the Columbia, your forces at either
point could be in a few days concentrated.
''Expeditions should be prepared at the earliest moment, that is,
as soon as grass can be obtained for the animals for Walla- Walla and
the Selah fishery. As the snow will not probably allow the expedition to the latter so early by three or four weeks, the one to the
former will be undertaken as soon as the season will permit with four
or five companies and three howitzers; it is desirable this expedition
should be conducted with reference to selecting a proper position for
a post, and to ascertain the feelings and dispositions of the several
tribes in that section of country; I do not believe they will continue
the war n. great while. The occupation of the country between the
Walla- Walia, Touchet, and Snake rivers, and the opposite side of the
Columbia, (map 21,) will very soon bring those tribes to terms. The
occupation at the proper time of the Yakama country, (map 17,) from
the At-ah-nam mission, and that on the Yakama river above and
below the Selah fishery, will compel the Yakamas, I think, to sue for
peace or abandon their country.
''By the memoir of Captain Cram, herewith sent, you will perceive
that obstacles on the routes to both the Fishery and Walla-Walla
will require your attention. On fitting out your expeditions pioneer
parties should be organized."
Such, in substance, were the instructions despatched to Colonel
Wright 20th January, for his guidance in the coming operations,
which were to be commenced as soon as the Columbia should be open
to Fort Dalles.
In the topographical memoir of Captain Cram particular mention
had been made of the importance in military operations of the Cascades, 45 miles above Fort Vancouver, (map 18.) Major Rains had
erected a block-house· here and garrisoned it with one sergeant and
ten men in the preceding autumn.
On the 6th February the general received a requisition from the
superintendent of Indian affairs in Oregon for on.e company of
regulars, to be stationed in the Cayuse Indian country, to protect the
friendly Cayuses from the volunteers, accompanying the requisition
with a representation from high authority as follows:
1
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''.January 15, the volunteers, without discipline, without order, and
similar to the madmen of the revolution, menace us 1vith death every
day; they have already despoiled of their provisions the inhabitants
of this country and the Indians who have so nobly followed the advice
to remain faithful friends of the Americans.
''To-day these same volunteers are not yet satisfied with rapine and
injustice, and wish to take away the :::mall remnant of animals and
provisi~ns ]eft. Every day they run off the horses of the friendly
Indians,'' * * -.'{- &c.
The Cayuse reservation is on the Umatilla at the point marked
''Agency,'' map 20.
On the 7th February the general directed Colonel Wright as follows: ''At the earliest moment practicable, agreeably to previous
instructions, you will send four companies to the Walia-Walla country.
Should, you however, find, on the arrival of the troops in the Cayuse
country, that a company is necessary to give protection to the Cayuse
Indians from the volunteers~ you will leave a company there with a
howitzer and ammunition."
On the 6th of March the Indians on the north side of the Columbia,
probably a foraging party of half-starved Klikatats, made a descent on
Joselyn' s farm, at the mouth of the White Salmon, about halfway
between the Cascades and Fort Dalles, and robbed it ofhalfthe stock.
On the receipt of this information Colonel Wright despatched Lieutenant Colonel Steptoe with two companies to that point, from Fort
Vancouver, and followed on the 7th and 8th with all the troops destined for service in the Indian country above Fort Vancouver, and
himself arrived at Fort Dalles 11th March.
The colonel posted a company temporarily at the head of the Cascades.
After giving the final instructions at Crescent City and Port Orford
in relation to the operations described in chapter VI, in the Rogue
river field of war, the general then proceeded to Columbia River district with the following members of his staff: Lieutenants Bonnycastle
and Arnold, aids-de-camp; Captain Cram and Lieutenant Mendell,
Topographical Engineers, and Assistant Surgeon Milhau, and arrived
at Fort Vancouver on the night of lOth March.
Here, remaining long enough to receive reports and to give the
necessary instructions to Colonel Wright, who was now on his way to
Fort Dalles, the general decided to take two companies of the 9th
infantry, (Fletcher's and Dent's,) which he placed under :Major Garnett, of the same regiment, to reinforce the troops in the Puget' s Sound
district, and himself to proceed to Fort Steilacoom.
These were left to be under the immediate orders of Colonel \Vright:
one company 4th infantry at Fort Vancouver, and one company and
part of another of dragoons; one company 3d artillery, eight companies infantry, at the Cascades, and above at Fort Dalles; when the
general departed with Garnett's reinforcement.
On the 14th March this reinforcement arrived at Fort Steilacoom,
and immediately entered the field. The general remained here to
have an interview with Lieutenant Colonel Casey, inspect, and issue

DEPARTMENT OF TIIE PACIFIC.

111

all needful orders for future operations, assigning Lieutenant· Mendell
as the topographical engineer in this field, and directing Captain
Cram to make a reconnaissance along the waters of the Straits of Fuca,
the Cape Flattery Indian coast, and return with despatches for the
_R ogue river field, thence to Benicia. Assistant Surgeon Milhau was
sent down to Crescent City for duty in this field.
At this time, in the Puget' s Sound field, Lieutenant Colonel Casey had
six companies infantry and one company artillery of regulars under
his command. In this field also were thirteen to seventeen companies, or skeletons of companies, of \Vashington volunteers, under the
orders of the executive, stationed at certain points, but over these the
United States army officer commanding the district had no control
whatever, they not having been called out by him, but by the
governor.
On the 15th March the commanding officer of the district called
upon the executive of Washington for two companies of volunteers to
be mustered into the United States service to serve on foot. The
authority for the call was derived from the official report from the
Hon. Secretary of War, wherein he says the number of volunteers
to be called in to reinforce the regulars must be left to the judgment
of the military commander of the department. Lieutenant Colonel
Casey informed the governor that with his present force of regulars
and the two companies of volunteers now called for, ''I am of the
opinion that I should have a sufficient force to protect this frontier
without the aid of those volunteers now in this Territory.''
To this requisition his excellency replied the next day: ''I will
state that the requisition will not be complied with. I do not consider
it expedient to change the plan of campaign nor the organization of
the troops so far as the volunteers are concerned."
On the 16th March the general, having given aU necessary personal
attention to the Puget' s Sound district, left Fort Steilacoom to return
to the scene of the Rogue river operations, and thence to Benicia,
where he arrived about the 22d March.
With his regulars Lieutenant Colonel Casey took such active steps,
after the departure of the general, that rapid progress was soon made
in hunting out the hiding places of the parties into which the main
body of hostiles was dispersed, however difficult of approach.
To Stuck prairie he sent an expedition, March 18, which attacked an
Indian village and captured several Indians; sent another expedition
with orders to attack a body supposed to be on Boise creek; organized
an expedition against the Indians on Dwamish lake, and requested
Captain Swartwout, of the steamer :Massachusetts, to co-operate with
his boats, but he declined; after that these Indians came in.
The companies of Dent, Pickett, and Fletcher, under Major Garnett, made an expedition to Meridian prairie May 13, and afterwards
scouted the country along Green and Cedar rivers. These scouts
were very active in hunting for parties of Indians.
On the 19th May Lieutenant Colonel Casey reported the war west
of the Cascade range of mountains at an end; and, on the 21st May,
Major Garnett's command of two companies of the 9th were ordered
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to join Colonel Wright, who was operating in the Columbia River
district, on the east side of the Cascade range, t~ which field we shall
now turn our attention.
On the 26th of March last Colonel Wright, in command, left Fort
Dalles for the Walla-Wall a country, having withdrawn from the Cascades all the defence except the sergeant and nine men, in charge of
the block-house, and encamped five miles beyond Fort Dalles. He
was now fifty miles to the east of the Cascades, (map 19.)
On the same day (March 26, 1856,) the Indians attacked the Cascades and took the place, all but the block-bouse, ·which was gallantly defended by Sergeant Kelly with eight men, who had one
killed and two wounded.
On the same night an express reached Colonel Wright, who immediately countermarched; also one reached Fort Vancouver, from which
Lieutenant Sheridan, 4th infantry, with a detachment, was sent up,
which reached the foot of the Cascades 9 o'clock the morning of the
27th and engaged the Indians; but, finding them too strong, drew off
and sent to Fort Vancouver for a reinforcement.
On the morning of the :. 8th Colonel vVright, 'vith a force of 250
rank and file, landed under the fire from the Indians at the head of
the Cascades and drove them. Then a detachment advanced under
Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Steptoe, major 9th infantry, and drove the
Indians, relieved the block-house, and was joined by Lieutenant
Sheridan's detachment, and soon retook the whole line (about 4~
miles) of the Cascades. They lost three killed and bad three wounded,
in course of the 26th, 27th, and 28th, in this affair. Besides these,
the Indians killed thirteen white men, women, and children, in their
attack on the Cascades the first day. Several Indians were killed by
the troops on this occasion.
It appeared in evidence that the chief, Chimoneth, and eight of
his men, supposed to be friendly, of the band who lived there, were
guilty of co-operating in this attack on the Cascades; these were
executed. It subsequently appeared that the Klikatats were the
principal actors in this attack, which was instigated by Kamiakin,
chief of the Yakamas, whose plan was to take the Cascades, destroy
the steamers above and below, and sweep the Columbia of every
white inhabitant.
Colonel Wright built two block-houses-one at the foot and one at
the bead of the Cascades-which, with the small garrison left in them,
afforded ample protection afterwards.
About the 6th of April General Wool, accompanied by his aid,
Lieutenant Arnold, Lieutenants Colonel Nauman and Ripley, left Benicia for the Columbia River district, and the general ascended to Fort
Dalles, arriving there in time to give Colonel Wright further instructions in reference to operations in the Yakama country, which consisted in moving promptly an expedition of five companies into that
field from Fort Dalles, (map 17.)
On the 28th of April this command had crossed the Columbia from
Fort Dalles.
Previous to starting, Colonel Wright addressed the
go\'ernor of Oregon as follows:
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''I am much embarrassed by these wanton attacks of the Oregon
volunteers on the friendly Indians. Under these circumstances, and
presuming that you still retain authority over the Oregon volunteers,
although at present beyond your territorial jurisdiction, I have to
request that th ~ y may be withdrawn from the country on the north
side of the Columbia river."
Frequent official letters had been receiYed from the Indian agents
in charge of these friendly Indians, as also of those towards the
Walla- Walla, complaining of the outrages committed by the volunteers, (Nesmith's command,) and asking for regular troops to be stationed in certain places to protect them against the volunteers.
Colonel Wright had advanced into the Yakama country, and was
encamped on the Natchess river 18th :.May, (map 17.) At that time
the river was so high that it was impassable. On the opposite (north)
side the main body of the Yakama Indians were collected in very
considerable numbers, expressing a desire for peace. To this end
the talks were held.
The chiefs, Ow-hi and Te-i-as, had promised on the 11th June to
come in with their people in five days. Since that time, up to the
18th June, no Indians, however, had come in, and Colonel Wright
had no information of their whereabouts, all having left the north
side of the river.
A bridge having been completed on the morning of the 18th June,
Colonel Wright crossed the Natchess with eight companies-450
rank and file-and marched north over a broken country and encamped on theW enass river. Lieutenant Colonel Steptoe was left,
with three companies, to occupy Fort N atchess. On 20th June
Colonel Wright was encamped in the Kittetas valley without having
found the Indians. He says: ''I do not despair of ultimately reducing
these Indians to sue for peace. I believe they really desire it, and
I must find out what outside influence is operating to keep them from
coming in.''
The governor of Washington had organized a battalion of volun·
teers, under Lieutenant Colonel B. F. Shaw, which left Camp Mont·
gomery (map 16) 12th June, passed through N atchess Pass, and
encamped 20th June on the W enass, (map 17.) It will be perceived
that this batt~.lion of volunteers entered the Yakama country in the
rear of Colonel Wright's command, just after they had left theW enass
for the north.
Colonel vVright had, before Shaw started, declined all co-operation
with these Yolunteers, and informed him (Shaw) that he had an ample
force of regulars for operations in the Yakama country.
The probability 1s, that the knowledge of the approach of Shaw's
battalion had caused the Iudians to disperse and deterred them
from coming in as they had agreed. Colonel \Vright says: ''I have
not overlooked, from the first, the evident determination of the val·
unteers to co-operate with the regular forces to bring this war to
a close, and I have steadily resisted all advances. :My efforts have
been retarded but not defeated by what was done."
On the 18th July, 1856, Colonel Wright reports, ''that, notwith·
H. Ex. Doc. 114-8
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standing the numerous difficulties and embarrassments I have encountered, the war in this country is closed. We have penetrated the
most remote hiding-places of the enemy and forced him to ask for
mercy. Deserted by their chiefs, Kameakin and Ow-hi, and perseveringly pursued by our troops, the Indians have no other course left
them but to surrender. So long as troops simply moved through
their country and retired it had little effect; the Indians were generally the gainers by it. But a steady advance over their whole
country, rendering it necessary to move their stock and families, had
a different effect, understanding, as they do, that the country is to be
permanently occupied. 7 7
. From the 16th to the 30th June the governor of Washington was
at Fort Dalles, giving his orders for the operation of the volunteers.
He ordered Shaw, 20th June, to move his battalion from the Winass
and ''push on to vValla-Walla, unite his force with that moving from
the Dalles, and take the command of the whole.' 7 The force at the
Dalles moved June 25. Both columns contained 360 enlisted men
and about 100 employes. These volunteers arrived at Mill Creek,
Walla-Walla valley, on 8th July.
On the 2d August the general commanding the depadment of the
Pacific issued the following order to Colonel Wright: ''The general
congratulates you on your successful termination of the war with the
Yakamas and Klikitats. * * * The general desires you, with the
least possible delay, to conduct an expedition into the Walla-Walla
country. Having arranged all difficulties with those tribes, then
establish the post, as before directed, in the Walla-Walla country.
No emigrants or other whites, except the Hudson Bay Company, or
persons having ceded rights from the Indians, will be permitted
to settle or remain in the Indian country or on land not ceded by
treaty, confirmed by the Senate, and approved by the President of
the United States, excepting the miners at the Colville mines. These
will be notified, however, that if they interfere with the Indians or
their squaws they ·will be punished and sent out of the country. It
.appears that Colonel Shaw, from Puget 7 s Sound, with his volunteers,
_has gone to the Walia-Walla country. Colonel Wright will order
-them out of the country by way of Fort Dalles. If they do not go
immediately they will be arrested, disarmed, and sent out.' 7
Lieutenant Colonel Steptoe, with four companies, started from Fort
Dalles 20th August for the Walla-Walla valley, and reached there
about the last of the month. Governor Stevens had preceded him.
On the 14th August the governor reports to the Secretary of War:
; 'I expressed the opinion that the indecisive and procrastinating
course pursuing and pursued in the Yakama country had brought or
nearly brought about a general combination of tribes eastward. That
combination I hoped to break up. The Walla-Walla expedition has
been completely successful. Colonel Shaw learning there was a large
force of hostiles in the Grand Rond, determined to attack them.
Moving in the night of 14th July he struck them on the 17th, and
after a running fight of 15 miles he entirely defeated them, captured
a large number of animals, destroyed nearly all of their provisions,
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and also got possession of about 100 pounds of their ammunition. The
loss of the enemy was at least 40 killed on the field of battle.
"I push forward in person to Walla-Walla to-morrow to meet the
Indians and establish relations of friendship with the tribes generally,
and especially those 13truck by Lieut. Col. Shaw."
Now, by comparing the dates of the operations of Col. Wrjght in
the Yakama country, it \vill be perceived how unjust is the reflection
made upon him by the executive of Washington Territory, for Col.
Wright's forces had advanced into and had the occupancy of that
country six weeks at least before the governor's volunteers started
for the same. With regard to the boasted strike of Col. Shaw upon
the Indians at Grand Rond, which his excellency seems to take
pleasure in reporting to the Secretary of War, let us here record what
"Howl ish Wampum," the Cayuse chief, says about it. He says:
.' 'When Col. Shaw arrived in this valley· I went to see him. Col.
Shaw said to me that he had come to make peace; that he had thrown
his arms behind him. I told him my heart was made happy. Soon
after Col. Shaw marched for the Grand Rond. The Cayuses were
encamped there-that is, the women, old men, and ehildren, with a
few of the young men. The chiefs were absent when Col. Shaw
approached. We sent Captain 'John,' a friendly Nez Perce, to
talk with the Cayuses. No persons authorized to talk were in the
Cayuse camp.
The women and children became alarmed at the
advance of the volunteers, and commenced packing up. The volunteers then charged the camp and killed several old men, women and
children.''
With regard to the credibility of this chief I have only to say, he
is the man the Oregon volunteers produced as their witness in justification of their acts in the Walla-Walla valley.
In reference to the part of his report where the governor says,
''he goes forward to the "\Valla-Walla to meet the Indians and establish relations of friendship with the tribes generally," we ~hall see
that his mission was anything but successful, and it was not his plan
of military operations after all that closed the war in that valley.
This plan was promulgated to the Secretary of War, dated May 23,
1856, in which it is said: ''I cannot too strongly urge the policy of
accumulating supplies in the Yakama country and in the Walla-Walla,
in readiness to wage a winter campaign. With proper preparation a
winter campaign can be waged and the war ended.''
A small pack train despatched by George Stevens for Wall a-Walla,
in advance of Steptoe's command, was captured by Indians, said to
have been of the tribes attacked by Shaw at the Grand Rond, in July.
1"'he governor, as superintendent of Indian affairs, wa:::; taking up a
supply of provisions and presents for the Indians, with whom he expected to hold a council about the time of the arrival of Steptoe's
command.
On the 15th September this superintendent of Indian affairs was
holding a council in the immediate neighborhood of Col. Steptoe's
camp, on mill creek. There were some four thousand present, embracing the Nez Perces, Cayuses, Walia-W alias, and the bands of
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Kamiakin, Schloom, and Ow-hi Yakamas. The Indians visited Col.
Steptoe in person, and he was quite successf1Il in restoring their confidence in the white people, which was much shaken by the recent.
conduct of the volunteers, who now had been disbanded and were en
route for Fort Dalles.
On the 18th September, Steptoe reports: ''I attended the council
yesterday, and was satisfied Governor Stevens had effected no good
by assembling the tribes. The governor admitted to me to-day he
had failed to accomplish what he had hoped, but he charged his failure·
to want of support from the regular army."
"I cannot help feeling gratified that the treaty of Walla-'Valla has.
not yet been ratified, because it is plain to me that an attempt to
execute it now would be attended by resistance at once on the part
of most of the Nez Perces, and ultimately by combined resistance
among the surrounding tribes. I must confess that, in my judgment,
it is unfortunate that Governor Stevens should have appointed this.
as the time for holding his council,·'' &c.
After the council had broken up, 19th September, the Nez Perces.
had most of them started for their homes, and the governor's party
for Fort Dalles. By the time the latter had gone three miles from
Steptoe's camp, his party was attacked, and he sent back a note to
Steptoe for aid, saying "he had 250 Indians in front." This note
was received by Steptoe at sunset, 19th. The colonel suggested to
the governor to fall back with his party to his camp, and they would
then go to the Umatilla, to which he would move his camp, and where
he could give protection. To this the governor replied in another
note: ''It is impossible for me to move back without assistance. We
have around us 300 Indians. Send your dragoons and a portion of
Fletcher's company as soon as possible, and I will go back to your
camp." This -vvas received by Steptoe at 11 o'clock that night, and
he immediately sent a force with orders ''to attack the Indians surrounding the governor's party, and bring it to camp.'' This duty
was handsomely performed by the regulars. The party was rescued
and safely brought to camp by 4 o'clock the next morning. On the
return they were assailed, but the Indiar1s were promptly driven by
the regulars without sustaining any loss. The rescuing party was.
officered by Lieuts. Davidson and "Wickliffe .
.A. block house was erected at Mill creek, and the remainder of the
command moved to the Umatilla, where grass could be obtained for
the animals, that about the creek having· been burnt by the Indians.
On the 19th October the general directed Col. Wright to proceed
in person to the Walia-Walla as soon as possible, to attend to the
establishment of the post, as before directed, in that vici11ity, and
sent Captain (Brevet Major) W yse' s company, 3d artillery, to reinforce his command. ·w hich took post at the Cascades.
''It is also of the highest importance that you, the senior officer,
(the chief mmi.,) should see and talk with all the tribes in that regio~1,
in order to ascertain their wants, feelings and disposition towards the
whites. Warned by what has occurred, the general trusts you will
he on your guard against the -whites~ and · adopt the most prompt and
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vigorous measures to crush the enemy before they have time to combine for resistance, check the war, and prevent further trouble by
:keeping the whites out of the Indian country."
On the 30th and 31st October Colonel Wright reports from the
Walla-Wall a valley as follows: "I have selected this position on Mill
creek, 6 miles above its junction with the Walla-Walla river, for the
post."
After the council of Governor Stevens (in September) the Indians
<lispersed, and it has been a work of great difficulty to communicate
with th.em. Many are so remote that it is impossible to communicate
·with them. I have, however, in my camp, about 40. I have had
:several talks with them; all very satisfactory. From appearances I
·apprehend no serious d~fficulties with any of these Indians. The
council of Governor Stevens was unfortunate; the Indians, many of
them, are hostile to him. They are opposed to the Walla-Walla
treaty of 1855, which he made with them, and will never be contented
until it is restored to them. I am fully satisfied it should not be confirmed.
''On assembling in council yesterday, I stated to them, that I wished
·to have a full and frank expression of their feelings and dispositions
towards the whites; the causes which brought on the war, &c. There
-were present the chiefs Red Wolf, Eagle from the Light, Howlish
Wampum, Tinton Metey, Stickees, two sons of Looking-Glass, besides
:several sub-chiefs and headmen of Nez Perces and Cayuse nations.''
The chiefs said, ''it was Laywer and his people who sold the country
at the Walla-Walia treaty of 1855, our hearts have been crying ever
·since, we did not wish to sell our lands. The hearts of the Indians
were bad from that time. 'The first drop of blood that was shed was
caused by that treaty."
''The speeches of all the chiefs amounted to the same as this. They
all denounced the treaty; both the Cayuses and Nez Perces were very
;severe on Lawyer and his party, whom they accuse of having been
brought over.''
. Eagle of the Light viras sent by Looking Glass, the wa:r chief of the
Nez Perces, as his representative, whose views in relation to the treaty
were the same as the other chiefs, and he attributed to it the first
shedding of blood. He said, ''he understood that Colonel Wright
came here to straighten out things, and wished to know whether the
bloody cloth was to be washed and made white, and all that is past
forgotten, or whether the war was to be continued between the whites
and red men. For his part he was for peace. He desired to see the
good talk of the white chiefs and the Indian planted in good soil and
,g row up together. He desired to live in peace and harmony 'vith the
white people."
Colonel vV right replied: ''That the bloody cloth should be washed,
·not a spot should be left upon it. That the Great Spirit had created
both the white and red men, and commanded us to 'love one another,'
that all past differences mut:lt be thrown beliind us, that the hatchet
~must be buried, and that for the future perpetual friendship must
-exist between us; that the good talk we had this day listened to should
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be planted and grow up in our hearts and drive away all bad feelings,
and preserve peace and friendship between us forever. I told them
to put what I said in their hearts, and when they returned to their
homes to repeat it to all their friends.''
Colonel vVright reported the foregoing to the general, and adds:
''I am fully satisfied with all that has been said, peace and quiet can
easy be maiJJtained. The Indians are perfectly satisfied with the
establishment of a military post here. A.ll they want is quiet and
protection. I must express my decided opposition to the treaty of
Walla-Walla, and pray it may never be confirmed. A.ll the chiefs in
this and the Yakama country whom I have seen are violently opposed
to it. Give them back those treaties and no cause of war exists.
They proclaim that unfair means were used, whether so or not they
will not be contented until these treaties are restored.''
On hearing of what had been done by Colonel WrigLt, the superin·
tendent of Indian affairs for Washington says to the Secretary of War.
"I now make the direct issue with Colonel Wright that he has made
a concession to the Indians which he had no right to make, that by S()
doing he has done nothing but to get the semblance of a peace, and
that by his acts he has in a measure ·weakened the influence of the
department having the authority to make treaties and having the
charge of the friendly Indians. He has, in my judgment, abandoned
his own duty, which was to reduce the Indians to submission, and has
trenched upon and usurped a portion of mine.''
The United States Steamer Massasuchetts, Captain Swartwout, at
the request of Lieutenant Colonel Casey, pursued a band of northern
Indians of about 117 in number, who had come down in their war
canoes, and depredated at various points. They were found November
20, encamped at Fort Gamble, and after giYing them battle they were
received on board and transported to Victoria, under a promise that
they would never return again. A.bout 27 of the Indians were killed
and all their canoes and property destroyed before they would surrender.
This descent of the northern Indians was more for the purpose of
plundering the Puget' s Sound Indians than the whites. There was
no intention on their part to war upon the whites. They had before
been drivenaway from Steilacoom by the troops there, and had been
worsted in a fight with some Indians on one of the reservations in the,
sound.
On the 18th of December, 1856, the commanding general of the,
department of the Pacific reported: ''The mail has arrived from
Oregon, bringing the gratifying intelligence from Colonel Wright and
Lieut. Colonel Casey that all is peace and quiet in the two Territories,
Oregon and Washington.
''Under present arrangements, I don't believe thnt the war can be
renewed by the whites. The posts are well arranged to preserve·
peace and to protect the inhabitants from any hostility on the part of
the Indians residing in the Territories.''
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In the preceding chapter, IX, it has been said that while the troops
were actively engaged in suppressing hostilities in the. northern
portions of the department an Indian war was threatened in certain
portions of California.
The causes which led to this state of things, and the measures taken
to meet the exigency, will be briefly narrated in the present chapter.
On the Colorado river, a bitter feud existed between the people of
two tribes which was constantly likely to break out into overt acts.
Brevet Lieut. Colonel Nauman, 3d artillery, was dispatched to Fort
Yuma in January, 1856, for the purpose of inquiring into the troubles
there apprehended. His mission was productive of good results; he
satisfied himself that there was no combination between these tribes
and those further north. The report of Lieutenant Colonel Nauman
gives some practical suggestions of importance in reference to the
appointment of an Indian agent to reside permanently at Fort Yuma,
for the purpose of controlling these Indians.
In the month of January, 1856, Captain Burton, 3d artillery, commanding at San Diego, was instructed to visit the tribes in the
neighborhood with a command from his post, with a vie'v of restoring
quiet among them, and ascertaining the causes of the difficulties,
(map 7.)
'rhis expedition resulted favorably, and it appeared that the encroachment of the whites upon the lands set apart by treaty for the
Indians, the neglect of the Indian agents to supply them with the
articles stipulated in the treaty, and the stealing of the cattle of the
whites, by some of the Indians, were the principal sources of the
apprehended outbreaks. Captain Burton became satisfied that the
principal chief of the Carvilla Indians had endeavored to form a combination with the Mohaves and Yumas, for the purpose of attacking
the white settlements in this neighborhood, during the preceding
autumn, but failed; and the captain attributed the failure to the
prompt movement of the troops in the preceding November.
The Carvilla Indians occupy the country from San Gorgonia Pass
to the Arroyo Blanco, (map 6.) Captain Burton proceeded to that
district in April, 1856, and ascertained that the whites were in the
habit of encroaching on the grounds set apart for these people; and
that this, and the thefts of those Indians who were without food,. were
the causes of the apprehended outbreaks; and he obtained evidence
of two leading Mormons of San Bernardino having, in the autumn of
1855, sent the following message to these Indians: ''The Mormons
and Indians are friends; the Americans are the enemies of the
Mormons and Indians, and had hitherto driven both from the great
waters of the east.''
·
It is also in evidence that Nathan C. Kinney, bishop of the Mormon
church in San Bernardino, in the month of May, 1856, visited these
Indians and called them together and admonished them as follows:
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''The .Americans are a bad people, were not Christians, and were
the enemies of the Mormons, and not to be relied on or believed in
no,vise, for the Americans are fools and devils; and that the .Mormons
were the rulers of the country and not the Americans, and that he
(Bishop Kinney) proposed to gather the Indians into the Mormon
settlement of San Bernardino, and there to maintain them; and that
the Mormons were not Americans, but a different people; and that
he came to baptize the Indians into the Mormon church.''
There is other evidence to show that this same bishop instructed
the Indians to kill the whites who were not Mormons, and that. he
would reward them with the cattle and horsBs of the whites.
To the judicious action of Captain Burton, under the orders he
received from the general commanding the department, we are in a
great measure indebted for the peace we were afterwards permitted
to enjoy in that quarter.
Reports had been brought to the commanding general of the
department that the United States land surveying parties in the
Mohave river district (map 6) had been attacked and several killed
by the Indians, and he was called upon to send a military force there
to protect the surveying parties.
On the 8th April, 1856, instructions were issued to the commanding officer at Fort Tejon to send a company of dragoons from that
post into the Mohave river country; but when it was on the point
of starting a threatened outbreak, reported by the Indian agent of
the Tejon (St. Sebastian) reservation, (map 5,) made it expedient to
postpone the expedition and send the troops to the reservation. In
the mean time it was ascertained that the United States land surveyors
who had been at work in the Mohave country were safe and the
Indians there were quiet.
On the 1st May, 1856, the commanding officer at Fort Miller reported that in the Tulare valley, in the latter part of April, ''some
Indians bad killed a co\v belonging to a white man; some of the
citizens (about two-thirds) wished to demand the aggressors of the
chiefs, but the minority portion insisted upon punishing all the
Indians collectively, and for this purpose had organized themselves
and gone in pursuit, but returned soon after with the report that
500 warriors had made a stand. The next day these ,~·bites attacked
a friendly party of Indians, who had remained neutral, and killed
six, wounded several, and the others dispersed. Another party of
friendly Indians shared a similar fate. From these facts, that officer
says: "The number of hostile Indians, therefore, encamped at the
head of the Tulare val]ey (map 5) may not be overrated.''
It is due to the citizens to say that the "war party of whites" was
only about one-third of the whole population; but the "war party"
called upon the governor for aid, and he called on the commanding
officer of the department. In the mean time a detaehment of regulars
from .F ort Mirier, under Lieutenant Livingston, 3d art.i1lery, and one
from Fort Tejon, under Lieutenant Alston, 1st dragoons, had been
sent into the field of those disturbances.
1'he general caused the following reply to be sent to the governor:
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''Detachments from both Fort Miller and Fort Tejon are now in the
field, and no doubt would be able to preserve peace, were it not from·
the determination of a few designing white men, as it would appear,
to wage a war of extermination against the Indians. ''No additional
force of regulars can be sent to the Tulare at this time, nearly all
being now in the field a~ainst hostile Indians in Oregon and Washington, and in the northern part of California. * * * We have yet to
learn that the Indians have struck a blow against the whites in the
Tulare except in self defence; and the general is of the opinion that
the regular force in the southeastern part of the State is sufficient to
protect the settlers from Indian aggressions, provided the frequent
murders and aggression.s on the part of the whites against the
Indians are checked before the latter are driven to combine in a
general war against the former.''
The war party, however, obtained arms, and organized themselves
into companies of volunteers, and in two engagements were repulsed
by the Indians, who had fortified themselves in a strong position.
On the l~th May, 1856, Lieutenant Livingston, having been
furnished with a howitzer, went with 20 regulars and about 30 volunteers to reconnoitre the position, and while so doing the lieutenant
became satisfied that an immediate attack would prove successful.
He accordingly turned their position, attacked them in flank, and
drove them before him, killing many and destroying their camp and
provisions. This was near the '' Four Creeks.'' After this th_e
Indians fled and dispersed in the recesses of the Sierra Nevada mountains. The volunteers, the "war party" of the whites, soon became
tired and returned to their homes.
The activity of the regular8 under Lieutenants Livingston and
Alston, put the inhabitants of the Tulare valley out of any further
danger.
The governor of California, much to his credit, in furnishing these
volunteers with the arms sent him by General Wool for their own
defence, directed them to incur no expense except for the transportation of the arms, and explicitly · prohibited them from proceeding .
against the Indians, but to come to terms as soon as possible.

XI.-Superintendents qf Indian a~ffairs; Indian sub-agents; military commanders qf posts in Iadian countn'es; Indian reservations.
The commanders of military posts in the Indian countries have
been stripped of all functions pertaining to Indian agencies, to the
end of assigning these to civilians, whose chief aim in accepting
them can only be to make profit of the appointmfints; in many cases,
it is feared, Tegardless of justice to the Indian or to the government.
To s-u ch Indian sub-agencies the troops have been humbled to the
condition, too often, of ''hewers of wood and drawers of water,'' or
of acting only as a police ''posse.''
It is a glaring fact that army detachments on the frontiers are fre-
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quently called upon to quell Indian hostilities either originated by
designing agents themselves, or caused through ignorance, indiffer:.
ence, or complicity, to be fomented by bad citizens into actual war.
So long as the present policy obtains of dividing the administration
of the practical operations, in reference to the tribes, between a
Commissioner of Indian Affairs and a Secretary of War, without subjecting the former to the authority of the latter, just so long will
inefficiency pervade the system.
The present practice of separating all control over the sub-agents
from the commanding officers of posts: and lodging it in the hands of
superintendents of Indian affairs, who are under the direction of a
civil bureau, inefficient in the matter, because of its want of military
organization and military authority, can never be otherwise than injurious, on the whole, to the Indian service.
As good may come of evil, so, undoubtedly, there are a few cases
under the present rule that may work well. But these cases are the
exceptions to the rule.
Under the existing policy there is seldom any cordial co-operation
between the agents of the War Department and those of the Department of the Interior upon Indian· matters when in the act of executing orders in the field. The Indian bureau should never have been
severed from the War Department, and the sooner it is restored by
act of Congress to its former and most natural parent the better will
it be for those truly interested in the rightful ends of government.
Colonel Wright, 9th infantry, while in the Walla- vValla country
reported his views upon this subject, which accord so entirely with
my own observations that I here quote them :
''During a long service I have· had much to do with Indians, and
the opinion which I have ever entertained has been that their
entire management should be in the hands of tbe War Department.
The interest of the Indians, alike with that of the government, demands it. The Indian department cannot control the Indians without
the aid of the military. The Indians will be much better satisfied.
They will not be embarrassed by conflicting counsels. They will
know what to rely upon. If we expect the Indians to put.faith in
us we must have a unity and singleness of purpose. This can only
be accomplished under the jurisdiction of one white chief."
Indian wars on our frontiers will never cease to be brought on by
bad white people until commanding officers of posts are clothed with
authority to arrest and bring to trial white depredators in the Indian
countries, and on the Indian reserves, before proper tribunals.
Practically, under the existing system, if a white man murder an
Indian the murderer is entitled to trial by jury before being hung,
and all his family are not necessarily included in his doom. But if
an Indian commit the venial offence of stealing a white man's pig, to
keep himself from starving, the case is quite different; "it is your
bull that has gored my ox;" and forthwith a war of extermination
is declared and vigorously prosecuted against the whole band to
which the Indian belongs, and wo be unto the popularity of a com-
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manding officer who should presume to raise his voice against the indiscriminate slaughter.
The provisions of the existing laws of Congress (''Act to regulate
trade and intercourse with Indian tribes, &c., passed 23d Congress,
1st session, approved June 30, 1834, and its amendatory act, 29th
Congress, 2d session, approved :March 3, 184 7, '') are severe enough.
But are they executed? No. This is a dead letter in practice, inoperative in the hands of civil agents, and it is over-ridden by an act
of the Oregon legislature! The statute of this Territory sets at
nought and declares the statute of Congress a nullity in reference to
this intercourse. And while an officer is compelled to execute a law
of Congress he makes himself amenable to the law of Oregon. And
here we have the reason why the hostile Indians are found so well
armed and appointed for war. The in moving whites sell their rifles,
revolvers, and ammunition to the Indians, because they get large
prices; and the traffic is unrestrained, because said law of Congress is
null, in virtue of the Oregon law, which is such as to remove all
chance of proof against the culprit. At the battle of Big Meadows,
on Rogue river, the Indians were armed with the best of Sharp's
rifles and Colt's revolvers, sold to them by the whites; and it was on
account of the inferiority of the arms, which his men had to use by
an absurd regulation, that Captain Smith came so near losing that
battle.
The system of colonizing the Indians within the limits of a State or
Territory upon reservations is, perhaps, under all circumstances,
the most humane, economical, and practicable that can be adopted.
But to render this effective two things are essentially necessary, but
which are too often neglected by the Indian department :
1. It is essential to survey the reservation and mark it out on the
ground by metes and bounds so that the Indian and the white may
know its exact limits. It is too commonly the case that the reservation is but a mere paper reservation; no survey having been made,
no bounds or monuments set to mark its existence, or to show where
jurisdiction begins or ends.
2. There should be a competent military force stationed on the reservation. It has become quite too much the practice to leave these
reservations unguarded by any military force, and to wait until difficulties occur between the Indians on them and the encroaching
whites, and then, after the troubles begin, to send for the military to
suppress the outbreak, whereas the practice should be to have a sufficient force at all times immediately on the spot to prevent encroachments and to enforce obedience.
All of which, general, is most respectfully submitted by your very
obedient servant,
THO. JEFFERSON CRAM,
Captain U.S. T. E.
Major General JOHN E. WOOL,
United States Army.

124

TOPOGRAPHICAL MEMOIR OF THE

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE EAST,

Troy, N. Y., January 2, 1858.
Sm: Herewith I have the honor to transmit, through the headquarters of the army, a very able, interesting, and truthful memoir and
report, with maps, by Captain T. J. Cram, of the Topographical Engineers, of the topography and military operations of the department
<>f the Pacific whilst under my command in 1854, 1855, 1856, and
1857.
In presenting the memoir and report I would respectfully call
attention to the following subjects, viz:
First. Chapters one and two, which contain a general description
of the department of the Pacific, including the ocean front.
Second. Chapter three, pages 36 to 43, refers to an arsenal of construction and depot for quartermaster and commissary supplies at
Benicia, California. The suggestions of Captain Cram I think ought
to be adopted.
Third. Chapters four and five refer to roads, rou.tes, and distances.
The route from New York and New Orleans, via Panama, San Fran~isco, and Sacramento, to Utah, or Salt Lake City, may be considered
of sufficient importance to claim special notice. I would simply add
that a military expedition from Sacramento, on account of snow in the
mountain passes, would be impracticable iu the winter season.-(See
pages 97 to 113.)
Fourth. Chapter six is interesting, having reference to the wars
between the whites and Indians in Oregon, by a perusal of which it
will be seen that the whites have generally been the aggressors. In
the same chapter will be discovered the diabolical character of Ben
Wright, Indian sub-agent, who has been represented in Congress as
the friend of the Indians.-(See pages 141 to 155.)
Fifth. The Indian war in Rogue River valley in 1855 and 1856.(See pages 156 to 190, in which will be discovered the immediate
causes of the war, its results, and the gallant and efficient mann~r by
which the war was brought to a close by the regular troops, under
the command of Lieutenant Colonel Buchanan.)
Sixth. Pages 197 to 228 give an accurate description of the country, its roads, rivers, and distances, embraced in western, northern,
and eastern Oregon.
Seventh. In chapter seven, pages 229 to 281, will be found an interesting description of Washington Territory, and particularly of
Puget' s Sound. The military posts, roads, and improvements recommended for this Territory I deem no less necessary to secure the
peace of the country than for the defence and protection of the inhabitants. A steamer of the speed of at least ten to twelve miles
the hour is required in Puget' s Sound for the protection of the whites
and Indians against the marauding Indians of the English and Russian possessions.
Eighth. Chapter eight relates to Indian treaties. In pages 252 to
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315 will be discovered the causes of the war and its continuance in
Washington Territory. The truthful history of Governor Stevens'
efforts to form treaties with the Indian tribes in his Territory, which
were not at the time called for, I would recommend as worthy of theperusal of the Secretary of War.
Ninth. Chapter nine, pages 316 to 433, furnishes an interesting
history of the several expeditions against the Yakamas, of the war in
Puget' s Sound, and of Governor Curry's most wanton, illegal, and
uncalled for expedition against the Walia-vVallas, and the similar
expedition of Colonel Shaw against the Cayuses. The expedition
against the vValla-'\Valla Indians was an effort on the part of Governor Curry to bring on a war that would be of long continuance, in
the expectation of a large drain from the treasury of the United
States. Although the war did not continue as long as the governor
anticipated, he, no doubt, will present an account that will, if approved by Congress, take from the treasury of the United States
several millions of dollars. Congress, however, may hesitate to appropriate to the full amount claimed, from the fact that the expenses
incurred were paid in territorial scrip, much of which has been sold
for less than twenty-five cents on the dollar.
On a careful examination of the condnct of Governor Curry and
others in carrying on the war it will be, I think, discovered that it
was not so much to protect and defend the inhabitants from Indian
barbarities as it was to promote ambitious and speculating schemes.
One thing is certain, that powers greater than belong to the President were exerted to carry 011 the war, by fitting out expeditions
against the Walia- W alias and the Cayuses, which were wholly unnecessary and under no circumstances called for; the expenses of which,
no doubt, will swell the claim against the United States one or two
millions, perhaps more. If Congress should foot the bill, which, it
is said, will amount to more than six millions, I would not be surprised if the next territorial Indian war should cost ten or twelve
millions. I do not know how this question of governors of Territories making war on their own account, and beyond their own jurisdiction, will be considered. If countenanced by the government, I
would not be surprised if the example should, when least expected,
and that time may have already arrived, lead to embarrassing results,
at least in regard to the finances of the government. It appears to
me that governors of Territories should not he permitted to make
war on their own account and beyond their own jurisdiction.
Tenth. Chapter eleven, page 445, relates to superin-te-~nts of
Indian affairs, which is especially recommended to the attenti,~:m of
the Secretary of vVar. The affairs of the Indian department as hitherto conducted in the department of the Pacific have been of very
slight if any, advantage to the Indians; whilst for their benefit large
amounts have been drawn from the treasury of the United States.
The superintendency of the Indians should, beyond all question, be
under the control of the vVar Department.
Having thus called attention to some of the most important sub~
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jects contained in Captain Cram's memoir and report, I would add
· that it is due to him to say that he has on all occasions whilst under
my command exhibited talents, zeal, ability, and efficiency worthy of
the highest commendation.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN E. WOOL,
MaJor General.
Ron. JOHN B. FLOYD,
Secretary of War.

